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THE COMMON-LAW CONCEPTION OF
LEASING: MITIGATION, HABITABILITY,
AND DEPENDENCE OF
COVENANTS
JOHN A. HUMBACH*
I. INTRODUCTION
Property law may be the most eternal of secular law. Its basic
precepts and conceptions are largely stable and long settled.' An aspect
of property law undergoing notable change, however, is the law of
landlord and tenant.'
The most important recent change in landlord-tenant law involves
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Pace University. B.A., 1963, Miami University
(Ohio); J.D., 1966, Ohio State University.
1. In part, this stability results from a deliberate policy choice to preserve the character of
titles and long-term expectations.
Where questions arise which affect titles to land it is of great importance to the public
that when they are once decided they should no longer be considered open. Such deci-
sions become rules of property, and many titles may be injuriously affected by their
change .... Doubtful questions on subjects of this nature, when once decided, should
be considered no longer doubtful or subject to change.
Minnesota Mining Co. v. National Mining Co., 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 332, 334 (1865). "Uniformity
and certainty in rules of property are often more important and desirable than technical correct-
ness." Rock Spring Distilling Co. v. Gaines & Co., 246 U.S. 312, 320 (1918) (quoting Layton Pure
Food Co. v. Church & Dwight Co., 182 F. 35, 39 (1910)). See Heyert v. Orange & Rockland
Utils., Inc., 17 N.Y.2d 352, 359-63 (1966). For an application of these ideas in the leasehold
context, see Gruman v. Investors Diversified Servs., Inc., 247 Minn. 502, 509-10, 78 N.W.2d 377,
381-82 (1956).
2. No doubt this activity partly accounts for the considerable, perhaps even disproportion-
ate emphasis which is given to landlord-tenant law in first-year property courses. A survey of
first-year property teachers revealed that 80% of those responding spend eight or more hours, and
30% spend 15 or more hours, on the law of the relation between landlord and tenant, making it,
1213
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the reversal of responsibility for the quality of leased premises. In
place of the tenant's traditional burden of caveat emptor3 and duty of
repair,4 many courts now recognize an implied warranty of habitabil-
ity,5 at least for residential tenancies. 6 These same courts typically re-
ject the traditional doctrine that mutual obligations in leases are
"independent," that is, that the tenant's obligations are enforceable by
a landlord even when the landlord is in breach. Rather, the landlord's
right to rent is made to depend on the landlord's meeting the newly
recognized obligations to supply habitable premises.
7
Even the tenant who wrongfully repudiates a lease is receiving new
protections. Increasingly, courts are requiring landlords to mitigate
their damages after a tenant abandons, rather than allowing them to do
nothing and collect the full rent.8
The traditional rules governing the landlord-tenant relation gener-
ally have been thought to rest on the idea that leases are essentially
conveyance transactions,9 that is, when a lease is made, an "estate" in
land is conveyed by the landlord to the tenant.' 0 Changes in the land-
lord and tenant obligations such as those described above seem to go to
the root of this conveyance conception of leases. The question there-
fore arises whether the whole conception of the landlord-tenant rela-
tion, at least for residential tenancies, is in need of wholesale revision.
It is indeed the new vogue to call the conveyance idea "antiquated"
after the estate system, the second most heavily covered area in first-year property courses. See
Humbach, ;Mat is Taught in the First Year Property Course?, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 459, 466 (1978).
3. E.g., Civale v. Meriden Hous. Auth., 150 Conn. 594, 192 A.2d 548 (1963); Smithfield
Improvement Co. v. Coley-Bardin, 156 N.C. 255, 72 S.E. 312 (1911); Hart v. Windsor, 12 M. & W.
84, 152 Eng. Rep. 14 (1843); 2 M. FRIEDMAN, LEAsES 392-93 (1974); 2 R. POWELL, REAL PROP-
aRTY § 233 (1977). See infra notes 225-29 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 266.
5. See generally Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 646 (1971); infra text accompanying notes 238-61.
6. Even the innovative Second Restatement of Property did not enlarge the landlord's du-
ties to maintain the condition of the premises for commercial tenancies to include those duties that
it had prescribed for residential tenancies. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 5.1 com-
ment b, reporter's note 2. The present state of judicial and statutory development does not war-
rant such extension. Id
7. See supra note 5.
8. See generally Annot. 21 A.L.R.3d 534 (1968); infra text accompanying notes 110-218.
9. See Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974);
infra note 270. See also Smithfield Improvement Co. v. Coley-Bardin, 156 N.C. 255, 72 S.E. 312
(1911); 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 213-17 (5th ed. 1942); 2 R. POWELL,
REAL PROPERTY 221[1] (1980); infra notes 15 & 115-18 and text accompanying notes 47-56.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 47-56, 115, 131-61, 226-27 & 270-77.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss4/2
CONCEPTION OF LEASING
and to pretend to treat leases like other contracts, " substituting an es-
sentially contract conception of leasing for the traditional conveyance
conception. In fact, however, courts do not treat leases like ordinary
contracts, even in those ground-breaking cases in which they purport to
do so. 12 Moreover, on careful analysis, ordinary contract law appears
even less conducive to the reformists' desired substantive changes than
the traditional conceptions.' 3  To be sure, contract principles such as
the rule of mitigation of damages, and the usual dependency of mutual
promises, have been plucked out of context and set up as models for
lease law to emulate. 4 The recent importation of half-truth versions of
contract principles into landlord-tenant law does not, however, treat
leases as ordinary contracts, nor is it very good jurisprudence.
It is thus a matter for debate whether the law of leases is due for a
conceptual revolution, rejecting the old "conveyance" theory and ap-
plying ordinary "contract" law to leasing transactions. Nevertheless, a
11. Eg., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
925 (1970); Dushoffv. Phoenix Co., 22 Ariz. App. 445, 528 P.2d 637 (1974); Lemle v. Breeden, 51
Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Sommer v. Kridel, 77 N.J. 446, 378 A.2d 767 (1977); Park West
Management Corp. v. Mitchell, 47 N.Y.2d 316,418 N.Y.S.2d 310,391 N.E.2d 1288 (1979); Lefrak
v. Lambert, 89 Misc. 2d 197, 390 N.Y.S.2d 959 (N.Y. City Civ. 1976). See infra text accompany-
ing notes 201-11 & 264.
A number of commentators have likewise viewed the conveyance conception of leasing as an
obstacle to reform, suggesting that a contractual treatment is a preferable modem substitute. E.g.,
McCormick, The Rights of the Landlord Upon Abandonment of the Premises by the Tenant, 23
MICH. L. REv. 211 (1925); Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A CriticalEvaluation of
the Past With Guidelinesfor the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 225 (1969); Schoshinski, Remedies of
the Indigent Tenant: Proposalfor Change, 54 GEO. LJ. 519 (1966); Note, Contract Princilles and
Leases of Realty, 50 B.U.L. Rev. 24 (1970); The California Lease--Contract or Conveyance, 4
STAN. L. Rev. 244 (1952).
One commentator argued that leases have always been treated as contracts. Siegel, Is the Mod-
em Lease a Contract or a Conveyance? A Historical Inquiry, 52 J. URB. L. 649 (1975). The fact
that parallelisms are found in the treatment of the two types of exchange transactions does not,
however, mean that the two are mutatis mutandis the same. Leases have received distinctive treat-
ment, and the distinctions are intimately bound to the conception of leases as conveyances, in
contrast to purely contractual arrangements for occupancy. Professor Siegel implicitly recognizes
that leases are conveyances by analogizing leases to contracts for the sale of goods. Siegel, supra,
at 657-59, 670-72, 673-74. Such analogies, however, miss the point of the argument that leases
should be treated as contracts: the point is that leases should be treated as contracts instead of as
conveyances, not as contracts of conveyance. There are, however, some often overlooked parallels
between lease law and ordinary contract law. See infra notes 269-95 and accompanying text.
Nevertheless, these parallels are not quite as Professor Siegel imagines them. See infra notes 273
& 287.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 204-11 & 269-95.
13. Id
14. See infra cases cited at notes 116 & 238.
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suitable conceptual account for certain socially required changes in the
law of leases clearly seems wanting. A primary objective of the discus-
sion that follows is to attempt to provide such an account along tradi-
tional lines. The approach will be to reexamine the core of landlord-
tenant law-the basic framework-as it has come to us from the medi-
eval mists of the common law."5 It is this framework, and its implica-
tions-indeed, its mandate-for change that will be the focus at this
Article.
The common-law conception of the landlord-tenant relation will be
portrayed as a natural result of an interplay between basic law of prop-
erty and of contract. This conception will be described by the rules and
results which it implies and by the theories that underlie these rules.
16
This will not be a historical account, though history must be men-
tioned. Neither will it be a complete account.' 7 A flood of specific ap-
plications would more likely obscure than elucidate the underlying
conception which those applications imply and from which they can be
seen to flow. Rather, the object here is to describe the basic conception
itself.
The hypothesis is that landlord-tenant law is in large part logically
coherent' 8 and that most of the specific applications of landlord-tenant
15. The extension by 1499 of the writ of ejectionefirmae (ejectment) to allow a leasehold
tenant to recover actual possession may be seen as the point at which the modem concept of leases
as property was crystallized. See 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 9, at 213-17; F. MAITLAND,
FORmS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 46-47 (1971). For an early case expounding the common-
law dual conception of leases, see Walker's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 22a, 76 Eng. Rep. 676 (1587).
16. The common-law conception of leasing, as portrayed in this Article, is by no means the
sole conception ever held or expounded by the common-law courts in deciding landlord-tenant
controversies. One may easily find cases which are irreconcilable with the conception or which,
though compatible in outcome, depart from its details in their reasoning. Nevertheless, the con-
ception portrayed has been the dominant common-law conception of leasing over the last 400
years, and suitably explains the outcomes of most lease cases, even those which courts rationalized
on somewhat different bases. See infra notes 172-78 and accompanying text. The fact that the
conception can explain those cases which ostensibly proceed on different rationales only shows the
validity and vitality of the conception as a fitting embodiment of the basic and intuitive policies
and purposes underlying the law of landlord and tenant. Irreconcilable cases merely evidence
further the resource and risk of the casuistic method of the common law.
17. For excellent detailed discussions of landlord-tenant law, see 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROP-
ERTY (A. Casner ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as A.L.P.]; M. FRIEDMAN, Supra note 3; 2 R. POWELL,
supra note 3; R. SCHOSHINSK, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT (1980); 3 & 3A G.
THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY (1980).
18. In a frequently quoted phrase, Justice Holmes observed that: "the law as to leases is not a
matter of logic in vacuo; it is a matter of history that has not forgotten Lord Coke." Gardiner v.
William S. Butler Co., 245 U.S. 603, 605 (1918). We are indeed indebted to Lord Coke, and
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss4/2
Number 4] CONCEPTION OF LEASING 1217
law follow from a basic conceptual framework. Thus, understanding
the framework should allow lawyers to develop sound "instincts" about
interstitial rules with which they may be unfamiliar. Furthermore,
those aspects of landlord-tenant law most in need of reform can be seen
as inconsistent with its fundamental conceptions. "Instincts" about
these aspects may likewise develop; a visceral sense of injustice need
not be the lone claim for reform. Change can be seen to promote, not
derogate, the logical coherence of the law.19
II. THE DUAL RELATION
The fundamentally unique characteristic of the legal relation of
landlord-tenant is that it consists of two intertwined legal relationships
or "privities." The first of these legal relationships, based on contract,
is called privity of contract; the other, called privity of estate, is based
on ownership.20
The relationship, or privity, of contract is perhaps better understood
because of its analogies in other areas of law. Landlord and tenant are
in privity of contract because2' they exchange promises between them-
selves that create bundles of entitlements and detriments, or rights and
certainly not for logic in vacuo, but for an articulation of a coherent basic conception of landlord-
tenant law. See Walker's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 22a, 76 Eng. Rep. 676 (1587).
19. Perhaps no apology is necessary for the implicit faith and homage which this Article as a
whole accords to a "doctrinal" or "formalistie" approach to judicial decisionmaking. After all, it
is the courts' appeals to conception, the making of conscious choices between conveyance or con-
tract theories of leasing, which are the basis of the discussion. On this basis alone, doctrinal legal
reasoning is inevitably germane to a discussion of what courts really do, irrespective of what ought
to be the relevance of such reasoning. More importantly, doctrinal reasoning may contribute to
consistency of results and, therefore, equality of treatment under the law, a point argued infra at
text following note 325.
20. See, e.g., Samuels v. Ottinger, 169 Cal. 209,211, 146 P. 638, 639 (1915); Arthur Treacher's
Fish & Chips v. Chillum Terrace, Ltd., 272 Md. 720, 728-29, 327 A.2d 282, 287 (1974); Kanawha-
Gauley Coal & Coke Co. v. Sharp, 73 W. Va. 427, 80 S.E. 781 (1914); Walker's Case, 3 Co. Rep.
22a, 76 Eng. Rep. 676 (1587).
21. Rather than "because," it would be more accurate to say "if," for it is not necessary to the
existence of a landlord-tenant relation that any contract promises be made between the parties.
National Bank of Commerce v. Dunn, 194 Wash. 472, 78 P.2d 535 (1938). See also Klinger v.
Peterson, 486 P.2d 373 (Alaska 1971); Consumer's Ice Co. v. Bixler, 84 Md. 437, 35 A. 1086 (1896).
See generally R. MEGARRY & H. WADE, REAL PROPERTY 623 (3d ed. 1966); 1 A.L.P., supra note
17, at § 3.2. If no promises are either expressly or impliedly made, then there is no contractual
relationship or privity of contract, and hence no dual relation as such. See Ellingson v. Walsh, 15
Cal. 2d 673, 674-75, 104 P.2d 507, 509 (1940). There is only privity of estate. Because an ex-
change of contractual promises is, at least by implication, almost invariably involved in the crea-
tion of a landlord-tenant relationship, the parties are in privity of contract with one another.
Their relation, therefore, is necessarily a dual one. See Samuels v. Ottinger, 169 Cal. 209, 146 P.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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duties,22 which are enforceable on a theory of contract. If the landlord-
tenant relationship involved only this, it could truly be said that a lease
is merely a contract, enforceable purely as such. But landlord and ten-
ant are not only seen by the law to be in privity of contract; they are
also conceived to be in "privity of estate."
Privity of estate, that is, the parties' legal relationship based on own-
ership, exists between landlord and tenant because a lease is viewed as
a "conveyance"-the landlord conveys and the tenant receives an own-
ership interest, albeit a temporary ownership interest, in the premises.23
The conveyance causes the landlord and tenant to become co-owners,
and their legal relationship as co-owners provides a distinct and in-
dependent basis, a "conveyance-theory" or property basis, for enforc-
ing many of the performances required between them. Thus, privity of
estate is the other part of the dual relationship between landlord and
tenant.
Unlike the rights and duties that make up the contractual relation-
ship, arising out of the parties' privity of contract, the rights and duties
arising out of privity of estate are more in the nature of tort. That is to
say, they are law-imposed rights and duties, attaching to persons hav-
ing the legal status of landlord and tenant. Unlike contractual rights
and duties, which are essentially voluntarily or consensually created
638 (1915); Consumer's Ice Co. v. Bixler, 84 Md. 437, 35 A. 1086 (1896); National Bank of Com-
merce v. Dunn, 194 Wash. 472, 78 P.2d 535 (1938).
The promise implied-in-fact referred to above means a genuinely "intended" promise. See in-
fra note 230. It is thus distinguishable from the constructive "real covenant" to pay reserved rent
or covenant "in law" which is sometimes referred to in the older cases. E.g., Paradine v. Jane,
Aleyn 26, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (1647); Walker's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 22a, 76 Eng. Rep. 676 (1587). See
also Kanawha-Gauley Coal & Coke Co. v. Sharp, 73 W. Va. 437, 80 S.E. 781 (1914). See gener-
ally 1 H. TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT 960-64, 1030-34 (1912). In Arthur Treacher's Fish &
Chips v. Chillum Terace Ltd., 272 Md. 720, 327 A.2d 282 (1974), the court observed:
Therefore, the obligations which the parties bear to each other may arise out of contract
or from the real covenants of the leasehold estate, or sometimes from both. Generally,
enforcement of the real covenants is independent of the contract obligations in the in-
strument; the former obligations arise out of and inhere in the estate itself.
Id at 727-28, 327 A.2d at 286.
22. The entitlements and detriments comprising these bundles may consist of contractual
"rights" and "duties" in the Hohfeldian sense as well as Hohfeldian privileges, powers, immuni-
ties, and their respective opposites. See Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions asr Applied
in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913), reprinted in W. HOtFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL
CONCEPTIONS As APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 23 (Cook ed.
1923). For the sake of simplicity and to avoid introducing unnecessary terminological distinc-
tions, the entire packages of entitlements and detriments will be referred to as "rights and duties."
23. See infra text accompanying notes 47-56.
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and assumed, the specific rights and duties of privity of estate arise and
are enforced whether or not they are voluntarily created or assumed.24
Among the most important rights and duties arising out of privity of
estate are (1) the landlord's obligation to allow peaceful possession to
the tenant and the tenant's corresponding right to peaceful posses-
sion,25 and (2) the landlord's right to receive the rent and the tenant's
corresponding duty to pay it.26 Although this possession-for-rent ex-
change is basic to the usual landlord-tenant relation, there are also
other aspects of privity of estate, including the duty of the tenant to
refrain from waste2" and the landlord's traditional immunity from re-
sponsibility to the tenant for the acts of strangers.28 The theoretical
explanation for these privity of estate rights and duties are discussed
below, but for the present, it is enough to observe that they may exist
and be enforced solely as a consequence of the supposed "conveyance"
from landlord to tenant, and entirely apart from any contract-based
rights and duties that the parties may or may not have.29
24. Contractual rights and duties are not always the result of conscious volition, and are
often law-imposed by the operation of such doctrines as objective mutual assent, the parol evi-
dence rule and the whole of interpretive presumptions. Cf. Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200
F. 287, 293 (D.C.N.Y. 1911) ("A contract is an obligation attached by mere force of law to certain
acts, usually words, which ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent"), aftd, 201 F. 664
(2d Cir. 1912), qft'd, 231 U.S. 50 (1913); 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRAcrs § 95 (3d ed. 1957) ("It is
even conceivable that a contract may be formed which is in accordance with the intention of
neither party").
Likewise, the rights and duties incident to privity of estate are voluntarily created and assumed
to the extent that the parties voluntarily assume the status of landlord and tenant. Furthermore,
the specifics of the privity of estate relation can be altered by contract and thus exist only to the
extent that the parties do not agree to the contrary, see infra note 222. Nonetheless, it appears
both historically accurate and analytically useful to assign the privity-of-estate rights and duties to
the category of tort instead of contract. As a matter of history, the enforcement of such rights and
duties was by means of actions which would now be thought of as tort actions: trespass and its
offspring, ejectment, and the recuperatory action of debt. See F. MAITLAND, supra note 15, at 45,
51; infra note 32 & text accompanying notes 54-71 & 86-89.
In any event, a distinction generally is made between rights and duties created by manifested
consent and, on the other hand, rights and duties imposed by law irrespective of consent. The
package of rights and duties that accompany privity of estate seem to fall into the latter category.
See Ames, The History ofAssumpsit, 2 HARV. L. Rav. 1, 5 (1888) (emphasizing this distinction in
relation to the duties imposed in the analogous relationship of bailment).
25. See infra text accompanying notes 54-56 & 86-89.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 57-71.
27. See infra notes 51 & 227. See also infra text accompanying notes 80-81.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 90-101.
29. Eg., Klinger v. Peterson, 486 P.2d 373, 378 (Alaska 1971); Ellingson v. Walsh, 15 Cal. 2d
673, 675-76, 104 P.2d 507, 509 (1940); Arthur Treacher's Fish & Chips v. Chillum Terrace, Ltd.
272 Md. 720, 727-29, 327 A.2d 282, 286 (1974); National Bank of Commerce v. Dunn, 194 Wash.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Because landlords and tenants are almost always in both privity of
contract and privity of estate, there is a dual relationship-a dual set of
rights and duties-existing between them. One might ask why all this
is necessary. The rights and duties between landlord and tenant that
arise out of privity of estate appear as though they could easily be
founded and enforced on a purely contractual basis.30 Indeed, they
could be contractually founded and enforced, at least so long as third
parties are not involved.31 One of the reasons for the duality of the
landlord-tenant relationship is that third parties do get involved.32 As
472, 481, 78 P.2d 535, 539-40 (1938); Walker's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 22a, 23a, 76 Eng. Rep. 676, 680
(1587); 1 H. TIFFANY, SUpra note 21, at § 171. The nature of the rent obligation is discussed inra
at text accompanying notes 57-71.
30. "As an original question, a lease might well have been regarded as a wholly bilateral
agreement by which the lessor, instead of making a conveyance, promises a continuing permission
to occupy the premises." 6 S. WILLISTON, supra note 24, at § 890.
In fact, "the lease started as a matter of contract, and it grew into a counterfeit proprietary
interest because the contractual protection was insufficient." S. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDA-
TIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 101, 127-29 (1969). Origins are not, of course, an infallible key to
modem classification: the antecedents of modem estate in fee simple were arrangements that
likewise had an essentially contractual rather than proprietary nature. Id at 93.
31. The contractual theory for protecting the tenant's right to possession is perhaps less obvi-
ous than the contractual theory upon which the rent obligation may be enforced. The common-
law approach to protecting possession contractually has been to hold that a lease contains, absent
provision to the contrary, an "implied covenant of quiet enjoyment." Historically, and still in
most American jurisdictions, this implied covenant exists by virtue of the "mere relation" of land-
lord and tenant. See, e.g., Fifth Ave. Bldg. Corp. v. Kemochon, 221 N.Y. 370, 117 N.E. 579
(1917); 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 9, at 251; 1 A.L.P., supra note 17, at § 3.47; Annot., 62
A.L.R. 1257, 1258-62 (1929), supplementedby 41 A.L.R.2d 1414, 1420-22 (1955). The "relational"
origins of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment suggest that this contractual contrivance was in
fact rooted in privity of estate itself. See 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 9, at 251; 1 F. POLLACK
& F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENrLISH LAW 301, 306 (1968). Ultimately, however, via the route
of analogue from the doctrine of "ancient warranty," the actual foundation for the protection, like
the foundations for all fee and leasehold property, was the essentially contractual relationship
existing shortly after the Norman Conquest between English lords and tenants. See S. MILSOM,
supra note 30, at 90 ('The lord's obligation was, in our language, to guarantee the payment, to
protect the holding of land"; namely, the land which was paid for the tenant's military services).
See also supra note 30; infra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
The implied covenant of quiet enjoyment makes the landlord answerable only for the landlord's
own acts, acts of persons in connivance with the landlord and acts of holders of paramount title,
but not for acts committed by strangers to the title. Eg., Evans v. Williams, 291 Ky. 484, 165
S.W.2d 52 (1942); Smith v. Nortz Lumber Co., 72 N.D. 353,7 N.W.2d 435 (1943). But cf. Blackett
v. Olanoff, 358 N.E.2d 817 (Mass. 1977) (landlord liable for leasing part of premises for use as a
noisy cocktail lounge, clashing with use by residential tenants). See generally Annot., 41 A,L.R.2d
1414, 1440-45 (1955).
32. As the owner of a possessory interest in real estate acquired by conveyance, a leasehold
tenant has standing to maintain such actions as trespass, ejectment, and nuisance against interfer-
ing third parties. I A.L.P., supra note 17, at § 3.53. See Ramos v. Fell, 128 So. 2d 481 (Ala. 1961)
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with so much of property law, however, the reason why dual relation-
ship was conceived is historical.
The modem law of contract-with the routine enforcement of
promises that are intended to be binding-simply did not exist when, in
the late fifteenth century, the need arose to reformulate the interpretive
conceptualization of legal rights and duties existing between landlords
and tenants.33 A main problem at the time was protecting ejected ten-
ants whose landlords were trying to convert arable land to sheep graz-
ing and who were, in the process, depopulating the countryside.34 The
theoretical basis for the enforcement of legitimately expected perform-
ances and for the protection of tenants' reasonable expectations could
not be drawn from the then nonexistent modem theory of contract.35
Rather, the most obvious analogue, and probably the most fitting at the
time,36 was the feudal relation of lord and tenant, created by subinfeu-
dation.37 Because this feudal relation provided a legal basis for protec-
(trespass); Thompson v. Harris, 9 Ariz. App. 341, 452 P.2d 122 (1969) (nuisance); Sherman v. Fall
River Iron Works Co., 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 524, 5 A. (1861) (same); Papadopulos v. Defabrizio, 102
Utah 84, 125 P.2d 416 (1942) (trespass). See general Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 1192 (1950). By com-
parison, a mere occupant under a license who has no "interest in land" traditionally has not had
such standing. See H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 118 (3d ed. 1939); compare Nahas v. Local 905,
Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 144 Cal. App. 2d 808, 302 P.2d 829 (1956) with United Elec. Light Co. v.
Deliso Constr. Co., 315 Mass. 313, 52 N.E.2d 553 (1943).
33. See S. MILSOM, supra note 30. On the development of the general enforcement of infor-
mal promises, see id at 271-315; Ames, supra note 24, at 1- 19. In commenting on certain substan-
tive effects of the order of historical development, Williston noted that "the law governing leases
I . . became settled before the law of mutually dependent promises was established .. .." 6 S.
WILLISTON, supra note 24, at § 890. The independence of lease covenants is erroneously supposed
to be one of the important stumbling blocks to reaching just results. See infra text accompanying
notes 262-306.
34. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 9, at 216-17.
35. See supra note 33. The medieval functional antecedents to modem contract law-ac-
count, covenant, and debt- could have been extended or supplemented to provide much of the
desired protection, and indeed Pollack and Maitland observed that the action of covenant "was
invented chiefly for the enforcement of what we should call leases." 2 F. POLLACK & F.
MAITLAND, supra note 31 at 106, 203-25. These contract-law antecedents, however, were not ex-
tended or sufficiently supplemented.
36. To solve the problem of protecting ejected tenants, see supra text accompanying note 34,
a basis for regarding leasehold rights as rights in rem, enforceable against the whole world, was
needed. Thus, modem contract theory, which provides a basis only for in personam rights, proba-
bly would not have served the intended purpose even if it had existed. See Golde Clothes Shop,
Inc. v. Loew's Buffalo Theatres, 236 N.Y. 465, 141 N.E. 912 (1923) (protection of tenant's occu-
pancy founded in legal title). "[A]fter the development of ejectment and the law of covenants
running with the land, the concept of a lease as a conveyance afforded the parties remedies supe-
rior to those available in contract." 1 A.L.P., supra note 17, at § 3.11.
37. In early feudal times, when a transfer of land was made--even in fee simple absolute-
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tion of sets of expectations not dramatically different from those of
parties to leases, the application of its precepts to the landlord-tenant
relation made considerable sense.
Because of the Statute Quia Emptores,38 feudal land law, in its origi-
nal application, was slowly becoming obsolete.39 The adaption and
application of feudal land law to the landlord-tenant relationship, how-
ever, gave it new life40 and supplied an analytical basis for protecting
the transferor usually retained a proprietary interest analogous in many ways to that of a modern
landlord. The transferee, though having the sole right of potentially perpetual possession, was
thus only a co-owner. The legal relation which existed between transferor and transferee was
referred to as "tenure" or privity of estate, and resulted in a number of law-imposed rights and
duties between the parties. This type of transfer, wherein the transferee became the tenant or
vassal of the transferor, was known as "subinfeudation." See generally H. CHALLIs, REAL PROP-
ERTY 4-19 (3d ed. 1911); R. MEGARRY & H. WADE, supra note 21, at 725; F. POLLACK & F.
MAITLAND, supra note 31, at 232-34. Successive subinfeudations resulted in a multilayered hier-
archy of land ownership, ranging from the King at the top, through intermediate lords, down to
the actual occupants. This ownership hierarchy characterized English feudalism.
The Statute Quia Emptores, 1S Edw. 1 (1290), had the effect of prohibiting, with narrow excep-
tions, any future transfers of fee simple absolute interests by subinfeudation. Its enactment meant
that the transferor of a fee simple absolute could no longer retain any proprietary interest in lands
transferred. Thus a transferee of a fee simple absolute after 1290 was "substituted" in the place of
the transferor in the feudal ownership hierarchy. Consequently, the transferee stepped into the
privity of estate already existing between the transferor and the transferor's feudal lord. Such
transfers were therefore said to be by "substitution" as distinguished from subinfeudation. 1
A.L.P., supra note 17, at 10-12; H. CHALLIS, supra, at 18-20; F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, supra
note 31, at 337.
Transfer by substitution is the only method applicable to fee simple interests today except possi-
bly in Pennsylvania and South Carolina. I A.L.P., supra note 17, at 58-60. Nevertheless, because
the Statute Quia Emptores did not apply to transfers of less than potentially perpetual (fee simple)
interests, it did not prevent subinfeudation between landlords and tenants. See R. MEOARRY &
H. WADE, supra note 21, at 45-46. Therefore, today's subinfeudation and substitution remain two
alternative methods for transferring leasehold interests. When the modem leasehold tenant
makes a transfer by substitution, the transaction is called an "assignment," whereas the modem
leasehold version of subinfeudation is called a "sublease." See infra note 103 and text accompa-
nying notes 102-09.
38. See supra note 37.
39. Because the Statute Quia Emptores prohibited the creation of new privity of estate rela-
tions for lands held in fee simple, see supra note 37, and because fee simple estates were gradually
extinguished by escheats over time, the feudal hierarchy of ownership gradually collapsed. See H.
CHALLIS, supra note 37, at 22; R. MEGARRY & H. WADE, supra note 21, at 33, 46. Furthermore,
economic inflation resulted in the increasing irrelevance of the transferors' retained interest in the
fixed money rents on lands transferred earlier. See R. MEGGARY & H. WADE, supra note 21, at
789; C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 24 (1962).
40. "By a paradox of history the relationship of landlord and tenant, originally no tenure at
all, is now the only tenure which has any practical importance." R. MEGARRY & H. WADE, supra
note 21, at 46.
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most of the then usual expectations of parties to leasing transactions.4'
Later, when promises became routinely enforceable as contracts, 42
promises between landlord and tenant were not excepted.43 Contract
theory not only provided a supplementary basis for the enforcement of
the rights and duties incident to privity of estate; it also supplied a basis
for the creation and enforcement of many other landlord and tenant
expectations.44 It is only necessary that the landlord or tenant success-
fully bargain for the right to enforce such other expectations.4- When
the privity of estate or conveyance conception proved too inflexible to
satisfy the multitudinous diversity of landlords' and tenants' desiderata,
contract theory was applied, not merely as a parallel basis for enforcing
the fundamental property relation, but as a superaddition to it. Thus
arose the present dual relation of property and contract between land-
lord and tenant.
III. THE BASIC CONVEYANCE-THEORY INTERPRETATION
The most basic observation that can be made about the landlord-
tenant relation is that it is a relationship of exchange: rent is exchanged
for possession, or in the more modem view, rent is exchanged for pos-
session-plus-services 4 6 In this section, the conveyance-theory interpre-
tation of the basic rent-for-possession exchange will be considered.
The objective will be to show the grounds upon which the tenant's right
to possession and the landlord's right to rent can be enforced without
resort to contract theory and without assuming the existence of any
contract at all between the parties. In the following section, the role of
contract law in the traditional lease conception will be considered.
41. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, introduction 3-4 (1977).
42. See supra note 33.
43. Ames, Assumpsitfor Use and Occupation, 2 HARv. L. REv. 377, 378-79 (1889).
44. For example, tenant rights to repairs and services not otherwise required of the landlord
by law, provisions for continuation or noncontinuation of the lease on condemnation or destruc-
tion of the premises, and the sharing of any proceeds or awards in condemnation. Commercial
leases, sometimes running to several dozen pages, demonstrate how far parties may seek by con-
tract to secure advantages not accorded them as incidents of privity of estate alone.
45. See infra note 222. But see infra text following note 222.
46. Eg., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
925 (1970); cases cited infra notes 219 & 238.
Professors Quinn and Phillips argue that the law's failure to accord the services portion of a
lease the same degree of importance as possession has resulted in a two-level exchange relation-
ship, consisting of a possession level and a services level. The subordination of services to a sepa-
rate level is in turn argued to be the source of much of the injustice of landlord-tenant law today.
See Quinn & Phillips, supra note 11, at 233-34.
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Specifically, the interplay between the conveyance and contract aspects
of lease transactions will be described as it pertains to two aspects of
landlord-tenant law which have recently been the subject of notable
changes: mitigation by the landlord after a tenant's abandonment or
forfeiture, and the assurance of tenants' fights to services provided by
an implied warranty of habitability and dependency of lease covenants.
The final section will address the question of whether any function is
served by insisting that leases create a dual relation.
Under the conveyance theory, the tenant's right to possession is en-
forced as though the tenant has an ordinary property right in the prem-
ises. For example, when a landlord leases to a tenant for a term of five
years,47 the common law conceives the result to be a conveyance to the
tenant of a property interest in the land-a property interest designed
to last five years.4" Under this theory, the tenant receives the entire
property interest, the right to possession for the entire five years, all at
once at the time of conveyance. 49 The conveyance-theory conception
of a leasehold is thus an application of the basic common-law concep-
tion of possessory interests in land generally. Such interests or "es-
tates" may be created so as to continue potentially forever or for lesser
periods of time, such as a life estate measured by the lifetime of a per-
son. 0 Just as the owners of land can divide up their rights to posses-
sion spatially (for example, east half to X, west half to Y), they can also
47. Here, and throughout the discussion, the assumption is being made that the leasehold in
question is a term or estate for years. For most purposes, other than duration, the periodic ten-
ancy is treated the same as an estate for years, see 1 A.L.P., supra note 17, at § 3.23, and though
the tenancy at will is for many purposes treated differently, see id at § 3.28-3.31, it is a compara-
tively infrequent interest in most states and will be disregarded entirely.
Inasmuch as this is a discussion of the common law conception of leasing, statutory tenancies,
and other pecuijar effects of rent control, rent stabilization and the like are beyond the scope of
this Article. Rent laws are essentially superadditions to, not abrogations of, the basic common law
precepts; accordingly, the present discussion is also introductory to their subject matter.
48. See Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, 459 Pa. 450,470-72,329 A.2d 812, 822-24
(1974) and cases cited therein. See also Camalier & Buckley-Madison, Inc. v. Madison Hotel,
Inc., 513 F.2d 407, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Sagamore Corp. v. Willcutt, 120 Conn. 315, 319, 180 A.
464, 465 (1935); Brown's Adm'rs v. Bragg, 22 Ind. 122 (1864); Becar v. Flues, 64 N.Y. 518, 520
(1876); Siegel, supra note 11 at 658 n.8. See generally 1 A.L.P., supra note 17, at § 3.11. Compare
the language quoted from Williston, supra note 30 with Whitaker v. Hawley, 25 Kan. 674, 687
(1881) ("[A] lease is in one sense a running rather than a completed contract. It is an agreement
for a continuous interchange of values between landlord and tenant, rather than a purchase single
and completed of a term in lands.").
49. See supra note 48.
50. See 2 F. POLLACK & F. MArrLAND,upra note 31, at 10-11.
[Vol. 60:1213
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss4/2
Number 4] CONCEPTION OF LEASING 1225
divide up their rights to possession in terms of time (for example, dur-
ing X's lifetime to X, remainder of perpetuity to Y).
Thus, in line with the common-law conception of the divisibility of
estates generally, we have the conception that a lease effects a temporal
division in the landlord's ownership interest. Following this theory, the
tenant's right to possession is just as complete during the stipulated
term of the lease as a fee simple owner's interest would be in
perpetuity. The only difference is duration--"a leasehold estate...
during the life of the lease. . . for all 'practical purposes is equivalent
to absolute ownership.' "s The landlord cannot interfere with the ten-
ant's enjoyment during the lease term just as a grantor of a fee simple
cannot invade the lands of the grantee. If the lease is for five years,
then the tenant "owns" possessory rights, that is, the right to exclude
others, for the five-year period.
The important point is that the right to possession does not move to
the tenant in a continuous flow from the landlord over the course of the
lease term.52 Rather, the right to possession for the whole term passes
to the tenant as a unitary block at the commencement of the lease.53
Thereafter, the landlord becomes, for purposes of possession, like any
51. Baker v. Clifford-Mathew Inv. Co., 99 Fla. 1229, 1232, 128 So. 827, 829 (1930). Because
the leasehold tenant is not the perpetual owner and the landlord has rights to eventual possession,
the tenant is constrained to avoid injuring what will one day pass to the successor in possession.
In other words, the tenant is required to refrain from committing waste. See, e.g., People v. May,
46 111. 2d 120, 262 N.E.2d 908 (1970) (arson by tenant). For discussions of the doctrine of waste,
ee A.L.P., supra note 17, at §§ 20.1-.23; R. POWELL, supra note 9, at §§ 636-650. See also infra
text accompanying notes 80-81 & 227.
52. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
53. Id Under the obsolete doctrine of interesse termini the tenant had to actually enter into
possession to acquire the right of possession itself. Prior to actual possession, the tenant's interest
was characterized as an "interest in the leasehold term," or an interesse termini. The distinction,
which apparently grew out of the rigorously possession-oriented idea of property rights, should
now be irrelevant. See C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 39, at 67, 166-67; H. UNDERHILL, LANDLORD
AND TENANT 241-42 (1909). See also James v. Kibler's Adm'r, 94 Va. 165, 174, 26 S.E. 417, 419
(1896).
More recently, courts have held that a lease need not convey a present interest but may create a
future possessory interest, a leasehold to commence in the future, In re Wonderfair Stores, Inc.,
511 F.2d 1206 (9th Cir. 1975); Imperial Water Co. No. 8 v. Cameron, 67 Cal. App. 591, 228 P. 678
(1924); Motels of Md., Inc., v. Baltimore County, 244 Md. 306, 223 A.2d 609 (1966). It is debata-
ble whether there can now be privity of estate without possession by the tenant. See Imperial
Water Co. No. 8 v. Cameron, 67 Cal. App. 591, 228 P. 678 (1924). Cf. Arthur Treacher's Fish &
Chips v. Chillum Terrace Ltd., 272 Md. 720, 729, 327 A.2d 282, 286-87 (1974) ("when a lessee
breaches a lease agreement prior to entering into possession, he cannot be held liable for rent,
because the leasehold estate has never come into existence as a present possessory interest, and
rent is an incident of the leasehold estate"). Accord Deming v. Scoville, 220 Ala. 224, 125 So. 683
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other stranger to the title54 with the same concominant duty to respect
the tenant's possession as any other third party." The landlord who
violates this duty is subject to actions in trespass, nuisance, and eject-
ment by the tenant. 6 From the outset of the term and for its duration,
the tenant owns the possessory interest.
The tenant's obligation to pay rent is more difficult to explain under
the conveyance theory, but this obligation can likewise be interpreted
to result from a purely "property" interest in the land, in this case a
property interest held by the landlord. Unlike the tenant's possessory
property interest, the landlord's property interest in the rent is not pos-
sessory, but rather an "incorporeal" interest in the land,5 7 similar to an
easement 58 or profit a prendre5 9 These interests are referred to as "in-
corporeal" because they do not carry a right to possession.6°
Rent is a kind of incorporeal interest consisting of the right to a re-
turn rendered out of the benefits of possession, that is, out of the bene-
fits which a possessor of land is deemed to get purely by virtue of the
possession. 61 Depending on whether the possessor is making valuable
(1930); James v. Kibler's Adm'r, 94 Va. 165, 26 S.E. 417 (1896). See generall, R. SCHOSHINSKI,
supra note 17, at 23-24; infra note 154.
54. The landlord may, of course, reserve special privileges or rights if these are specified in
the lease, and the landlord is not a stranger to title with respect to waste. See supra note 51.
55. See, eg., Tooke v. Allen, 85 CaL App. 2d 230, 192 P.2d 804 (1948) (trespass and nui-
sance); Ivey v. Davis, 81 Ga. App. 598, 59 S.E.2d 256 (1950) (trespass); Winchester v. O'Brien, 266
Mass. 33, 164 N.E. 807 (1929) (nuisance); Chelsea Hotel Corp. v. Gelles, 129 N.J.L. 102, 28 A.2d
172 (1942) (trespass); Golde Clothes Shop, Inc. v. Loew's Buffalo Theatres, Inc., 236 N.Y. 465, 141
N.E. 917 (1923) (ejectment); I A.L.P., supra note 17, at § 3.38. See also infra text accompanying
notes 86-89.
56. See supra note 55.
57. See 2 A.L.P., supra note 17, at § 9.41. See also Smith v. Smith, 56 Hawaii 295, 303, 535
P.2d 1109, 1115-16 (1975) and cases cited therein; 2 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 31, at
125-33.
58. For example, a right to use the land for a specific purpose, such as a right of passage.
59. For example, a right to sever a substance such as coal or timber from the land.
60. Valley Nat'l Bank v. Avco Dev. Co., 14 Ariz. App. 56, 58-59, 480 P.2d 671,673-74 (1971).
Technically, only a right to rent payments unconnected with a lease, the so-called rent-charge, is
truly "incorporeal." Rent reserved under a lease, the "rent-service," is "incident to the reversion,"
and, because the reversion itself is probably not an incorporeal interest, see H. CHALLIS, supra
note 37, at 51-53; 2 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 31, at 129, neither strictly speaking is
the incident rent. See R. MEGGARY & H. WAD, supra note 21, at 693, 789. This definitional
distinction, however, is more confusing than significant and, following the example of the AMERI-
CAN LAW OF PROPERTY, see 2 A.L.P., supra note 17, at § 2.41, will be ignored.
61. "Rent may be defined in a general way, as a tribute or return ofa certain amount, which
is regarded as issuing out of the land, as part of its actual or possibleprofits, and is payable by one
having an estate in the land, as compensation for his use and enjoyment of the land. . . ." 2 H.
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use of the land or not, this benefit "by virtue of the possession" may or
may not really accrue to the possessor. In either event, it is nevertheless
deemed to accrue to the possessor because possession itself is valua-
ble.62 The compensation that the tenant is to pay out of these benefits
issued by the land is referred to as "rent," 63 and the incorporeal interest
which gives a person the right to a part of this putative benefit is also
called a rent.' 4
The incorporeal property interest called rent, which is the property-
right source of the landlord's right to payments, is created by a so-
called "reservation" in the lease. In making a lease, the landlord does
not have to part with the entirety of the ownership interest. The land-
lord may hold back or "reserve" part of the ownership. Indeed, the
landlord always holds back a right to future possession, the so-called
reversion.65 He may, however, also retain other rights, such as incorpo-
real rights, which are not inconsistent with the passing of possession to
the tenant. For example, the landlord may reserve a right of passage
across the land, or a right to sever timber. Or, as in the case of a min-
eral lease with a royalty, the landlord may reserve the right to receive
every fifth barrel of oil produced by the land. Comparably, a landlord
may reserve a right to receive a stipulated monetary amount out of the
benefits that the land is deemed to yield during specific time periods,
for example, $500 per month for each month of the lease term. Al-
though the subject matter of reserved "rent" is certainly less palpable
TIFFANY, supra note 32, at 1459 (emphasis added). Accord Hall v. City of Baltimore, 252 Md.
416,424, 250 A.2d 233,238 (1969); Graves v. Berdan, 29 Barb. 100, 102 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1859), aft'd,
26 N.Y. 498 (1863); 1 H. TIFFANY, supra note 21, at § 168.
62. When the land is not being used by the possessor, or if it is being underutilized, the
accruing benefit seems rather hypothetical. Even in the cases of total nonuse, however, the land's
potential is nevertheless continuously available to the possessor. The potential value of possession
is equal to the fair rental value of the land and is deemed to be continuously received by the
possessor, even though the possessor, for reasons of his own, decides to squander the value by
letting the land lie fallow or putting it to a less than optimal use. See I H. TIFFANY, supra note 21,
at § 182b. See also infra notes 149 & 151 and accompanying text. But ef. Williams v. Puccinelli,
236 Cal. App. 2d 512, 521, 46 Cal. Rptr. 285, 290 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (no value received by
tenant who was "never able to actually use the premises ... during the short period in which
[tenant] was in constructive possession thereof.").
63. In re Daben Corp., 469 F. Supp. 135, 141 (D.P.R. 1979).
64. 2 A.L.P., supra note 17, at § 9.41. Tiffany identifies two other distinct senses in which the
word "rent" is used: to refer to particular payments or installments, and to refer to the proceeds
received. 2 H. TIFFANY, supra note 32, at 1459-60.
65. The possibility of a perpetual lease or "lease in fee" is not addressed in this Article. See
McLean v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 827, 829-31 (E.D. Va. 1970) (perpetual leases not favored
in the law).
Number 4] 1227
Washington University Open Scholarship
1228 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 60:1213
than the subject matter of reserved easements or profits a prendre, these
different types of incorporeal interests are analogous. 66 Like other in-
corporeal interests, rent is a property interest in the land itself, reserved
and held by the landlord, and this reserved property right to share in
the benefits of possession exists irrespective of any express contractual
promise by the tenant to pay rent.67
Although the landlord leases to the tenant with a reservation of a
portion of the benefits produced, the landlord does not automatically
get the reserved benefit. Benefits of possession accrue to the possessor
by virtue of possession. The tenant is the possessor, and therefore it is
the tenant who will, in the first instance, receive the benefit of posses-
sion. If, however, the landlrd has reserved a monetized portion of the
total possessory benefit in leasing to the tenant then, when the tenant
"receives" the whole possessory benefit, he receives in effect something
belonging in part to the landlord. Thus, the tenant becomes personally
obligated to turn over to the landlord that portion of the received bene-
fit which belongs to the landlord. In this way the landlord's incorpo-
real rent interest in the land is, over time, converted into a chose in
action against the tenant.68 Under common law pleading, an action in
debt was the appropriate form of action for enforcing the duty to pay.69
The gist of this action was that the defendant held a sum of money
66. "The word rent is derived from 'render,' and the name thus emphasizes the distinction
between rent, which is actually rendered or paid by the tenant, and aprofit aprendre, which is
taken by the party entitled thereto, without the active intervention of the tenant." 2 H. TIFFANY,
supra note 32, at 1459. See also supra note 61.
67. "[R]ent is not the result of an ordinary contract for future payments of money. . . . The
land is the debtor, 'yielding and paying' the rents at the stipulated intervals; the covenant to pay is
an accessory one." Hall v. City of Baltimore, 252 Md. 416, 424, 250 A.2d 233, 238 (1969). See also
supra note 29. Generally, the creation of a landlord-tenant relation will itself result in a contract,
implied in fact, to pay rent. See supra note 21.
68. While the right to unaccrued rent has been considered an incorporeal interest in the land,
accrued and unpaid rent is treated as a chose in action. See Smith v. Smith, 56 Hawaii 295, 304,
535 P.2d 1109, 1116 (1975); 2 A.L.P., supra note 17, at § 9.41. In a number of American jurisdic-
tions, however, even unaccrued rent is called a chose in action. See 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord and
Tenant § 515 (1970). The loss of the distinction between the respective characters of accrued and
unaccrued rent should not be of any practical significance since the abolition of the forms of
action; in particular, the substantive requirements for the recuperatory action in debt.
69. See Gunn v. Scovil, 4 Day 234 (Conn. 1810); 7 W. HOLDSWORTm,supra note 9, at 261-75;
Ames, supra note 43. The action of debt was also proper for enforcement of contract-based obli-
gations of the tenant, as well as the conveyance-based constructive "real covenant" or covenant
"in law" to pay reserved rent. See Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn 26, 27, 82 Eng. Rep. 897, 898 (1647);
Walker's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 22a, 76 Eng. Rep. 676-77 (1587). See generally 1 H. TIFFANY, supra
note 21, at 960-64, 1030-34; supra note 21.
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belonging to the plaintiff.70
The important point is that a sum of money could become due, and
the action in debt was available even if the tenant never, even im-
pliedly, promised or contracted to pay a penny.7 The landlord's right
to the rent payments could exist purely as a property interest whenever,
by "reserving" a rent, he withheld from the tenant a part of the total
interest that he held in the land.
Several important principles of landlord-tenant law follow from this
conception of the leasing transaction:
L Failure to pay the rent does not affect the tenant's right to posses-
sion .72 In the common-law conception, a failure to pay the rent cannot
affect the tenant's right of possession because, by the time a rent default
occurs, the tenant already has received a right of possession, as a uni-
tary block, for the entire term of the lease.73 Hence, the tenant's right
of possession is independent from the performance of the obligation to
pay rent.
The landlord is thus in the same position as any other seller who
70. See 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 9, at 366-68; F. MAITLAND, supra note 15, at 31, 51.
Even though the action of debt was for recovery of a sum of money, the modem action most
conceptually similar is replevin. The landlord would, in concept, "replevy" rents captured by the
tenant but belonging under reservation to the landlord.
At an even earlier time, the proper forms of action for the recovery of rents by a freeholder were
the so-called real actions, such as the assize of novel disseisin-a functional precursor of modem
ejectment actions. In theory, non-payment by the tenant "disseised" the landlord of the rents.
See 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 9, at 262-63; 2 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 31, at
125-26; 2 H. TIFFANY, supra note 32, at 1507-08.
71. See 2 H. TIFFANY, supra note 32, at 1509-10; supra note 67. See also 2 F. POLLACK & F.
MAITLAND, supra note 31, at 126-27. In modem cases, this phenomenon is most clearly seen in
the liability of assignees in possession who have not "assumed" the obligations of the lease. See
infra note 107 and accompanying text; but see supra note 21.
72. See e.g., tenBraak v. Waffle Shops, Inc., 542 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1976); Hyde v. Bains, 247
Ala. 8. 22 So. 2d 324 (1945); Klinger v. Peterson, 486 P.2d 373 (Alaska 1971); Brown's Adm'rs v.
Bragg, 22 Ind. 122 (1864); Western Rebuilders & Tractor Parts, Inc. v. Felmley, 237 Or. 191, 391
P.2d 383 (1964); 1 A.L.P., supra note 17, at § 3.94. Cf. Continental Grain Co. v. Afram Bros., 35
Wis. 2d 676, 151 N.W.2d 685 (1967) (lease of vessel). At common law, when a feudal tenant
defaulted on promised services, the feudal lord had no procedure for regaining possession and was
remitted to the power of "distress," that is, the right to seize chattels found on the land to satisfy
the claim for rent. See S. MILSOM, supra note 30, at 95-96.
73. See supra note 72 and text accompanying notes 47-56. See also D. DOBBS, REMEDIES
857-58 (1973). For an analogous rule applicable to sales of real estate in the absence of an implied
vendors' lien, see M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES OF REAL PROPERTY 792-94
(1975).
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transfers title to a buyer on credit.74 If a landlord wishes to use the
leasehold as collateral for the payment of the original purchase price,
the lease must stipulate the retention of a security interest in the lease-
hold. This security interest, like any other, is a qualification of the ten-
ant's title, making the right to possession defeasible in case the rent is
not paid.75 The right to repossess the leased premises may take the
form of a special limitation, analogous to a fee simple determinable, or
it may be a condition on the term, analogous to a fee simple on condi-
tion subsequent, enforceable by the right of entry.76 Only on the basis
of retained interests, such as a right of entry or special limitation, may
the landlord assert a right of forfeiture against the tenant.
It should be observed that at common law the tenant's right to pos-
session cannot be affected by the failure of the tenant to perform any
other obligations, whether created by covenant or otherwise, unless ex-
pressly provided in the lease.77 Thus, it is typical today for leases to
provide expressly for termination by special limitation or condition in
case the tenant defaults in the payment of rent or otherwise.78 In a
number of states, the common-law rule has been modified by statute so
that a default in the payment of rent or certain other defaults will con-
74. See Brown's Adm'rs v. Bragg, 22 Ind. 122 (1864). Cf. U.C.C. § 2.702(a) (extremely lim-
ited statutory right of a seller to reclaim goods after receipt by the buyer).
75. See U.C.C. § 9-503; D. DOBBS, supra note 73, at 857-58.
76. See Burnee Corp. v. Uneeda Pure Orange Drink Co., 132 Misc. 435, 230 N.Y.S. 239
(App. Term 1928). See general, 1 A.L.P., supra note 17, at § 3.89; R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note
17, at 377-85; Niles, Conditional Limitations in Leases in New York, 11 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 15 (1933);
Annot., 118 A.L.R. 283 (1939). Occasionally, particularly in leases, the special limitation is called
a conditional limitation. See M. FRIEDMAN, PREPARATION OF LEASES 43-45 (1962); 2 W. WALSH,
COMMENTARIES ON LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 193 (1947). Such a limitation, like a special limi-
tation on a freehold, for example, a fee simple determinable, automatically terminates the lessee's
estate. On the other hand, a condition, like a condition subsequent, confers only a right of entry
or power of termination which has no terminating effect on the lessee's estate until exercised by
the lessor, either by reentry or ejectment. See Conger v. Conger, 208 Kan. 823, 328-39, 494 P.2d
1081, 1086-87 (1972); 1 A.L.P., supra note 17, at § 3.89; R. SCHOSHINSKI, sufpra note 17, at 37-85;
Annot., 118 A.L.R. 283 (1939). Both types of provisions operate to effectuate a forfeiture of the
tenant's interest following the occurrence of the stipulated triggering events.
77. See, e.g., Greenfeld v. Supervisors' Dist. No. 3, 205 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1953) (violation of
use restriction); Olson v. Pedersen, 194 Neb. 159, 231 N.W.2d 310 (1975) (no express covenant in
forfeiture clause); Keller v. Model Coal Co., 142 W. Va. 597, 97 S.E.2d 337 (1957) (no forfeiture
provisions); I A.L.P., supra note 17, at § 3.94. There were minor exceptions with only historical
significance, such as the possibility of a tortious alienation. See Humbach, Landlord Control of
Tenant Behavior: An Instance ofPrivate Environmental Legislation, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 223,
258-59, 259 n.116 (1976).
78. See 1 A.L.P., supra note 17, at § 3.94; 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at § 16.2.
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stitute grounds for defeasance of the tenant's estate.79 One such statute,
the Statute of Gloucester,80 was enacted as early as 1278, and provided
for termination in case the tenant committed waste. The Statute of
Gloucester has been reenacted or received as a part of the common law
in many states.81 In the absence of a statute or an express provision in
the lease, however, a defaulting tenant is still secure in his possession. 2
2 Eviction of the tenant by the landlord, or one who has a better title
than the landlord, terminates the obligation to pay rent. 3 This rule fol-
lows obviously enough from the analytical basis of the common-law
duty to pay reserved rent; namely, that the tenant by possession re-
ceives a benefit, a portion of which belongs to, and must be rendered to
the landlord.8 4 If the tenant is evicted from possession by the landlord
or by a paramount title holder, then the tenant no longer receives the
putative benefit of possessor as such; that is, the tenant no longer re-
ceives anything belonging to the landlord. Either the landlord receives
the benefit or, in case of eviction by a paramount title holder, the right-
ful beneficiary receives it.85
Incidentally, eviction by the landlord without some right to evict is a
79. E.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 139, § 19 (Law Co-op 1981); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS §§ 711,
715 (MeKinney 1979). For a compendium, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 12.1,
statutory note la (1977).
80. 6 Edw. I ch. 5 (1278), repealed by Repeal Act, 42 & 43 Vict., ch. 59 (1879).
81. For a compendium of authorities, see 5 R. POWELL, supra note 9, at § 650. See also infra
note 227.
82. Typically, an express provision in the lease or a statute now provides for defeasance. See
supra note 78. Generally, therefore, a tenant who defaults is subject to eviction. Nonetheless, in
the common-law conception of leases, defeasibility is exceptional and must be viewed as such if
the contours of the conception are to be understood.
83. E., Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969) (constructive evic-
tion); Morris v. Kettle, 57 NJ.L. 218, 30 A. 879 (1895) (actual eviction from a part of premises);
Fifth Ave. Bldg. Co. v. Kernochan, 221 N.Y. 370, 117 N.E. 579 (1917) (actual eviction); I A.L.P.,
supra note 17, at § 3.52. "Eviction" is used in this Article in the narrow technical sense, referring
only to ousters by the landlord, through his connivance, or by a holder of paramount title. Na-
tional Furniture Co. v. Inhabitants of Cumberland County, 113 Me. 175, 179, 93 A. 70, 71-72
(1915); 49 AM. JUR. 2D, Landlord and Tenant § 300 (1970).
84. See supra text accompanying notes 57-71.
85. The tenant's contractual duty to pay rent, based on his promise to pay, would likewise be
discharged by an eviction, since an eviction would surely constitute a material breach of the im-
plied covenant of quiet enjoyment. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (1981);
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 276 (1932); 1 A.L.P., supra note 17, at §§ 3.48, 3.50; infra note
278. Nevertheless, relieving the tenant of his obligation to pay rent because of an eviction does
not depend on the existence or breach of an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment. Fifth Ave.
Bldg. Co. v. Kernochan, 221 N.Y. 370, 117 N.E. 579 (1917).
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toit.6 If the landlord commits the tort of eviction, he is liable for dam-
ages to the tenant because such eviction constitutes an interference with
possession rightfully belonging to the tenant.8 Further, trespasses and
nuisances committed by the landlord are torts, which are actionable by
the tenant.88 Nevertheless, if the landlord's wrongful acts fall short of
depriving the tenant of possession, privity of estate-and hence the ob-
ligation for reserved rent-is not affected.8 9
3. Ouster of the tenant by strangers to the title, destruction of build-
ings on the premises, or any other event detracting from the tenant's use
does not affect the rent obligation.90 Ouster of the tenant by a stranger
to the title is not a technical "eviction," which refers only to ouster by
the landlord or a paramount title holder.91 Absent a true eviction, as so
defined, a mere wrongful ouster does not affect the obligation to pay
reserved rent.92 Likewise, it is well-established at common law that
neither partial nor total destruction of buildings or improvements on
the premises will in any way affect a tenant's liability for rent,93 al-
though the rule is subject to numerous statutory and case-law
exceptions.94
86. E.g., Schuler v. Bordelon, 78 Cal. App. 2d 581, 177 P.2d 959 (1947); 1 A.L.P., supra note
17, at §§ 3.28, 3.49, 3.52. See also supra text accompanying notes 55-56; infra note 87.
87. Kearns v. Sparks, 296 S.W.2d 731 (Ky. 1956); Brown v. Holyoke Water-Power Co., 152
Mass. 463, 25 N.E. 966 (1890); Slater Realty Corp. v. Meys, 137 N.J.L. 263, 59 A.2d 650 (1948);
supra note 86.
88. See supra note 55.
89. E.g., Donaldson v. Mona Motor Oil Co., 193 Minn. 283, 258 N.W. 504 (1935). See also
Talbot v. Citizens' Nat'l Bank, 389 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1968); 1 A.L.P., supra note 17, at § 3.50; 2 H.
TIFFANY, supra note 32, at 1501. For a discussion of the recent trend to recognize certain lease
obligations as "dependent," see infra text accompanying notes 262-313.
90. Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn 26, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (1647) (dispossession in civil war) is one of
the earlier landmarks. See also Bowers v. Sells, 125 Ind. App. 324, 123 N.E.2d 194 (1954); Katz v.
Duffy, 261 Mass. 149, 158 N.E. 264 (1927); Stewart v. Lawson, 199 Mich. 497, 165 N.W. 716
(1917); Annot., 1 A.L.R. 4th 849 (1980); cases cited infra note 93. See generally I A.L.P., supra
note 17, at § 3.103; M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at § 9.1.
91. See supra note 83.
92. See supra note 90. Nor would such an ouster of the tenants violate the implied warranty
of quiet enjoyment. See supra note 31.
93. E.g., Sheets v. Selden, 74 U.S. 416 (1868); Cook v. Anderson, 85 Ala. 99,4 So. 713 (1888);
Osterling v. Sturgeon, 261 Iowa 836, 156 N.W.2d 344 (1968); Wood v. Bartolino, 48 N.M. 175, 146
P.2d 883 (1944); Anderson v. Ferguson, 17 Wash. 2d 262, 135 P.2d 302 (1943). See generally 1
A.L.P., supra note 17, at § 3.103; M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at § 9.1.
94. E.g., Graves v. Berdan, 26 N.Y. 498 (1863); Albert M. Greenfield & Co. v. Kolep, 380
A.2d 758 (Pa. 1977); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW. § 227 (McKinney 1968); 1 A.L.P., supra note 17, at
§ 3.103. Total destruction of the demised premises, for example, when a destroyed building has
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Of course, after such an outster or other use-impairing event it can-
not easily be said that the tenant still receives the full possessory benefit
from the land. Hence, after such events, it is harder to say that the
tenant receives something out of which he must render rents belonging
to the landlord.95 In the case of ouster, however, the tenant does have
actions in trespass to recover damages96 and mesne profits97 and in
ejectment. 98 Indeed, it is because the tenant has an action in ejectment
that, under the common-law conceptualization, the tenant is treated as
an owner of an interest in land.99 As such an owner, it arguably fol-
lows that it is the tenant's responsibility to bring ejectment actions
against dispossessors and to maintain the premises so that the premises
are actually useful and yield the expected potential benefit."° These
ideas of the tenant's position reflect, of course, the doctrine of caveat
emptor, albeit writ rather large. They do not, however, necessarily fol-
low from the conveyance theory. Even viewing the lease as a convey-
ance transaction, the law still may choose to impose a continuing
responsibility upon the landlord for the usefulness of the land after the
tenant agrees to take possession. Specifically, the conveyance may, that
is, be accompanied by an implicit warranty of habitability.101
been only partially leased to the tenant, is a typical common-law exception which constitutes
grounds for termination of the lease and extinguishes the duty to pay rent. The tenant's duty to
pay rent after destruction is often affected by lease provisions.
95. Compare supra text accompanying notes 57-71 with infra note 151. See also note 100.
96. See cases cited supra notes 32 & 55.
97. E.g., Irwin v. Nolde, 176 Pa. 594, 35 A. 217 (1896); Creswell Ranch & Cattle Co. v.
Scoggins, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 373, 39 S.W. 612 (1897). See also Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 1192, 1203-14
(1950).
98. See Heroux v. Katt, 76 R.I. 122, 68 A.2d 25 (1949). See also Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 1192,
1197-99 (1950). It has even been held that only the tenant, not the landlord, has standing to
maintain ejectment. See Western N.Y. & P. Ry. v. Vulcan Foundry & Mach. Co., 251 Pa. 383,96
A. 830 (1916).
99. See supra note 15. See also R. MEOGARY & H. WADE, supra note 21, at 1133-34; supra
text accompanying notes 15 & 33-37.
100. See infra note 151 and text accompanying note 225. The issue may also be couched, and
resolved, in terrbs of contractual allocation-of-risk analysis. For example, in the early landmark
case of Paradine %v. Jane, Aleyn 26, 82 Eng. Rep. 847 (1647) the court observed that "as the lessee
is to have the advantage of casual profits, so he must run the hazard of casual losses." Id at 27, 82
Eng. Rep. at 898. In order to reconcile its interpretation of the parties' allocation of risk with the
notion that the rent issues out of the land, the Paradine court cited an earlier case which adopted
the fiction that, if part of the leased land is destroyed, "then entire rent shall issue out of the
remainder." Taverner's Case, 1 Dyer 56a, 73 Eng. Rep. 123 (1544). For a remedy, the tenant was
remitted to recourse against the wrongdoers who deprived him of his benefit. Paradine v. Jane,
Aleyn at 26, 82 Eng. Rep. at 897.
101. See infra text accompanying notes 225-61.
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IV. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN CONVEYANCE AND CONTRACT
The pure conveyance-theory paradigm for landlords' and tenants'
rights and duties demonstrates that contractual promises are not neces-
sary ingredients of an enforceable landlord-tenant relationship. Never-.
theless, contractual promises are usual ingredients of the relationship,
and it is the interplay between the conveyance and contractual aspects
of leases that gives the landlord-tenant relationship much of its unique
character.
In many cases, the dual nature of leases can be ignored because it is
irrelevant to the outcome of the particular controversy at hand. In ac-
tions between lessor and lessee, for example, to enforce the basic rent-
for-possession exchange, both the conveyance and contract aspects of
leases relate to the very same subject matters and, typically, require
exactly the same performance behavior. The fact that the landlord-
tenant relationship is a dual relationship is obscured and thus can be
safely overlooked. In other cases, however, such as when the tenant
abandons the premises or makes an assignment of the lease, recogni-
tion of the dual nature of leases is the key to the outcome.
An assignment by the tenant separates the normally intertwined obli-
gations of privity of estate and privity of contract, revealing them as
concurrent yet different grounds for enforcement of the rent-for-posses-
sion exchange. 02 Because an assignment causes this separation, it use-
fully illuminates the distinct existences of conveyance-based duties and
contract-based duties.
Fundamentally, an assignment is a conveyance by the tenant of his
entire proprietary interest or estate in all or part of the leased prem-
ises.103 Thus, an assignment eliminates the privity of estate between
102. See Ellingson v. Walsh, 15 Cal. 2d 673, 675, 104 P.2d 507, 509 (1940); Kanawha-Gauley
Coal & Coke Co. v. Sharp, 73 W. Va. 427, 430, 80 S.E. 781, 783 (1914); cases cited infra notes 106-
08.
103. E.g., J.D. Cornell Millinery Co. v. Little-Long Co., 197 N.C. 168, 170, 148 S.E. 26, 27
(1929); Davis v. Vidal, 105 Tex. 444, 447, 151 S.W. 290, 293 (1912). See generally 1 A.L.P., supra
note 17, at §§ 3.56-.57, 3.61-.63; R. SCHOSHINsm, supra note 17, at 552-74. A tenant also may
transfer the possession of the demised premises for a period shorter than the time remaining in his
own term, thereby retaining a portion of his proprietary interest in the premises. This latter type
of transfer is a sublease, as distinguished from an assignment.
A sublease is simply a lease from a lessee. It is little different from any other lease. By subleas-
ing, the transferor-tenant remains the tenant of the prime-landlord and becomes the landlord of
the subtenant, creating an ownership hierarchy. Subleasing is thus the modem version of subin-
feudation. See supra note 37. The sublease does not affect either the privity of estate or the
contract obligations existing between the original landlord and tenant under the prime lease.
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the assignor-tenant and the landlord while establishing that same priv-
ity of estate between the assignee and the landlord. The legal effects of
an assignment are in part a reflection of this shifting of the privity of
estate to the assignee.
The usual effect of an assignment by the tenant is to give the land-
lord two persons from whom he may recover the rent: the assignor-
tenant and the assignee-tenant. The landlord may recover rent from
the assignor-tenant because, as a matter of contract law, assignments do
not ipso facto relieve an assignor of the contractual duty to perform as
promised."° Accordingly, even after an assignment of a lease, the as-
signing tenant remains liable on the contractual promise' °5 to pay rent
made expressly or impliedly in the original lease. °6 For purposes of
Rather, it creates a second and simultaneous set of privities of estate and contract between the
original tenant and the subtenant.
By contrast, an assignment substitutes the assignee in the assignor's place with respect to origi-
nal privity-of-estate obligations. It is the modem leasehold version of transfers by substitution, see
supra note 37, and therefore corresponds to the modern conveyance of fee simple estates.
Because the designation of a transfer as a sublease or assignment is substantively significant-
affecting the question of who is liable to whom and for what, courts should probably seek to
ascertain and follow the parties' intentions in such matters. Jaber v. Miller, 219 Ark. 59, 239
S.W.2d 760 (1951). Courts, however, often ignore the intent of the parties. Rather, a transfer is
designated as a sublease only if the transferor retains a sufficient interest in the premises to remain
in privity of estate with the landlord. A minority of jurisdictions will recognize a sublease based
upon the transferor's retention of a mere right of entry for condition broken. To create a sublease
under the majority rule, however, the retained interest must be a reversion, for without a rever-
sion, the transferor has no "estate" and thus cannot be in privity of estate with the original land-
lord. See generally authorities cited supra; Ferrier, Can There be a Sublease for the Entire
Unexpired Portion of a Term?, 18 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1929); Wallace, Assignment and Sublease, 8
IND. LJ. 359 (1933).
In addition to conveying the assignor-tenant's estate, an assignment may also, depending on the
parties' intentions, include: an assumption by the assignee of the assignor's contractual obliga-
tions under the lease, see, e.g., Packard-Bamberger & Co. v. Maloof, 83 N.J. Super. 273, 199 A.2d
400 (1964), rev'd on other grounds, 89 NJ. Super. 128, 214 A.2d 45 (1965), or a release by the
landlord of the assignor-tenant's contractual obligations under the lease, see, e.g., Eastman v. Nel-
son, 8 Alaska 548 (1935), or both. Neither such an assumption nor release is, however, a necessary
concomitant of an assignment, and a release of the assignor will not be implied ipso facto from an
assumption by the assignee, Eastman v. Nelson, 8 Alaska 548 (1935).
104. Duties may be delegated, but the person delegating the duty remains liable for the failure
of the delegate to perform. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 318(3) comment d & illus-
tration 10 (1981); A. COPRBIN, CONTRACTS § 866 (1964).
105. This assumes that the original lease contains either an express or implied contractual
promise to pay rent. See supra note 21. If the original lease included no contractual promise but
only a reservation of rent, the assignor-tenant would not remain liable for rent accruing after the
assignment. See National Bank of Commerce v. Dunn, 194 Wash. 472, 487-88, 78 P.2d 535, 539-
40 (1938). See also infra note 107 and accompanying text.
106. See Viera v. Soto, 240 F. Supp. 541 (D.V.I. 1965); Eastman v. Nelson, 8 Alaska 548
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the duty to pay rent, therefore, the assignor-tenant remains in privity of
contract with the landlord. In addition, upon taking possession the as-
signee of the lease is also liable to pay the rent, whether or not he con-
tractually promises or "assumes" to pay rent. This liability arises out
of the privity of estate which the assignment establishes between the
assignee and the landlord: "The assignee who does not assume [the
lease] is not. . . bound by its contractual obligations. But the nonas-
suming assignee who occupies the premises is liable by reason of his
tenancy, and his obligation, arising out of privity of estate continues at
least through the period of his occupancy."' 7
There can, of course, be only one recovery by the landlord'08 and, as
between assignor and assignee, the latter is primarily liable for the
rent. 0 9 Nevertheless, the assignment situation presents an interesting
exploded view of the dual nature of leases, showing the two privities of
estate and contract in simultaneous but separate operation as bases for
enforcement of the rent obligation.
Two recurring factual circumstances involving the interplay between
conveyance and contract deserve particular attention because they have
(1935); Samuels v. Ottinger, 169 Cal. 209, 146 P. 638 (1915); Kintner v. Harr, 146 Mont. 461, 408
P.2d 487 (1965); Gerber v. Pecht, 15 NJ. 29, 104 A.2d 41 (1954). See also Walker's Case, 3 Co.
Rep. 22a, 23a, 76 Eng. Rep. 676, 680 (1587) ("the lessee himself shall not prevent by his own act
such remedy which the lessor hath by his own contract."). Even if the landlord's consent to the
assignment is necessary and obtained, such consent would not release the assignor from the con-
tract obligation to pay rent. A deliberate release by the landlord is required. Eastman v, Nelson,
8 Alaska 548 (1935); Broida v. Hayashi, 61 Hawaii 493, 464 P.2d 285 (1970); Gerber v. Pecht, 15
N.J. 29, 104 A.2d 41 (1954); Buck v. J.M. McEntee & Sons, 275 P.2d 984 (Okla. 1954). See su ra
note 103.
107. Ellingson v. Walsh, 15 Cal. 2d 673, 676, 104 P.2d 507, 509 (1940). Accord Consumer's Ice
Co. v. Bixler, 84 Md. 437, 35 A. 1086 (1896); Kanawha-Gauley Coal & Coke Co. v. Sharp, 73 W.
Va. 427, 80 S.E. 781 (1914). See also Walker's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 22a, 22b, 76 Eng. Rep. 676, 678
(1587) ("Forasmuch as the rent issues out of the land, the assignee who hath the land, and is in
privy of estate is debtor with respect to the land.") The nonassuming assignee, however, remains
liable for accruing rents only until he makes a bona fide reassignment to another. See Reid v.
John F. Wiessner Brewing Co., 88 Md. 234, 40 A. 877 (1898); Packard-Bamberger Co. v. Maloof,
83 N.J. Super. 273, 199 A.2d 400 (1964), rev'don other grounds, 89 N.J. Super. 128, 214 A.2d 45
(1965); National Bank of Commerce v. Dunn, 194 Wash. 472, 78 P.2d 535 (1938); Annot., 89
A.L.R. 433 (1934), Annot., 148 A.L.R. 393 (1944).
The assignee's liability is for reserved rent based upon the reservation made by the landlord in
leasing to the original tenant. The assignee acquires the leasehold estate subject to this reservation
because no one can convey a better title than he has. See supra text accompanying notes 57-71.
108. See, eg., Gholson v. Savin, 137 Ohio St. 551, 31 N.E.2d 858 (1941); Lincoln Fireproof
Warehouse Co. v. Greusel, 199 Wis. 428, 224 N.W. 98 (1929).
109. See Kintner v. Harr, 146 Mont. 641,408 P.2d 487 (1965); Gerber v. Pecht, 15 N.J. 29, 104
A.2d 41 (1954). See also supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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engendered the greatest criticism of the conveyance theory, and hence,
the dual relationship conception of leases: first, cases of abandonment
or forfeiture by the tenant, and second, cases in which the landlord fails
to provide necessary services. These are discussed in turn.
A. Abandonment and Forfeiture
If the tenant abandons the premises and ceases to pay rent prior to
the termination of the lease, and if the tenant is not justified"' in doing
so, then there is a breach of duty by the tenant."'I Upon such a breach,
the landlord traditionally has been entitled to leave the premises empty
and recover the entire agreed rent as it accrues under the terms of the
lease, as if the premises were still occupied by the tenant.'12 Moreover,
this entitlement to recover the full rent for empty premises traditionally
has been available to the landlord irrespective of the landlord's ability
110. An abandonment is justified when there is eviction, either actual or constructive. See,
e.g., Fifty Assocs. v. Berger Dry Goods Co., 275 Mass. 509, 176 N.E. 643 (1931); Dittman v.
McFadden, 159 Okla. 262, 15 P.2d 139 (1932); First Wisconsin Trust Co. v. L. Wiemann Co., 93
Wis. 2d 258, 286 N.W.2d 360 (1980). See also supra text accompanying notes 84-89; infra notes
275-77.
111. As a general matter, merely abandoning occupancy would probably not constitute a
breach of the lease unless the tenant has agreed, expressly or by implication, to remain in occu-
pancy. E.g., Stevens v. Mobil Oil Corp., 412 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Miller v. Benton, 55
Conn. 529, 13 A. 678 (1887); Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Lackey, 397 So. 2d 1100 (Miss. 1981);
Baron Bros. v. National Bank, 83 S.D. 93, 155 N.W.2d 300 (1968); K & C Assoc. v. Airborne
Airfreight Corp., 20 Wash. App. 653, 581 P.2d 1082 (1978). See generall I A.L.P.,supra note 17,
at § 3.41; Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 971 (1971). It is the failure to pay rent as it accrues which most
frequently constitutes the breach of duty at issue. Thus, abandonment as a legal wrong refers
more often to an attempt by the tenant to abandon, and thereby repudiate, the whole arrangement
rather than merely to relinquish his actual occupancy. See tenBraak v. Waffle Shops, 542 F.2d
919, 924 n.5 (4th Cir. 1976) ("two elements are necessary to show abandonment: (1) vacation of
the premises; and (2) a clear intent not to be bound by the lease.")
It might have been better to refer to abandonment of the whole arrangement as "repudiation"
in order to distinguish it from mere relinquishments of occupancy. See K & C Assoc. v. Airborne
Airfreight Corp., 20 Wash. App. 653, 581 P.2d 1082 (1978). Nevertheless, abandonment is the
word usually employed to describe the type of events under discussion, perhaps because the term
'repudiation" has strong contract associations while "abandonment" has, in the case of chattels,
the fairly long-standing property connotation of relinquishment of title. See R. BROWN, PER-
SONAL PROPERTY § 1.6 (3d ed. 1975).
112. E.g., Respini v. Porta, 89 Cal. 464, 26 P. 967 (1891); Sagamore Corp. v. Wicutt, 120
Conn. 315, 180 A. 464 (1935); Gruman v. Investors Diversified Servs., Inc., 247 Minn. 502, 78
N.W.2d 377, (1956); Centurian Dev. Co. v. Kenford Co., 60 A.D. 2d 96, 400 N.Y.S.2d 263 (4th
Dept. 1977); Becar v. Flues, 64 N.Y. 518 (1876). See generally 1 A.L.P., supra note 17, at § 3.99; 2
M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at § 16.3; 3 H. TIFFANY, supra note 32, at 1492-93; 2 S. WILLSTON,
Nupra note 24, at § 1403; Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 534, 546-56 (1968).
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to mitigate damages by taking back possession or reletting." t3 In the
typical modem context of an apartment dweller who must move
before the end of the lease, this no-mitigation rule seems harsh from
the tenant's point of view. Moreover, it appears to be at variance with
the general rule applied to "ordinary" contracts that no recovery may
be had for losses that the plaintiff, with reasonable effort, could have
avoided. "4 The no-mitigation rule for leases is founded, however, not
on ordinary contract principles, but rather on the view that a lease is a
conveyance of an ownership interest in land. 1 5 Because of the per-
ceived injustice of the no-mitigation rule for leases, it has been sub-
jected to considerable criticism" 6 and, in some jurisdictions
modification." '7 The modification is sometimes accompanied by dis-
paraging remarks about the conveyance theory of leasing out of which
the no-mitigation rule flows." t8
When the tenant attempts to abandon a lease arrangement, there is
113. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
114. See generally RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 336 (1932); 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 104,
at § 1039; D. DoBBs, supra note 73, at § 12.6; J. MURRAY, CONTRACTS § 227 (1974). It is often
said that there is not, strictly speaking, an obligation or duty to mitigate damages, but rather a rule
prohibiting recovery of compensation for so-called "avoidable consequences." This rule is im-
plicit in the general measure of damages for the breach of executory contracts of exchange, that is,
the difference between the contract price and fair market value. D. DOBBS, supra note 104, at
§ 12.6. See infra text accompanying notes 133-37.
115. "[A lease] is like the sale of specific personal property to be delivered. In such a case the
title passes to the vendee, and of course he is liable for the purchase-money." Becar v. Flues, 64
N.Y. 518, 520 (1876). See also D. DOBBS, supra note 104, at § 12.6; 2 M. FRIEDMAN, SUpra note 3,
at 667-68; supra note 48.
116. E.g., Gruman v. Investors Diversified Servs., 247 Minn. 502, 78 N.W.2d 377 (1956); Bern-
stein v. Seglin, 184 Neb. 673, 171 N.W.2d 247 (1969); Sommer v. Kridel, 74 N.J. 446, 378 A.2d 767
(1977); Mar-Son v. Terwaho Enters., Inc., 259 N.W.2d 289 (N.D. 1977); Wright v. Baumann, 239
Or. 410, 398 P.2d 119 (1965). The seminal article on the subject is McCormick, The Rights of t/he
Landlord Upon Abandonment f the Premises by the Tenant, 23 MICH. L. REV. 211 (1925).
117. A dozen or more states have created rules which depart from the traditional common-law
rule allowing the landlord to recover full damages without mitigation. Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 534,
565-70 (1968). See also Sommer v. Kridel, 74 N.J. 446, 452-53, 378 A.2d 767, 771 (1977), See
generally 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 665 (1974 & Supp. 1982). The rule has also been
modified by statute. See, e.g., MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-207 (1981); Wis. STAT. ANN,
§ 704-29 (West 1981).
118. McCormick's statement is typical: "The notion of 'privity of estate' and its attendant
rights and duties appears as quaint and startling as a modem infantryman with a cross-bow."
McCormick, supra note 116, at 222.
See also Parkwood Realty Co. v. Marcano, 77 Misc. 2d 690, 692, 353 N.Y.S.2d 623, 626 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 1974). "[Tlhis [mitigation] issue should be met head-on by removing the long-established
and deeply encrusted veneer from the real estate lease contract and showing it for what it is-a
contract like any other contract." Id.
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no reason to suppose that either privity of contract or of estate is extin-
guished. The unilateral repudiation of an executory contract by one of
the parties does not in itself rescind the obligation or privity of con-
tract.' '9 The nonrepudiating party presumably could elect to treat the
repudiation as an offer of mutual rescission; that is, as an offer to termi-
nate by mutual agreement all extant rights and duties under the con-
tract. 120 Such an election to extinguish all aspects of the contractual
relation, including the remedial aspects, is certainly one which the
nonrepudiating party is, however, free to reject. 21  Similarly, the uni-
lateral repudiation of a conveyance by the transferee does not place the
119. See Walker & Co. v. Harrison, 347 Mich. 830, 81 N.W.2d 352 (1957); Rosenthal Paper
Co. v. National Folding Box Co., 226 N.Y. 313, 123 N.E. 766 (1919). See generally RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 243, 253 (1981); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 313, 317, 318
(1932); 5A A. CORBIN, supra note 104, at §§ 982, 1236; see also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
§ 410 (1932). It should not be inferred from the statement in the text that the disappointed prom-
isee may regard the contract as unaffected by the repudiation and proceed to provide a wasteful
and unwanted counterperformance. It is well established that if the repudiation was accompanied
by a present breach, the promisee cannot proceed with his own performance and refuse to mitigate
damages, except at his own risk. See, e.g., Clark v. Marsiglia, I Denio 317, (N.Y. 1845); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 243(2), 350 comment b (1981); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
§ 317(2) (1932); Farnsworth, The Problems of Non-Performance in Contract, 17 NEw ENG. L. REv.
249, 314 (1982). Even if the repudiation is entirely anticipatory, the weight of authority denies the
promisee an election to proceed with performance at the repudiator's expense, precedence being
given to the rule of mitigation. See, e.g., Bu-Vi-Bar Petroleum Corp. v. Krow, 40 F.2d 488 (10th
Cir. 1930); Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co., 35 F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1929); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 253, 350 comment b (1981); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 317
(1932); but see Reliance Cooperage v. Treat, 195 F.2d 977, (8th Cir. 1952); 4 A. CORBIN, supra
note 104, at §§ 981-983. Nevertheless, despite the effects of repudiation on the parties' obligations
of performance, the contract remains alive at least for purposes of the remedial obligations, see
infra notes 133-37, and, indeed, the remedies may even be accelerated by virtue of the repudia-
tion. Long Island R.R. v. Northville Indus. Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 455, 362 N.E.2d 558, 393 N.Y.S.2d
925 (1977); Hochster v. De la Tour, 2 El. & Bl. 678, 118 Eng. Rep. 922 (1853). See also Coughlin
v. Blair, 41 Cal. 2d 587, 262 P.2d 305 (1953). See generally 5A A. CORBIN, supra note 104, at
§§ 959, 982, 1236; J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 12-2 (2d ed. 1977); infra note 134.
120. See McCreary v. Mercury Lumber Distrib., 124 Cal. App. 2d 477, 268 P.2d 762 (1954);
Olson v. Pedersen, 194 Neb. 159, 231 N.W.2d 310 (1975). See generally U.C.C. § 1-107; RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 277(1) (1981); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 410 (1932). The
repudiating party is hardly in a position to object to such an election by the aggrieved party.
Nevertheless, the nonrepudiating party would ordinarily have available the more favorable alter-
native of treating the repudiation as an event which both discharges the duty of further perform-
ance and which triggers a right to recover damages for breach of contract from the repudiating
party. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, §§ 243(2), 253 (1981); RESTATE-
MENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 274, 313, 317, 318, 397 (1932); 4 A. CORBIN, supra note 104, at § 975; 5A
A. CORBIN, supra note 104, at §§ 1236-1237; supra note 119.
121. See supra note 120. The leading case is Hochester v. De la Tour, 2 El. & BI. 678, 118 Eng.
Rep. 922 (1853).
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conveyed title back in the transferor. The transferor may elect to ac-
cept reconveyance of the title, but there is no requirement to do so.'
22
When a leasehold tenant conveys title back to the landlord and the
landlord accepts such reconveyance, the transfer is called a "surren-
der."'123 A surrender thus places both parties back in the positions that
they held, with respect to title, prior to making the lease. It follows
that, at the very least, a surrender extinguishes the privity of estate and
its attendant obligations. 12a Accordingly, an accepted surrender is to
privity of estate what mutual rescission is to contract. An abandon-
ment by the tenant, however, cannot be in itself an accepted surrender;
it can only be regarded as a unilateral offer, or "proffer," of surrender,
which the landlord may either accept or reject.' 21 Just as one party to a
contract cannot, by breaching, force the other to accept a mutual rescis-
sion of the contract, so also a tenant cannot, by breaching, force the
landlord to accept a surrender of the tenant's leasehold.
Because of the dual-relationship conception of leases, when a tenant
abandons with the intention to relinquish his arrangement with the
landlord, it may be said that the tenant proposes two changes in the
legal relationships between them: the tenant offers to rescind the con-
122. Examples of this principle outside the landlord-tenant context include: the requirement
of acceptance by the donee as a requisite to the effectuation of a transfer of chattels by gift, see R.
BROWN, supra note I11, at § 7.14, and the requirement of acceptance by a grantee in order to
complete the delivery of a deed to real property. See Hood v. Hood, 384 A.2d 706 (Me. 1978);
Holbrook v. Trusdale, 100 A.D. 9, 90 N.Y.S. 911 (1904); 23 AM. JUR. 2D, Deeds §§ 77, 127 (1965).
123. See Welcome v. Hess, 90 Cal. 507, 27 P. 369 (1891); Parris-West Maytag Hotel Corp. v.
Continental Amusement Co., 168 N.W.2d 735 (Iowa 1968); Ralph v. Deiley, 293 Pa. 90, 141 A.
640 (1928); 2 H. TIFFANY, supra note 32, at 1578. A transfer by the landlord of his reversionary
interest to the tenant in possession is called a "release." Id. at 1568-70. Release is, therefore, the
counterpart from the landlord's side of surrender.
124. See Kanter v. Safran, 68 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1953); supra text accompanying note 23; 2 H.
TIFFANY, supra note 32, at 1588; McCormick, supra note 116, at 216.
125. See, e.g., Sagamore Corp. v. Willcutt, 120 Conn. 315, 180 A. 464 (1935); Noce v. Steman,
77 N.M. 71,419 P.2d 450 (1966); Monger v. Lutterloh, 195 N.C. 274, 142 S.E. 12 (1928); Ralph v.
Deiley, 293 Pa. 90, 141 A. 640 (1928). Of course, what the landlord says and what he in fact does
may be two quite different things. The application of such general principles as estoppel may
cause courts to recognize surrenders even in the absence of any deliberate or informed acceptance
by the landlord. E.g., Williams v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales Corp., 396 F. Supp. 288
(N.D. Tex. 1975); Welcome v. Hess, 90 Cal. 507, 27 P. 369 (1891); Kanter v. Safran, 68 So. 2d 553
(Fla. 1953); Sanden v. Hanson, 201 N.W.2d 404 (N.D. 1972); Pague v. Petroleum Prods., Inc., 77
Wash. 2d 219, 461 P.2d 317 (1969). When surrenders are imputed on the basis of conduct incon-
sistent with the continuation of the tenancy, for example by reletting, they are referred to as "sur-
renders by operation of law." See generally I A.L.P., supra note 17, at § 3.99; 2 M. FRIEDMAN,
supra note 3, at §§ 16.301-02; Updegraff, The Element of Intent in Surrender by Operation of Law,
38 HARv. L. REv. 64 (1924). See also infra note 148.
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tract and proffers a surrender of title. In theory, at least, the landlord
may accept either or both of these proposed changes, or he may accept
neither and thus keep alive both the privity of contract and the privity
of estate.1 26 Faced with an abandoning tenant, the landlord thus has in
theory three 2 7 choices available:
Choice I-refuse to accept both the proffered surrender and the offer of
mutual rescission implied by the abandonment;
Choice II-accept the proffered surrender but refuse to accept the offer of
mutual rescission;
Choice III-accept both the proffered surrender and the offer of mutual
rescission.
Considering these three choices in light of the dual-relationship con-
ception of leases, it appears that a no-mitigation rule for leases would
arise and apply only if the landlord elects Choice I. In electing Choice
II, the landlord only retains a contract basis for enforcing the future
rent obligation and this rationale of enforcement would be subject, one
may correctly suppose, to the rules and limitations of ordinary contract
law, including the rule of mitigation. In the third choice, the landlord
would have no basis at all for enforcement of the rent obligation as to
the future,128 and rent accrual would cease.
Choice I leaves the dual nature of the lease intact and, accordingly,
leaves intact the dual nature of the relationship arising from the breach
of the lease.'2 9 Thus, Choice I, but only Choice I, could theoretically
lead to the application of the no-mitigation rule founded upon the dual
126. See McCormick, supra note 116, at 216-21.
127. A cursory look at the three listed choices makes obvious a fourth possibility available to
the landlord: acceptance of the offer of rescission but refusal to accept the proffered surrenler.
This fourth choice would leave the landlord without the extra protection of the privity-of-contract
rights while he still has a tenant-and a breaching one at that. Therefore, it is hard to see why the
landlord would ever, as a practical matter, wish to elect this fourth possibility.
There may also be a fifth possibility, namely, termination of the lease pursuant to a forfeiture
provision, if such a provision is contained in the lease. See supra text accompanying notes 72-73.
This possibility represents a somewhat different category of choice, with legal effects that depend
to some extent on the language of the forfeiture provision, and will be discussed separately infra at
text accompanying notes 183-200. A sixth possibility, in many states, is statutory forfeiture. See
supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. Because the operation of such statutes is a matter of
statutory interpretation, and not of common-law conception, it is beyond the scope of this Article.
128. For this reason, it may be speculated that a landlord generally would not deliberately
elect Choice III except as part of a settlement, for additional consideration, negotiated with the
tenant. Local rules on surrender by operation of law may, however, cause the landlord to extin-
guish inadvertantly all the tenant's liability (Choice HI) when the landlord only is trying to extin-
guish the privity of estate (Choice II). See supra note 125; infra text accompanying notes 167-82.
129. See supra notes 119-20.
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relationship. Indeed, the cases seem to support the position that, under
the traditional rules, the landlord may recover the full rent without mit-
igating only if the landlord selects Choice I in response to the tenant's
abandonment. Otherwise, the landlord's recovery, if any, will be re-
duced by the losses which the landlord could have avoided by
mitigation.
Applying the traditional dual-relation framework to cases in which
the landlord elects Choice I or Choice 11,130 and cases of tenant forfei-
ture, the analysis proceeds as follows:
L Landlord Rejects Both Surrender and Mutual Rescission (Choice
I). If the tenant abandons and the landlord decides to accept neither
the offer of mutual rescission nor the proffered surrender, the landlord
continues to have a right to rent based on both the contract and estate
aspects of the dual relation. In other words, by refusing to accede to
the termination of either aspect of the dual relation, the landlord
should retain both the right to reserved rent based on the privity of
estate,' 3' as well as an action for damages based on the contractual
promise to pay rent.' 32 There is a difference between contract damages
and rent.
Damages are essentially a compensatory payment exacted by the law
in order to protect a disappointed promisee from losing, among other
things, the value of his bargain. 33 Damages give the promisee a substi-
130. Because the election of Choice III terminates the basis for any future rent obligation, the
analysis under Choice III does not merit separate discussion. See supra note 128 and accompany-
ing text. The only issue that could arise is the essentially factual one of whether the election of
Choice III was also accompanied by a release of the obligations for any accrued rents as well, See
supra note 119-20 and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., Winshall v. Ampco Auto Parks, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 334 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Pague
v. Petroleum Prods., Inc., 77 Wash. 2d 219, 461 P.2d 317 (1969).
132. See, e.g., Sagamore Corp. v. Willcutt, 120 Conn. 315, 180 A. 464 (1935). The landlord
would not, of course, be able to obtain both the rent and damages if this would result in a double
recovery. In addition, there may be limitations on the times at which he may sue for damages.
Hermitage Co. v. Levine, 248 N.Y. 333, 162 N.E. 97 (1928). See infra note 143.
133. See, e.g., Hawkins v. McGee, 84 N.H. 114, 146 A. 641 (1929); Freund v. Washington
Square Press, 34 N.Y.2d 379, 314 N.E.2d 419, 357 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1974); C. MCCORMICK, DAM-
AGES 561 (1935). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1981); J.
CALAMARI & J. PERILLO,supra note 119, at 518-19, 521-22; J. MURRAY, supra note 114, at §§ 219-
220.. Typically, when damages are assessed to protect the expectation interest under a contract for
an exchange, the measure of recovery is the difference between the contract price and the fair
market value of the item being sold. See J. MURRAY, supra note 114, at § 220; infra note 136.
Damages may also be assessed to protect the disappointed promisee from other losses, so-called
special damages, to protect other interests such as reliance, or to force disgorgement by the breach-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss4/2
Number 4] CONCEPTION OF LEASING 1243
tute for the performance bargained for, but they do not always, or even
usually give him the performance itself.1 34 Even if the very perform-
ance owed to the promisee was intended to consist solely of a payment
of money, for example, a contractual agreement to purchase for a price,
damages would still not generally be the equivalent of the performance
itself. This is because the cost or value of the promisee's own perform-
ance would, to the extent not incurred or rendered, be deducted from
the recovery.'35  Thus, when an ordinary executory contract to
purchase is breached by the buyer, the damages recoverable are not
equal to the agreed price. Rather, the general measure of damages is
the difference between the agreed price and the market value of the
thing to be sold. 36 Or, viewed another way, the disappointed seller is
expected to mitigate his damages either by retention of the thing sold or
by resale at its market value. 137 From either viewpoint, however, the
seller's recovery would be only the seller's net loss or "loss of bargain"
due to the breach, not the whole price. The recovery of contract dam-
ages thus gives the seller a substitute for performance and not the con-
tract performance itself.
Rent, by contrast, is seen at common law as an incorporeal interest in
land. 138 A tenant in possession is required to pay the reserved amount
of rent to the landlord in order for the landlord, as the owner of the
ing party of an unjust enrichment via restitution. See generally D. DOBBS, supra note 73, at § 12.1;
J. Mut RA, supra note 114, at §§ 219-220; Farnsworth, Legal Remediesfor Breach of Contract, 70
COLUM. L. REV. 1145 (1970). These and other functions of damages are disregarded in the text
because their discussion would not further illuminate the distinction between an exaction in lieu
of performance made to compensate for the nonperformance (damages), and an exaction of the
agreed performance itself (rent).
134. See Coughlin v. Blair, 41 Cal. 2d 587, 598, 262 P.2d 305, 311 (1935) ("The judgment for
damages is substituted for the wrongdoer's duty to perform the contract" and "absolves the de-
fendant from any duty, continuing or otherwise, to perform the contract"). See also Freund v.
Washington Square Press, 34 N.Y.2d 379, 314 N.E.2d 419, 357 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1974); RESTATE-
MENT OF CONTRACTS § 313(1) comment c (1932); Farnsworth, supra note 133, at 1149-60.
135. See, e.g., Vitex Mfg. Corp. v. Caribtex Corp., 377 F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1967); J. MURRAY,
supra note 114, at § 221. For the sake of simplicity, numerous nongermane exceptions and
provisos have been ignored in this generalization.
136. E.g., Coombs & Co. v. Reed, 5 Utah 2d 419, 303 P.2d 1097 (1956); D. DOBBS, supra note
73, at § 12.11; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 133, at § 186. See also U.C.C. § 2-708(1), which has
somewhat modified the details but not the basic principles for calculating damages applicable to
breaches of contracts for the sale of goods.
137. U.C.C. §§ 2-703, -706, -708 (1973); D. DOBBS, supra note 73, at § 12.6. The implicit in-
corporation of the rule of mitigation into the general measure of damages for breach is thus a very
important occasion for its application.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 57-67.
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rent, to have the enjoyment of the incorporeal interest. t39 When the
courts exact payments of reserved rent from a tenant they are not giv-
ig the landlord a compensatory remedy but rather a recuperatory one,
a kind of specific performance."4  Like an action in ejectment, an ac-
tion for reserved rent gives the landlord exactly what is his, not merely
compensation for its loss. 141 The landlord's incorporeal interest-
rent-is thus treated as being comparable to, and as specifically pro-
tectable as, the tenant's corporeal, possessory interest in the land. 142 A
tenant's right to regain possession by ejectment is not qualified by rule
of mitigation nor, on this basis, would one expect that the landlord's
right to reserved rent would be so qualified. 43
The next logical inquiry is how privity of estate, as the basis for rent
obligations, can persist after the tenant has abandoned occupancy. Af-
139. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
140. Id See also 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 9, at 262-63; F. MAITLAND, supra note 15, at
38-39, 51-52.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
142. The comparability of rent and possession at common law is further underlined by the fact
that, before their abolition, real actions such as the assize of novel disseisin were the appropriate
forms of action for the recovery of rents held in freehold. See supra note 70.
143. The policy significance of the differences between payments of money and possession is
disregarded in this analytical explanation of the traditional no-mitigation rule for leases. Obvi-
ously, though, it is precisely due to the difference between payments and possession that the ana-
lytical explanation given in the text fails so stunningly to find any parallel policy justification. See
D. DoBs, supra note 73, at § 12.6. This appears to be a place where the implications of the
common-law conception seem to stray too far from the underlying policy desiderata. Neverthe-
less, as pointed out infira at text accompanying notes 212-18, the fault may not be with the tradi-
tional conception, but rather with unsuitable factual assumptions which typically accompany its
application.
Incidentally, as a corollary to the idea that rent is a benefit yielded up to the tenant and then
paid to the landlord, the common-law rule is that, absent agreement, the landlord may not recover
rent in advance even if the tenant has totally repudiated the lease. 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3,
at § 5.101. See also Jordan v. Nickell, 253 S.W.2d 237 (Ky. 1952). This rule at least has the merit
of analytical consistency, but the same cannot be said of the related rule, applied in a minority of
jurisdictions, which prevents the recovery even of contract damages for anticipatory repudiation
or breach. See, eg., Barrow v. Irving Trust Co., 68 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1934); Cooper v. Casco
Merchandise Trust Co., 134 Me. 372, 186 A.2d 885 (1976); Hermitage Co. v. Levine, 248 N.Y. 333,
162 N.E. 97 (1928); General Dev. Corp. v. Wilber-Rogers Atlanta Corp., 28 Ohio App. 35, 273
N.E.2d 908 (1971); Henson v. B. & W. Finance Co., 401 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). The
latter holdings appear to indefensibly disregard the difference between damages and rent. Amick
v. Metropolitan Mortgage & Sec. Co., 453 P.2d 412 (Alaska 1969), overruled on other grounds,
Wickware v. Juneau, 557 P.2d 783 (Alaska 1976); Grayson v. Mixon, 196 Ark. 1123, 5 S.W.2d 312
(1928); Sagamore Corp. v. Willcutt, 120 Conn. 315, 180 A. 464 (1935); Stableford v. Schul-
ingkamp, 67 So. 2d 306 (Miss. 1953); South Main Akron v. Lynn Realty, 106 N.E.2d 325 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1951). See also Hawkinson v. Johnston, 122 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1941). See generally Note,
The Modern Lease-An Estate in Land or a Contract, 16 Tax. L. REV. 47, 48-55 (1937).
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ter all, the theory of the landlord's privity-of-estate right to reserved
rent depends on the assumption that possession yields benefit to the
tenant-possessor and that a portion of this benefit belongs, by reserva-
tion, to the landlord.1 " If the tenant removes himself from possession,
it is not readily apparent that the tenant continues to receive something
belonging to the landlord. In order to account for the continuation of
privity of estate after the tenant's abandonment, it is necessary to in-
dulge a fiction; namely, that a nonoccupying tenant's right to posses-
sion is equivalent, for these purposes, to possession itself. Such a
fiction is closely related to the idea that it is up to the tenant, like any
other owner, to see that the land produces the benefit which it can
produce. 145  The tenant is deemed to receive the benefits of possession
by virtue of having an entitlement to them. If the tenant decides to
squander the benefit by underuse or nonoccupancy, blame for the loss
lies solely with the tenant. 146
The frequent inappropriateness of the fiction that the tenant's right
to possession is for these purposes the equivalent of possession will be
examined below.147 There is one argument, however, that may be
made in its favor. The landlord should not, by the tenant's abandon-
ment, be made a possessor against his will. The landlord who refuses
to accept a proffered surrender does not necessarily become the pos-
sessor just because the tenant, as a matter of actual possession, is no
longer in possession. 148  If the landlord does not in fact resume posses-
sion after the tenant abandons, then it would seem to be in best accord-
ance with general principles to regard the tenant as being in
144. See supra text accompanying notes 57-71.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 90-101.
146. See supra note 62.
147. See infra text accompanying notes 212-18.
148, After it is discovered that the tenant has abandoned possession, the landlord may take
steps to protect the premises from damage or deterioration. The usual holding is that such protec-
tive steps by the landlord do not constitute acceptance of the proffered surrender. Coftfin v. Fowl-
er, 483 P.2d 693 (Alaska 1971); 1 A.L.P., supra note 17, at § 3.99; 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at
§ 16.301. But see supra notes 125 & 128. Nor is acceptance and retention by the landlord of the
keys to the premises treated as a per se acceptance of the surrender. See, e.g., Coffin v. Fowler,
483 P.2d 693 (Alaska 1971); Noce v. Stemen, 77 N.M. 71,419 P.2d 450 (1966); Surety Realty Corp.
v. Asmer, 249 S.C. 114, 153 S.E.2d 125 (1967); but see Bove v. Transcom Elec., 116 R.I. 210, 353
A.2d 613 (1976). Nor is offering the premises for reletting. See, e.g., Noce v. Stemen, 77 N.M. 71,
419 P.2d 450 (1966); 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at § 16.301; but see Williams v. Kaiser Alumi-
num & Chem. Sales, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 288 (N.D. Tex. 1975) ("There is some imprecision on the
question of... reentry"). For a discussion of whether these conclusions are compelled by the
conveyance theory of leasing or even consistent with it, see infra text accompanying notes 212-18.
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constructive possession of the premises. 149 The legal entitlements at-
tendant upon constructive possession, including the tenant's right to
reenter,15 0 form the basis for continuation of the privity of estate,'
and hence the obligation to pay the full rent. 152
There is one situation in which the landlord must sue for contract
damages and cannot sue for reserved rent-when the landlord has
merely contracted to lease but has not yet made a conveyance with a
reservation of rent, thereby establishing privity of estate with the ten-
ant. Such a contract to convey a leasehold conceptually resembles an
ordinary executory sales contract and one might surmise that the recov-
ery of contractual damages for its breach would be subject to the gen-
eral rules for contract damages such as the rule of mitigation for
avoidable losses. Because the general measure of damages in sales
contracts is the difference between the agreed price and the market
value of the thing to be sold, an injured landlord recovers only the loss
of bargain due to the breach, not the whole price.15 3
149. Walsh v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 20 F.2d 586, 587 (3d Cir. 1927) ("premises ... remain
constructively in possession of the tenant").
"['W]here there is no adverse possession, the title draws with it constructive possession, so as to
sustain the action of trespass." Gillespie v. Dew, I Stew. 229, 230 (Ala. 1827).
150. See Kulawitz v. Pacific Woodenware & Paper Co., 25 Cal. 2d 664, 155 P.2d 24 (1945);
Welcome v. Hess, 90 Cal. 507, 27 P. 369 (1891); Lincoln Fireproof Warehouse Co. v. Greusel, 19
Wis. 428, 224 N.W. 98 (1929).
151. If the abandoned premises were usurped by an adverse possessor, the tenant would be
entitled to maintain ejectment and, in connection therewith, a trespass action for damages and for
mesne profits to recoup lost possessory benefit. See supra text accompanying notes 95-98. The
tenant's right to exclude others from the benefits of possession should have a theoretical market
value which approaches the value of the benefits themselves. See supra note 62. In fact, the right
to exclude others and recover mesne profits is what is meant by "title" insofar as possessory title to
land can be recognized at all in persons not having actual possession of the land.
It is assumed, of course, that the landlord has taken no steps to reassert his own dominion and
control over the premises and thus justify the assertion that he has accepted the proffered surren-
der. The kinds of facts which might properly justify such an assertion are considered elsewhere.
See supra notes 125 & 148; infra text accompanying notes 212-18.
152. One may speculate whether the mitigation rule would apply if the landlord refused the
proffered surrender and sues on the tenant's promise to pay rent instead of suing for the reserved
rent itself. Historically, this election could seemingly be accomplished merely by suing in assump-
sit rather than debt. See 2 H. TIFFANY, supra note 32, at § 913. Whether the landlord could limit
the theory of recovery under modem rules of procedure is problematical. See Winshall v. Ampco
Auto Parks, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 334 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Taylor v. DeBus, 31 Ohio St. 468 (1877).
Consider, however, the analogous possibility that a landlord may sue the lessee-assignor ex con-
tractu after abandonment by a nonassuming assignee. See Lincoln Fireproof Warehouse Co. v.
Greusel, 199 Wis. 428, 224 N.W. 98 (1929); supra note 107 and accompanying text.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 134-36.
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Mitigation is thus the rule when the landlord and tenant have en-
tered only a contract to lease rather than having made an actual
lease.'5 4 Upon the tenant's breach of such a contract to lease, the land-
lord is expected to minimize the loss resulting from the breach, by
either possessing or reletting.' 55 By application of the same principle,
which governs other sales contracts, the landlord cannot simply insist
on payment of the full amount that was promised, but can recover only
those damages which could not have been avoided by mitigation.'56
Because no title has been transferred to the tenant and no rent has yet
been reserved, and because no possessory benefit has been received by
the tenant via possession, there is no rent to be recouped by the land-
lord from the tenant.
By contrast, however, once the landlord and tenant make the lease
itself and the tenant enters, 5 7 the view that the lease is a conveyance
would imply that the landlord should be able to recover the full prom-
ised rent without mitigation as ordinary contract damages. Even with
an ordinary contract of sale, the loss of bargain measure of damages is
applicable only if the buyer has not accepted the thing sold. 58 Once
the buyer has taken title, the seller becomes entitled to recover the en-
tire price.' 59 By parity of reasoning, under ordinary contract rules, the
landlord should be able to recover the full promised rent as it accrues
154. Arthur Treacher's Fish & Chips, Inc. v. Chillum Terrace, Ltd., 272 Md. 720, 327 A.2d 282
(1974); Wright v. Baumann, 239 Or. 410, 398 P.2d 119 (1965); R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 17, at
22-27, 689-90; Annot., 85 A.L.R.3d 514 (1978); Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 534, 573-75 (1968). Depend-
ing upon the parties' real intention, an agreement looking to a future leasehold possession might
be either a "contract to lease" or a lease of a future possessory interest, that is, leasehold to com-
mence in futuro. Motels of Md. v. Baltimore County, 244 Md. 306, 311,223 A.2d 609, 612 (1966);
Railway Express Agency v. Commissioner, 307 Minn. 245, 246, 239 N.W.2d 245, 246 (1976). One
court held that, in either event, there is no privity of estate in praesenti, and therefore, the mea-
surement of damages is governed solely by contract principles and thereby limited to nonmiti-
gable losses. Arthur Treacher's Fish & Chips, Inc. v. Chillum Terrace, Ltd. 272 Md. 720, 327 A.2d
282 (1974). This outcome, however, is technically questionable because recognizing the creation
of a leasehold future interest-if an abrogation of the doctrine of interesse termini-should give
the landlord a privity-of-estate basis to recover rent. Imperial Water Co. v. Cameron No. 8, 67
Cal. App. 591, 228 P. 678 (1924). See also Greening v.. Herres, 165 Wash. 470, 5 P.2d 992 (1931);
R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 17, at 23-24; supra note 53.
155. See supra note 154.
156. Id
157. On the need for entry by the tenant to complete the conveyance, see supra note 53.
158. See U.C.C. § 2-709(a); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 335 comment a, illustrations 3,4
(1932); see also U.C.C. §§ 2-706, -708.
159. See supra note 158.
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once there has been a conveyance of the leasehold to the tenant. 160
In summary, the rule permitting landlords to recover the full amount
of rent even after the tenant has abandoned, though seemingly contrary
to the usual contract rule, may be seen in terms of the traditional analy-
sis to have two explanations. First, the landlord may not be suing for
contract damages at all, but rather to recoup the rent that has been
reserved. Second, the principles of ordinary contract law, applied to the
conveyance of a leasehold, also would allow a full recovery without
mitigation. Of course, both of these explanations require acceptance of
the traditional conception of leases as conveyances and the fictional,
though not necessarily concomitant assumption that landlords, in al-
lowing premises to lie idle, do not in fact resume possession and
thereby "accept the surrender." Both explanations thus depend on the
appropriateness of that conception and fictional assumption.' 6'
2. Landlord's .Acceptance of Surrender but not Mutual Rescission
(Choice II). If the landlord accepts the surrender of the abandoning
tenant's estate but not the rescission of the lease-contract, the right to
reserved rent based on privity of estate would be extinguished.' 62 The
landlord should still be able to recover damages for breach of the con-
tract to pay rent. 163 This recovery, however, because it is damages and
not rent, would be subject to the rule of mitigation and would compen-
sate only for nonavoidable losses."
Because Choice II gives the tenant the benefit of mitigation, it is,
160. See Becar v. Flues, 64 N.Y. 518 (1876); supra note 115.
161. See infra text accompanying notes 201-18.
162. Lincoln Fireproof Warehouse Co. v. Greusel, 199 Wis. 428, 224 N.W. 98 (1929); Annot.,
70 A.L.R. 1102 (1931).
163. Winshall v. Ampco Auto Parks, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 334 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Novak v. Fon-
taine Furniture Co., 84 N.H. 93, 146 A. 525 (1929); United States Rubber Co. v. White Tire Co.,
231 S.C. 84, 97 S.E.2d 403 (1956); McCormick, supra note 116, at 216-21; UpdeGraff, supra note
125, at 79-82.
164. See supra note 163. See also Condor Corp. v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 529 F. Supp.
87 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 822 (1976); Respini v. Porta, 89 Cal. 464,26 P. 967 (1891);
Kanter v. Safran, 68 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1953). The mitigation rule could be given effect directly or,
analogizing to ordinary contract cases, by implication in the general measures of damages for
executory exchange contracts, that is, the agreed rent less the fair rental value of the premises.
Randall v. Thompson Bros., 1 Tex. Civ. Cas. 1102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1881); Brown v. Hayes, 92
Wash. 300, 159 P. 89 (1916). See also Yates v. Reid, 36 Cal. 2d 385, 224 P.2d 8 (1950) (lease
authorized reletting).
Of course, if the landlord were unable to make any alternative arrangements to cover the losses,
then the damages would be equal to the rent. B.K.K. Co. v. Schultz, 7 Cal. App. 3d 786, 86 Cal.
Rptr. 760 (1970). In the Schultz case, however, the court seemed to overlook the benefit deemed
[Vol. 60:1213
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from the tenant's point of view, clearly preferable to Choice 1.165 For
practical reasons, however, Choice II often would be the most sensible
choice for the landlord as well, despite the application of the rule of
mitigation. 166 By accepting the proffered surrender, the landlord re-
gains the right to possession and thereby puts himself in a position to
minimize his potential losses either by reletting or enjoying possession
himself. Because he has accepted only the proffered surrender and not
the contract rescission, the landlord still retains his contract right of
recourse against the breaching tenant for losses which the landlord
cannot avoid. Choice I theoretically gives the same contractual protec-
tion as Choice II, but as a practical matter the landlord's exposure to
loss is much greater under Choice I. The collection of rent from a non-
occupant can be difficult, expensive and problematic. Hence, Choice I
would be less favorable than Choice II if there is a good chance that, by
reletting or holding possession himself, the landlord can derive benefit
from the premises.
Although Choice II often is more attractive than Choice I for the
landlord, and almost always more attractive for the tenant, 67 there
seems to be disagreement as to how or even whether the landlord can
selectively terminate one part of the dual relation, by retaking posses-
sion or reletting, while leaving the other part intact. Several commen-
tators and a few cases appear to accept the position that a landlord
cannot accept a proffered surrender without terminating the whole
lease arrangement and extinguishing all rights, including the right to
contract damages with respect to future accruing rents. 68 Rather ironi-
to be received by a possessor by virtue of the possession. See supra text accompanying notes 61-
64.
165. The advantage to the tenant of Choice II has been specifically cited as a reason for re-
jecting the rule applied in some cases, see infra text accompanying notes 167-78, which would
prevent the landlord from opting for Choice II. See Monger v. Lutterloh, 195 N.C. 274, 277, 142
S.E. 12, 15 (1928); Martin v. Siegley, 123 Wash. 683, 685-88, 212 P. 1057, 1058-59 (1923).
166. A principal exception is if the landlord rents many units and has constant vacancies be-
cause of high turnover. See infra text accompanying notes 210-11.
167. The only advantage of Choice I to the tenant is that the right to resume possession would
continue. This advantage is seldom of direct benefit to the tenant, although in a rare case the right
to possession may give the tenant some collateral advantage. See, e.g., Kulawitz v. Pacific Wood-
enware & Paper Co., 25 Cal. 2d 664, 155 P.2d 24 (1945) (tenant continued to have the benefit, as
condition precedent to rent obligation, of "essential" restrictive covenant by landlord; landlord's
breach of the covenant discharged tenant's rent obligation). See infra note 182.
168. E.g., Gardiner v. William S. Butler & Co., 245 U.S. 603 (1918); tenBraak v. Waffle Shops,
542 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1976); Williamson v. Crossett, 62 Ark. 393, 36 S.W. 27 (1896); Vineyard
Village-Georgia, Inc. v. Crum, 136 Ga. App. 335, 221 S.E.2d 208 (1975); Eidelman v. Walker &
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cally, this version of the law actually would discourage mitigation be-
cause it would penalize landlords who try to mitigate their damages by
extinguishing their rights to recovery entirely.' 69  Though the reason
for imposing such a "both-or-neither" limitation on the landlord's
choices is somewhat obscure, the notion perhaps derives from the his-
torical rationale for allowing contract actions for rent in the first place:
"/F1or better security of payment [of the rent] ...the lessor should
have his remedy of debt upon the reservation or action upon this col-
lateralpromise at his election."'1
7 0
If actions in contract (assumpsit) were extended to cases already cov-
ered by another action (debt) solely "for better security," then it is per-
haps logical that the contract rights be interpreted, presumptively at
least, to be merely coextensive with the secured rights. Any event
which extinguishes the secured rights, for example, the reserved rent,
should likewise extinguish the securing ones.17
Dunlop, Inc. 265 Md. 538, 290 A.2d 780 (1972); Taylan Realty Co. v. Student Book Exchange,
Inc. 354 Mass. 777, 242 N.E.2d 877 (1968); Haycock v. Johnston, 97 Minn. 289, 106 N.W. 304
(1906); Saracena v. Preisler, 180 App. Div. 348, 167 N.Y.S. 871 (1917). See generally 2 M. FRIED-
MAN, supra note 3, at 70; 3A G. THOMPSON, supra note 17, at § 1348; H. TIFFANY, supra note 32,
at 1588. But see infra notes 178-81.
169. See Abraham v. Gheens, 205 Ky. 289, 265 S.W. 778 (1924); Haycock v. Johnson, 81
Minn. 49, 83 N.W. 494 (1900); Whitehorn v. Dickerson, 419 S.W.2d 713 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967).
Another criticism is that this rule promotes the idleness, not the usefulness, of property. See
Martin v. Siegley, 123 Wash. 683, 687,212 P. 1057, 1058-59 (1923) (rejecting the rule and allowing
the landlord to relet without "surrender of the landlord's rights [to contract damages] under the
lease agreement").
170. Ames, supra note 43, at 378-79. "[The covenant to pay [rent] is an accessory one." Hall
v. City of Baltimore, 252 Md. 416, 424, 250 A.2d 233, 238 (1969) (quoting Jersey Blvd. Corp. v.
Lerner Stores Corp., 168 Md. 532, 539, 178 A. 707, 709 (1935).
171. A constructional presumption that a surrender was intended to be accompanied by a
mutual rescission of the contract in the form of Choice III makes eminently good sense where the
surrender is voluntary and involves no breach by the tenant. See, e.g., Dills v. Stobie, 81 Ill. 202
(1876). Exactly the opposite presumption is indicated if the tenant has breached and the landlord
needs better security. See Gordon v. Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc., 195 Kan. 341, 404 P.2d 949
(1965).
Updegraff observed that the situation of abandonment followed by the landlord's reletting is
"analogous to the situation found to exist in any case of assignment of a lease," that "the tenure
between the landlord and the lessee is at an end, but the contractual obligation continues," Upde-
graff, supra note 163, at 79-80. See supra notes 102-08 and accompanying text. The distinction is
merely that in reletting after abandonment, the old privity of estate is extinct and a new one is
created. In an assignment, by contrast, the original privity of estate and its contract promise, given
as security, can be seen to continue. To give substantive effects to such a distinction, however,
yields an anomalous result: when the original tenant does not breach, the original tenant is held
to the contract, and the landlord is given two possible debtors in the assignor and assignee,
whereas when the original tenant breaches, he is allowed to go free.
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Another speculation, perhaps more apt, is that exponents of the both-
or-neither limitation simply have lost sight of the dual nature of the
rent obligation and assume that the landlord only has one basis of re-
covery, a monistic lease, which must be stood upon or relinquished.1 72
Indeed, this kind of confusion1 73 is evident not only in the both-or-
neither cases, but also in others holding to the contrary that, without
accepting the surrender or losing his remedy, the landlord may relet the
premises to a second tenant, but only as self-appointed and wholly ficti-
tious agent for the first. 74 Although this fictitious agency theory for
allowing the landlord a recovery after reletting has held considerable
172. See, e.g., Ten-Six Olive Co. v. Curby, 208 F.2d 117, 121 (8th Cir. 1953) ("[A] surrender
and acceptance of a lease terminates the liability of the tenant on all obligations under the lease
not then accrued.") (emphasis added); Vineyard Village-Georgia v. Crum, 136 Ga. App. 335, 337,
221 S.E.2d 208, 210 (1925) ("[Acceptance of a surrender] discharges the tenant from liability for
future rents and a cancellation or rescission of the contract is thus effected by agreement of the
parties, express or implied.") (emphasis added). Sometimes a court will refuse to allow a recovery
of rent on the grounds of surrender and refuse to consider the possibility of the survival of con-
tract damages. See, e.g., Gray v. Kaufman Dairy & Ice Cream Co., 162 N.Y. 388, 56 N.E. 903
( 1900); Pelton v. Place, 71 Vt. 430, 46 A. 63 (1899). See also Haycock v. Johnson, 81 Minn. 49, 83
N.W. 494 (1900); Hensen v. B. & W. Fin. Co., 401 S.W.2d 261 (rex. Civ. App. 1966); Anderson v.
Andy Darling Pontiac, 257 Wis. 371, 43 N.W.2d 362 (1950). For a discussion of variations and
cases, see Kanter v. Safran, 68 So. 2d 553, 557 (Fla. 1953).
For a recent case which kept the dual nature of the rent obligation in very clear focus, see
Winshall v. Ampco Auto Parks, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 334 (E.D. Mich. 1976), in which the court
specifically rejected defendant's attempt to confuse the issue by trying "to engraft the cumbersome
doctrine of surrender onto the body of contract law." Id at 336. See also Novak v. Fontaine
Furniture Co., 84 N.H. 93, 146 A. 525 (1929); Brown v. Hayes, 92 Wash. 300, 159 P. 89 (1916).
173. There are other sorts of confusion as well. For example, it is the view in New York that a
surrender of possession is not always a surrender of a "lease" or of the estate thereby created, and
that acceptance of a surrender of possession is merely evidence of a surrender of the estate. Kot-
tler v. New York Bargain House, Inc., 242 N.Y. 28, 34, 150 N.E. 591, 593 (1926). Thus, even after
reletting, the landlord may still recover "rent" as opposed to "damages" from the first tenant,
provided only that the reletting was with the tenant's consent. Underhill v. Collins, 132 N.Y. 269,
271, 30 N.E. 576, 577 (1892). This rent, however, is measured rather like damages. Id at 272, 30
N.E. at 577. Moreover, whether this rent obligation survives the estate termination or not depends
on the existence of a contract calling for such survival. Michals v. Fishel, 169 N.Y. 381, 62 N.E.
425 (1902). Thus, the rent obligation seems incontestably contractual in nature. If, on the other
hand, the landlord takes possession by summary dispossession proceedings, the tenant's liability is
said to be "not for rent, but for damages." Hermitage Co. v. Levine, 248 N.Y. 333, 162 N.E. 97
(1928). See also infra note 197.
174. E.g., Liberty Plan Co. v. Adwan, 370 P.2d 928 (Okla. 1962). In Ralph v. Deiley, 293 Pa.
90, 141 A. 640 (1928), the court specifically recognized the dual nature of the lease, but then
inexplicably stated that "privity of estate is divested when the lessee [merely] quits the premises"
while acceptance of the surrender would terminate the privity of contract. Id at 95, 141 A. at 643.
Incidentally, subsumed under "fictitious agency" cases are those holdings that ascribe the con-
tinuation of contract damages liability to the fact that the landlord in reletting is acting "for the
account" or "for the benefit" of the tenant, whether or not the court actually uses the word
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sway, the fiction upon which it rests is unnecessary and distracting'"
and has served mainly to produce confused opinions 7 6 and anomolous
holdings. 7 7 There is no reason why a landlord who reenters after an
abandonment, either resuming possession or reletting the premises,
should be deemed to have accepted both the proffered surrender and
the offer of mutual rescission.178
In most jurisdictions there is no "both-or-neither" limitation on the
landlord's choices, and Choice II is recognized as one of the landlord's
possible responses to the tenant's abandonment, even if sometimes on
the fictitious agency theory. There are two variants of the rule.
7 9
Under the first, the landlord may accept the surrender of the leasehold,
thereby terminating the privity of estate without impairing the land-
lord's contract rights, provided notice is given to the tenant that this is
the landlord's intention. 180 Under the second variant, the landlord's
contract rights are preserved, provided only that the landlord demon-
strate an intention to do so in dealing with the premises.181 Under
"agent." E.g., DeHart v. Allen, 26 Cal. 2d 829, 832, 161 P.2d 453,455 (1945); Carpenter v. Riddle,
527 P.2d 592, 594 (Okla. 1974).
175. See Hermitage Co. v. Levine, 248 N.Y. 333, 162 N.E. 97 (1928); 1 A.L.P., rupra note 17,
at § 3.99; 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at § 16.302. The agency theory is more than just an inapt
fiction; it carries with it such excess baggage as the seemingly irrelevant question whether, without
the tenant's consent, the landlord can act as the tenant's agent in reletting. Compare Gray v.
Kaufman Dairy & Ice Cream Co., 162 N.Y. 388,56 N.E. 903 (1900) with Underhill v. Collins, 132
N.Y. 269, 30 N.E. 576 (1892).
176. See supra notes 172 & 174.
177. If the landlord relets as the tenant's agent, it would be anomalous to hold, as courts do,
that the tenant has no right to any surplus which the landlord might gain by reletting. E.g.,
Whitcomb v. Brant, 90 N.J.L. 245, 100 A. 175 (1917). See Wanderer v. Plainfield Carton Corp.,
40 Ill. App. 3d 552 (1976); Eidelman v. Walker & Dunlop, 265 Md. 538, 290 A.2d 780 (1972);
Maida v. Main Bldg., 473 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971). It is quite an anomalous agent who
does not have to account to its principal for the profits of the endeavors on the principal's behalf.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 427 (1958); F. MECHAM, OUTLINES OF LAW OF
AGENCY 365 (4th ed. 1952); W. SEAVY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 243-44 (1964).
178. Winshall v. Ampco Auto Parks, 417 F. Supp. 334 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Novak v. Fontaine
Furniture Co., 84 N.H. 93, 146 A. 526 (1929); Brown v. Hayes, 92 Wash. 300, 159 P. 89 (1916). See
supra text accompanying notes 163-64. In Gordon v. Consol. Sunray, 195 Kan. 341, 346, 404 P.2d
949, 954 (1965), the court stated: "Acceptance of a surrender of a lease should not be presumed.
The burden of proving it is on the lessee .... "
179. The two variants are expressed in terms of the dual-relation conception of leases, al-
though the cases themselves are often rationalized in other terms, such as the fictitious agency
theory.
180. Eg., Von Schleinitz v. North Hotel Co., 323 Mo. 1110, 23 S.W.2d 64 (1929); Liberty Plan
Co. v. Adwan, 370 P.2d 928 (Okla. 1962); Karns v. Vestor Motor Co., 161 Tenn. 331, 30 S.W.2d
245 (1930). See 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 675.
181. Eg., Sagamore Corp. v. Willcutt, 120 Conn. 315, 180 A. 464 (1935); Kanter v. Safran, 68
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either variant, the results are the same: the tenant's privity-of-estate
duty to pay rent and right to possession are extinguished, while the
tenant's liability for mitigated damages on the contractual promise to
pay is preserved.'i 2
3. Forfeiture by the Tenant. Under the general common-law rule,
absent provision for forfeiture in the lease, the tenant's right to posses-
sion for the term is not affected by the tenant's failure to pay the rent or
to perform any other obligations under the lease.18 3 That is, at com-
mon law, leases are nonforfeitable for breach, absent an express condi-
tion or limitation on the leasehold estate.184 Nevertheless, landlords
can and do provide for lease termination or reentry when tenants de-
fault. Moreover, it seems fair to say that, by custom if not law, forfeita-
ble leaseholds are more the norm than the exception today even if
courts abhor forfeiture and are alert to prevent or relieve against it.'8 5
Because forfeiture works by means of express conditions or limita-
tions terminating the tenant's estate, the juridical effect of a forfeiture
is, at very least, to extinguish the privity of estate."8 6 The situation is
So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1953); Hoke v. Williamson, 98 Kan. 580, 158 P. 1115 (1916); Novak v. Fontaine
Furniture Co., 84 N.H. 93, 146 A. 525 (1929); Ralph v. Deiley, 293 Pa. 90, 141 A. 640 (1928).
182. See cases cited supra notes 180-81. Any contractual obligations of the landlord in rela-
tion to possession should, presumably, be discharged as a result of the tenant's material breach.
Amick v. Metropolitan Mortgage & See. Co., 453 P.2d 412 (Alaska 1969), overruled on other
grounds, Wickwire v. City & Borough of Juneau, 557 P.2d 783 (Alaska 1976). See Walker & Co.
v. Harrison, 347 Mich. 630, 81 N.W.2d 352 (1957); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§§ 241-243 (1981); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 274,397 (1932). Acceptance of the proffered
surrender eliminates the tenant's property basis for continued possession, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 47-56 & 72-82, and the remaining legal relationship of the parties rests solely in con-
tract.
For a case illuminating this distinction, see Kulawitz v. Pacific Woodenware & Paper Co., 25
Cal. 2d 664, 155 P.2d 24 (1945). In Kuiawit, the tenant abandoned possession, but no acceptance
of surrender or rescission occurred. The landlord then brought an action for rent while the ten-
ant's possessory and contractual rights were both still in force. Although the tenant was in default
on the rent, the tenant's continuing possessory interest prevented application of the usual contract
consequences of a material breach. Id. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 246
(1981); RETATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 309-310 (1932). Indeed, the continuing possessory inter-
est supplied justification for discharge of the tenant under the lease when the landlord breached a
counter-promise.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 72-82.
184. See supra note 76.
185. See generally R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 17, at 385-94; Humbach, supra note 77, at 266-
332; infra text accompanying notes 295-313. Even with a forfeiture provision, the landlord's
power to evict is seriously limited by equitable and other judicial protections.
186. Hall v. Gould, 13 N.Y. 127 (1855); Oldershaw v. Holt, 12 Ad. & E. 590, 113 Eng. Rep.
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similar to cases of eviction 187 where, as previously mentioned, the priv-
ity of estate and the duty to pay rent arising out of it terminates. 188 In
cases of wrongful eviction, the landlord loses not only the privity-of-
estate right to reserved rent but also the contractual right to rent pay-
ments. The contract right to rent is lost because, by wrongfully evicting
the tenant, the landlord has committed a breach' 89 which would, on
ordinary contract principles, discharge the tenant from further
performance. 190
When a leasehold is forfeited on the grounds that the tenant has
committed a material breach, however, the eviction by the landlord is
justified rather than wrongful. Although a justified eviction terminates
privity of estate and the attendant right to reserved rent, a justified evic-
tion should not necessarily affect the tenant's contractual obligations
under the lease. By acting pursuant to an appropriate provision for
forfeiture in the lease, the landlord ought to be able to terminate the
privity of estate without breaching any duty owed to the tenant. One
might therefore expect that an eviction on forfeiture should not consti-
tute a per se excuse or discharge of the tenant from the contract-based
obligations under the lease. Although a forfeiture must extinguish the
obligation for rent, it does not follow that the tenant's liability for con-
tract damages necessarily should also be extinguished unless the parties
agree to a release. 9' Despite this reasoning, however, it is the general
935 (1840). See Hermitage Co. v. Levine, 248 N.Y. 333, 162 N.E. 97 (1928); Lincoln Fireproof
Warehouse Co. v. Greusel, 199 Wis. 428, 224 N.W. 98 (1929).
187. See Kelley v. Von Herberg, 184 Wash. 165, 50 P.2d 23 (1935); supra note 83.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 83-89.
189. For a discussion of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, see szpra notes 31 & 84-85.
190. In order to excuse a tenant, the landlord's breach would have to be material. See Infra
notes 278 & 295. In the case of a contract to supply possession, however, one can scarcely imagine
a more material breach than eviction from that very possession.
191. If the tenant breaches by abandoning possession and ceasing to pay the rent two possible
characterizations may apply to the landlord's resumption of the tenant's estate: either forfeiture
based upon the tenant's wrongful abandonment, or acceptance of a proffered surrender. There is
only one necessary analytical difference between forfeiture after the tenant's abandonment and
acceptance of the proffered surrender in such a case. The difference is that forfeiture must ostensi-
bly be founded upon a forfeiture provision in the lease, or on a statute providing for forfeiture, see
supra text accompanying notes 72-81, whereas the acceptance of a proffered surrender is thought
of as an independent, post-lease transaction between the parties, for which no lease provision is
required. The juridical effects on privity of estate and privity of contract could be and arguably
should be the same for both, that is, the tenant's estate and reserved rent obligation are extin-
guished, but the tenant's contract obligations continue unimpaired. Nevertheless, because of the
confused development of the law on surrenders, such as its fictitious agency theory, see ajora notes
167-82 and accompanying text, and the general presumption that forfeiture also extinguishes con-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss4/2
CONCEPTION OF LEASING
rule that a termination of the lease by the landlord's retaking of posses-
sion upon a forfeiture extinguishes all further obligations. 192
Fundamentally, the matter should be one of intention: the juridical
effects of a forfeiture provision-whether the forfeiture extinguished
privity of estate alone or the privities of estate and contract-should
depend on the parties' intentions in creating the provision. 93 Thus, in
one view, a forfeiture provision may be treated as an alternative dura-
tion provision for the overall arrangement, intended to apply to the
parties' contractual relationship as well as to the leasehold estate itself.
This interpretation would be appropriate in a case in which, for exam-
ple, the lease provided that, on the tenant's breach, the lease would
-determine and be utterly void"' 9 4 or that it would "cease and come to
an end as if that were the day originally fixed [t]herein for the expira-
tion of the term [t]hereof.'' 95 Conversely, if the lease contains a con-
tractual undertaking that expressly continues the tenant's liability-a
so-called survival clause or lessee's covenant of indemnity-then liabil-
ity for contract damages should survive forfeiture.'96 Why such a sur-
vival clause or covenant of indemnity should be necessary to preserve
contract-damage liability is questionable,' 97 though the issue is merely
tract rights, see infra notes 192-96 and accompanying text, the two have significantly different
juridical effects. As a result, it matters considerably which response a landlord chooses after the
tenant abandons. See McCormick, supra note 116.
192. 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 669-70; Annot., 99 A.L.R. 42 (1935). See McArthur v.
Rostek, 483 P.2d 1351 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971); Sutton v. Goodman, 194 Mass. 389 (1907).
193. See Grommes v. St. Paul Trust Co., 147 IUl. 634, 35 N.E. 820 (1893).
194. Jones v. Carter, 15 M. & W. 718, 153 Eng. Rep. 1040 (1846).
195. Rohrt v. Kelley Mfg. Co., 162 Tex. 534, 536, 349 S.W.2d 95, 96 (1961).
196. E.g., William Filene's Sons v. Weed, 245 U.S. 597 (1918); Hermitage Co. v. Levine, 248
N.Y. 333, 162 N.E. 97 (1928); Selts Inv. Co. v. Promoters of the Federated Nations, 197 Wis. 471,
222 N.W. 812 (1929). See I A.L.P., supra note 17, at § 3.97. But see Northern Ind. Steel Supply
Co. v. Chrisman, 139 Ind. App. 27, 36-37, 204 N.E.2d 668, 673-74 (1965).
197. In Oldershaw v. Holt, 12 Ad. & E. 590, 113 Eng. Rep. 935 (1840), the court apparently
was prepared to allow a recovery of any provable contract damages even though the obligation for
reserved rent had terminated. Similarly, in Hall v. Gould, 13 N.Y. 127 (1855), the court upheld a
judgment for damages rendered on a claim for rent, saying that, though the estate was at an end
and rent, as such, could no longer accrue, liability nevertheless rested on covenant. These cases,
however, seem to have no following, and Hall v. Gould seems to have been effectively limited to
cases of reentry by ejectment action or without legal process. Summary dispossession proceedings
are the more usual proceeding for recovering possession in New York and such proceedings are
held to annul the relation of landlord and tenant except to the extent that there are covenants that
expressly survive such proceedings. Michaels v. Fishel, 169 N.Y. 381, 62 N.E. 425 (1902); Gray v.
Kaufman Dairy & Ice Cream Co., 162 N.Y. 388, 56 N.E. 903 (1900).
The more typical view, stated in Watson v. Merrill, 136 F. 359, 362 (8t Cir. 1905), is that
resumption of possession by the landlord "necessarily constituted, in the absence of an express
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one of correct interpretation, not of conception. Thus, the propriety of
the usual interpretive presumption is not of direct concern to the pres-
ent analysis. In any case, a draftsman can readily avoid the problem by
explicitly clarifying intention. 98 The important point is that, after a
forfeiture, any rent obligation which does survive, whether or not ex-
pressly provided for, can only be purely contractual'99 and is therefore
subject to the rule of mitigation.20 0
4. Evaluation of the Traditional and "Purely" Contractual Analyses.
In treating a lease as a contract of conveyance and applying ordinary
contract principles to it, we have seen that when the tenant wrongfully
abondons or breaches a condition of the lease two distinct possibilities
emerge. First, the landlord may recover the full reserved rent without
mitigating damages by choosing to stand on the conveyance and re-jecting the tenant's attempt to force title back.2°' Second, the landlord
will be expected to mitigate damages if he reacts to the tenant's breach
by taking back title through an acceptance of the proffered surrender,
or by a forfeiture.
Although the conveyance theory of leasing can explain the tradi-
tional outcomes in terms of a coherent conception of leasing transac-
tions, such conceptual explanations do not justify those outcomes or, in
particular, justify the rule that the landlord can recover the full rent
without mitigation. To the contrary, the significant minority of courts
agreement to the contrary, a termination of the lease, and a release of the lessee from the payment
of all the installments of rent he had promised to pay thereafter." One possible explanation of this
interpretational bias towards total extinction of all further liability is that, having retaken the
possession, it would be unfair to allow the landlord to have the premises' use as well as the agreed
compensation for its use. See Lamson Consol. Store Serv. Co. v. Bowland, 114 F. 639, 641 (6th
Cir. 1902). Nevertheless, this hardly explains the refusal to allow contract damages. See Grom-
mes v. St. Paul Trust Co., 147 Ill. 634, 35 N.E. 820 (1893); infra note 214. Another possible reason
for this rule is that, if the purpose of the contract liability is to provide "better security," then the
contract liability should terminate whenever the secured obligation terminates. See supra text
accompanying notes 170-77.
198. See supra note 196.
199. Crawford Clothes, Inc. v. Levine, 434 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1970); Grommes v. St. Paul Trust
Co., 147 Ill. 634, 35 N.E. 820 (1892); Fifty Assocs. v. Berger Dry Goods Co., 275 Mass. 509, 176
N.E. 643 (1931); Hermitage Co. v. Levine, 248 N.Y. 333, 162 N.E. 97 (1928); Selts Inv. Co. v.
Promoters of Federated Nations, 197 Wis. 476, 222 N.W. 812 (1929). See 2 H. TIFFANY, supra
note 32, at 1494 n.75.
200. See supra note 199. See also Satin v. Buckley, 246 A.2d 778 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968); Jordon
v. Nickell, 253 S.W.2d 237 (Ky. 1952); Monger v. Lutterloh, 195 N.C. 274, 142 S.E. 12 (1928).
201. Depending upon its wording, however, breach by the tenant of a conditional limitation
may force title back on the landlord without his desiring it. See supra note 76.
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that have refused in recent times to apply the no-mitigation rule have
said in doing so that they were rejecting the conveyance theory and
treating leases like other contracts.2 2 But does rejection of the no-miti-
gation rule really require rejection of the conveyance theory, and more
to the point, is a purely contract theory of leasing really better suited to
support a general mitigation rule for leases than the traditional convey-
ance-cum-contract conception?20 3
Although the adoption of a mitigation rule for leases supposedly is
an application of ordinary contract principles to leases, an examina-
tion of the mitigation-rule cases themselves often belies that claim.
Many cases hold, for example, that in order to have any recovery, the
landlord must affirmatively prove that reasonable efforts were made to
relet the abandoned premises.2 4 That is, without an attempt to miti-
gate, no damages are recoverable at all. This "duty" to mitigate,
backed up by a forfeiture, is not at all the rule applied to breaches of
ordinary contracts.
Under the general measure of damages for breach of an executory
contract for an exchange of values, the aggrieved party may usually
recover at least the difference between the value to be provided by the
breaching party and the fair market value of the aggrieved party's own
performance.205 This general measure of damages does not presup-
pose or require that the aggrieved party attempt to mitigate damages;
that is, it does not create a "duty" of mitigation backed up by a forfei-
ture. Rather, it merely places the onus of securing a substituted per-
202. See. e.g., Vawter v. McKissick, 159 N.W.2d 538 (Iowa 1968); Bernstein v. Seglin, 184
Neb. 673, 171 N.W.2d 247 (1969); Sommer v. Kridel, 74 N.J. 446, 378 A.2d 767 (1977); Lefrak v.
Lambert, 89 Misc. 2d 197, 390 N.Y.S.2d 959 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1976); Parkwood Realty Co. v. Mar-
cano, 77 Misc. 2d 690, 353 N.Y.S.2d 623 (N.Y Civ. Ct. 1974); Mar-Son, Inc. v. Terwaho Enters.,
Inc., 259 N.W.2d 289 (N.D. 1977); Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 534, 565-70 (1968).
203. Despite the occasional attacks on the conveyance conception of leases, see, e.g., Sommer
v. Kridel, 74 N.J. 446, 378 A.2d 767 (1977); Lefrak v. Lambert, 89 Misc. 2d 197, 390 N.Y.S.2d 959
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1976); supra notes I1 & 118, there is no case to my knowledge that purports to reject
the conveyance theory for purposes of determining the tenant's right to possession. Consequently,
whatever courts may say, they are not adopting a contractual theory of leasing, at least not for all
purposes. Such an attempt to mount two horses at the same time is perhaps conceptually unaes-
thetic but may be acceptable if justice compel; it. But does justice compel it?
204. Vawter v. McKissick, 159 N.W.2d 538 (Iowa 1968) (part of cause of action); Sommer v.
Kridel, 74 N.J. 446, 378 A.2d 767 (1977) (same); Lefrak v. Lambert, 89 Misc. 2d 197, 390 N.Y.S.2d
959 (N.Y, Civ. Ct. 1976) (same); but cf. Hirsh v. Merchants Natl Bank & Trust Co., 166 Ind. App.
497, 336 N.E.2d 833 (1975) (tenant must prove possibility of mitigation); Parkwood Realty Co. v.
Marcano, 77 Misc. 2d 690, 693, 353 N.Y.S.2d 623, 626 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1974) (same).
205. See supra note 133.
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formance on the aggrieved party.2 °6
An employment contract probably is the kind of ordinary contract
most closely resembling a lease. Like a lease, in its contract aspects, an
employment contract involves a continuous interchange of values be-
tween the parties. 20 7 The employee hires out his services over an
agreed term much as a landlord, in contractual terms, hires out the use
of his premises. Thus, a premature wrongful discharge of the employee
compares with the premature abandonment by a tenant of the use of
the premises hired for a term from the landlord. Quite interestingly,
the usual contract rule for employment contract cases closely parallels
the traditional no-mitigation rule for leases: the wrongfully discharged
employee is allowed to recover the present value of the full contract
wage, without mitigation, unless the employer sustains the burden of
proving facts of mitigation, such as substitute income which was or rea-
sonably could have been earned.208 If this ordinary contract rule were
applied to leases, a landlord could at least recover the difference be-
tween the rent and fair rental value, and perhaps the full rent, even if
the landlord made no effort to mitigate damages.20 9
Likewise, the cases rejecting the no-mitigation rule for leases do not
always seem to take adequate account of another ordinary contract
rule, sometimes referred to as the "lost volume" seller rule. This rule
applies to cases in which, after a breach, the aggrieved promisee cannot
truly prevent ensuing loss by making a substitute contract with another
party. This results when the "substitute" contract would have been
available to the promisee even if the first contract had not been
206. "The rule of mitigation may not be invoked by a contract breaker as a basis for hypercrit-
ical examination of the conduct of the injured party. . . . [The defendant] had the burden of
proving that the plaintiff did not use reasonable diligence in procuring a substitute . " Apex
Mining Co. v. Chicago Copper & Chem. Co., 306 F.2d 725, 731 (8th Cir. 1962).
207. Under the Louisiana Civil Code, as a matter of comparison, leases and employment con-
tracts are treated in the same Title ("Of Lease") as alternative types of synallagmatic contracts for
hire. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN., arts. 2669, 2673-75 (1952). See also Whitaker v. Hawley, 25 Kan.
674, 687 (1881); Williston, supra note 30; supra note 48.
208. E.g., Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 176, 474 P.2d 689, 89 Cal. Rptr.
737 (1970); Crillo v. Curtola, 91 Cal. App. 2d 263, 204 P.2d 941 (1949); Krehbiel v. Goering, 179
Kan. 55, 293 P.2d 255 (1956); Spurk v. Civil Serv. Bd., 231 Minn. 183, 42 N.W.2d 720 (1950). See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 comment c (1981); D. DOBBS, supra note 73, at
§ 12.25; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 133, at 627-28; Farnsworth, supra note 133, at 1195. The rule
has been criticized, see, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, supra note 133, at 628, but it has held firm
nevertheless.
209. See Whitehorn v. Dickenson, 419 S.W.2d 713 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967) (Tennessee law) (dic-
tum supporting proposition although adhering to no-mitigation rule).
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breached. Were it not for the breach, the promisee could have had the
advantage of both contracts. The breach of one of the contracts, how-
ever, irretrievably deprives the promisee of the advantage of that con-
tract. Because, in such cases, the second contract does not truly
mitigate the loss from breach of the first one, the rule of mitigation
ordinarily would not require the promisee's recovery to be reduced by
any amounts received under the second contract.210
Similarly, a landlord of a multi-unit building in which there nearly
always is a number of empty units might never be able to mitigate
damages by reletting a breaching tenant's apartment. If the landlord
did relet the breaching tenant's apartment while there are other vacan-
cies, the landlord might thereby lose a chance to lease one of the other
vacant apartments. It does not, however, generally appear from the
cases rejecting the no-mitigation rule that the landlord becomes enti-
tled to the full rent simply by showing other vacancies.211
Thus, many of the results in cases requiring mitigation, though pro-
fessedly based upon ordinary contract law, seem to deviate freely from
it. A rather special contract law has been invented if contract theory is
to account for the results. These results would, however, in most prac-
tical situations, fit rather nicely under the traditional conveyance theory
of leasing. All that is required is to recognize the reality that when the
tenant acts to relinquish his claim to possess the premises, the posses-
sion in fact usually is resumed by the landlord. The landlord may not
want the possession, but it is hard to believe that in most cases the
landlord does not in fact accept the possession. Certainly, landlords do
not under such circumstances regard the right of possession as up for
grabs, available to anyone who wishes to take occupancy.2 12 Most
landlords would act firmly and decisively to exclude any squatters who
210. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 347 comment f, 350, comment d (1981);
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 133, at § 41; J. MURRAY, supra note 114, at 462-63; Farnsworth, supra
note 133, at 1195-98. See also Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 30 N.Y.2d 293, 285 N.E.2d 311, 334
N.Y.S.2d 165 (1972); U.C.C. § 2-708(2);.
211. The idea was specifically rejected in Sommer v. Kridel, 74 N.J. 446, 457, 378 A.2d 763,
773 (1977), in which the court said that the landlord must treat the apartment in question as if it
were one of his vacant stock. See, e.g., Dushoff v. Phoenix Co., 22 Ariz. App. 445, 528 P.2d 637
(1974) (number of units the landlord has for rent is taken into account in determining reasonable-
ness of effort to relet). See also Lefrak v. Lambert, 89 Misc. 2d 197, 390 N.Y.S.2d 959 (N.Y. Civ.
Ct. 1976); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-207 (1981).
212. This notion is reminiscent of the old rule of general occupancy which applied to life
estates pur autre vie ("to .4 for the life of B"). If the life tenant died before the cestui que vie,
nobody had an automatic right to possession, and the rule was that "[hle that first can hap it, shall
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may appear, and this exclusion-oriented frame of mind, plus control de
facto exercised by the landlord, constitutes possession.
If the landlord does not make reasonable efforts to relet or otherwise
take advantage of the potential benefits of resumed possession, then the
landlord has only himself to blame for the premises' low yield.2" 3 In
any event, as a possessor excluding others from the premises' benefit or
yield, the landlord ought to be deemed to be receiving, and perhaps
also spurning, the benefits of possession. 1 4 Privity of estate would, of
course, be extinguished on such a view. Therefore, the landlord's only
possibility of recovery would be on a contract basis for the difference
between fair rental value which he is deemed to have received and the
rent agreed to in the lease. Thus, implicitly, the rule of mitigation
would apply to such recovery.215 Consonant with the conveyance con-
ception of leases, the burden would be on the landlord, as a seller, to
show that the claimed losses were not mitigatable; that is, that the fair
rental value of the premises was less than the rent agreed upon in the
broken lease.216 Further, because the repossessed premises would be
"the landlord's," they would properly be treatable as a part of his va-
cant stock for purposes of determining whether mitigation is
possible.21 7
Admittedly, the view that a landlord does resume possession in fact
after abandonment is a departure from one of the traditional assump-
enjoy out the term." See H. CHALLIS, supra note 37, at 359; R. MEGARRY & H. WADE, mipra note
21, at 103-04. See also 1 A.L.P., supra note 17, at § 226.
213. Compare supra note 151 with supra text accompanying notes 144-46. See Wright v.
Kilgo, 212 Ga. 712, 95 S.E.2d 7 (1956); Sanden v. Hanson, 201 N.W.2d 404 (N.D. 1972); Frisco
Joe's, Inc. v. Peay, 558 P.2d 1327 (Utah 1977); Richter v. Fassett, 253 Wis. 101, 33 N.W.2d 230
(1948).
214. See supra notes 125 & 151. Though the landlord may be receiving the benefits of posses-
sion, it must be remembered that he is nevertheless being deprived of the benefits of his bargain.
Those benefits include not merely the difference between the agreed rent and the fair rental value
of the premises, but also the value of the freedom from the risks of possession. Seesupra note 100.
Accordingly, even after applying the conveyance theory in the fashion described in the text, the
landlord seemingly should still be entitled to a contractual recovery of the fair rental value differ-
ential plus costs, including lost rent during a reasonable vacancy period pending reletting, arising
from the need to relet--costs whose risk were supposedly shifted under the original lease.
215. See supra note 137.
216. D. DoBBs, supra note 73, at § 12.6. See Davis v. Wilson, 261 Or. 137, 493 P.2d 31 (1972)
(citing 3 S. WILLISTON, SALES § 582 (1948) on the burden of a seller of goods to prove the general
measure of damages). The case implicitly treats a lease as a conveyance although recognizing that
the rule of mitigation applies-thereby reaching the result of cases like those cited .rupra note 204,
without resort to a novel contract theory rationale.
217. See supra note 211.
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tions of the conveyance theory.21 The particular assumption departed
from is, however, one of fact, not concept; it is merely a question of
interpreting actual intent to retake dominion and control, based upon
the evidence of conduct. Moreover, the departure appears likely to
conform better with the usual facts under modem conditions and pat-
terns of behavior. In any event, such a departure certainly is less than
that required by the adoption of a contract theory of leasing. Despite
frequent assertions to the contrary, few of the desired results in aban-
donment cases could be better rationalized by conceiving of leases
purely as contracts, at least not by reference to ordinary contract law.
If, however, leases are treated as conveyances in the traditional concep-
tion, for which and concerning which contracts are made, ordinary
contract law applied to the resulting conveyance-cum-contract readily
provides a conceptual account for the rule of mitigation.
B. The Problem of Services
The typical lease of space in a multi-unit building is not merely an
exchange of rent for possession. Rather, it is an exchange of rent for
possession-plus-services.21 9 Services that are expected to accompany
possession usually include maintenance and repairs of the physical fa-
cility, but can also include such items as utilities, central heat, door-
men, or even saunas and pools, depending upon the circumstances and
the parties' agreement. As an original question, the services part of the
exchange may or may not have been conveniently fit into a purely con-
veyance theory of lease rights and duties.22 Nevertheless, until very
218. See supra note 148. Perhaps one reason for holding that de facto resumptions of posses-
sion are not acceptances of proffered surrenders, see supra notes 125 & 148, is the desire to avoid
depriving the landlord of all rights against the defaulting tenant, on the assumption that accept-
ance of surrender would extinguish the landlord's contract rights to rent. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 167-82.
219. Javins v. First Nat'I Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
925 (1970); Kamarath v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. 1978). See also King v. Moorehead, 495
S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Park West Management Corp. v. Mitchell, 47 N.Y.2d 316, 418
N.Y.S.2d 310, 391 N.E.2d 1288, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979). See generally Quinn & Phillips,
supra note 11, at 225-39.
220. The idea of affirmative duties as a part of property interests is hardly unknown. There
are, for example, the duties with respect to hazardous conditions, which are imposed in favor of
invitees, passers-by, and others, on persons who possess land. See W. PROSSER, TORTS 351-99
(4th ed. 1971). In addition, there are the affirmative duties attaching in the form of so-called real
covenants or equitable servitudes. E.g., Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Indus. Say.
Bank, 278 N.Y. 248, 15 N.E.2d 783 (1938); 2 A.L.P., supra note 17, at §§ 9.16, .36. Perhaps more
on point is the implied covenant or obligation of the tenant to make ordinary repairs in order to
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recently, no general obligation on the landlord to provide services be-
yond bare possession has been understood to arise from the conveyance
of the possessory interest itself.22'
In theory, at least, it should be no cause of serious concern that the
conveyance aspect of a lease transaction does not protect the tenant's
service-related expectations. If the parties to a lease are not satisfied
with the law-imposed details of their legal relationship, they can always
modify those details. By contractual agreement, the basic landlord-ten-
ant relation created in a conveyance can be shaped and molded to fit
the requirements of virtually any imaginable exchange relation involv-
ing a temporary interest in real estate.222 For two important reasons,
however, the possibility of contracting has not proved a panacea for
perceived deficiencies in the basic conveyance-created relation. First,
parties-especially residential tenants-very often do not or realisti-
cally cannot bargain for the contractual protections they need in order
to have a legal right to the benefits that they expect to receive under the
lease. Second, even when the desired contractual protections are suc-
cessfully bargained for, such protections may be rendered practically
nugatory by the long-held rule that a tenant in possession must pay the
full rent whether or not the landlord performs the contractual obliga-
tions to provide services under the lease. This rule for leases, superfi-
cially at variance with ordinary contract law,223 is sometimes referred
to as the doctrine of "independence of covenants" in leases.224
L Failure of Tenants to Negotiatefor DesiredProtections. As a mat-
ter of common law, the landlord traditionally had no law-imposed gen-
eral obligation to put or maintain the leased premises in any particular
prevent permissive waste. See infra note 226 and accompanying text. Because the rights and
duties arising out of privity of estate were essentially law-imposed incidents of a voluntarily as-
sumed status relationship, it may be guessed that they were intentionally made no more onerous
or detailed than was required by the status relationship-between possessor and the reversioner,
or incorporeal-interest, holder.
221. See infra text accompanying notes 225-29.
222. The law-implied rights and duties under a lease are almost never mandatory and almost
always yield to a contrary agreement of the parties. See tenBraak v. Waffle Shops, Inc., 542 F.2d
919, 925 n.8 (4th Cir. 1976); M. Karam & Sons Mercantile Co. v. Serrano, 51 Ariz. 397, 77 P.2d
447 (1938); Bovin v. Galitzka, 250 N.Y. 228, 165 N.E. 273 (1929).
223. See infra text accompanying note 269.
224. E.g., Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Durant Land Improvement Co., 144 N.Y. 34, 39
N.E. 7 (1894); Pugh v. Holmes, 384 A.2d 1234 (Pa. Super. 1978); Rock County Say. & Trust Co. v.
Yost's, Inc., 36 Wis. 2d 360, 153 N.W.2d 594 (1967); J. MURRAY, supra note 114, at § 183; 6 S.
WILLISTON, supra note 24, at § 890.
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condition.225 To the contrary, consonant with the conveyance theory
that the tenant is owner of a temporary interest in land, the tenant has
been the one required to make ordinary repairs.2 26 The failure to make
such repairs would be actionable by the landlord and is referred to as
"permissive waste. 2 27 Of course, it would be theoretically possible for
the landlord to assume contractually the responsibility for keeping the
225. Eg., E.P. Hinkel & Co. v. Manhattan Co., 506 F.2d 201, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Smithfield
Improvement Co. v. Coley-Bardin, 156 N.C. 225, 72 S.E. 312 (1911). Accord Lawler v. Capital
City Life Ins. Co., 68 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1933); Richard Paul, Inc. v. Union Improvement Co., 59
F. Supp. 52 (D. Del. 1945); Service Oil Co. v. White, 218 Kan. 87, 542 P.2d 652 (1975); Hart v.
Windsor, 12 M. & W. 68, 152 Eng. Rep. 114 (1843); Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn 26, 82 Eng. Rep. 897
(1647). See generally 1 A.L.P.,supra note 17, at § 3.45; 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 392-93; 2
R. POWELL, supra note 3, at § 225. Over time, exceptions were grafted on to the general rule, such
as making the landlord responsible for common areas and facilities, see, e.g., Primus v. Bellevue
Apartments, 241 Iowa 1055, 44 N.W.2d 347 (1950); Charlow v. Blankenship, 80 W. Va. 200, 92
S.E. 318 (1917); 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 406-07, for the fitness of particular facilities
which the landlord contracted to provide, see, e.g., Woolford v. Electric Appliances, Inc., 24 Cal.
App. 385, 75 P.2d 112 (1938), or for the condition of furnished premises leased for short terms, see
infra note 240. There was, however, no general warranty of habitability or fitness, and primary
responsibility for the condition of the premises was left to the tenant, like any other owner of an
interest in land. "[Flraud apart, there is no law against letting a tumbledown house." Robbins v.
Jones, 15 C.B. (N.S.) 221, 240, 143 Eng. Rep. 768, 776 (1863).
226. E.g., E.P. Hinkel & Co. v. Manhattan Co., 506 F.2d 201 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Thomas v.
Roper, 162 Conn. 343, 294 A.2d 321 (1972); 1 A.L.P.,supra note 17, at § 3.78; 5 A.L.P., supra note
17, at § 20.12; R. POWELL, supra note 3, at 1 640; R. SCHO5HINSKI, supra note 17, at 269-77. For a
description of the types of repairs required of the tenant, see cases cited supra See also discussion
in Suydam v. Jackson, 54 N.Y. 450, 454 (1873):
[T]he implied covenant or obligation of a lessee growing out of the relation of landlord
and tenant [is], "to treat the premises demised in such manner that no injury be done to
the inheritance, but that the estate may revert to the lessor undeteriorated by the willful
or negligent conduct of the lessee .... If a window in a dwelling should blow in, the
tenant could not permit it to remain out and the storms to beat in and greatly injure the
premises without liability for permissive waste; and if a shingle or board on the roof
should blow off or become out of repair, the tenant could not permit the water, in time of
rain, to flood the premises, and thus injure them, without a similar liability. He being
present, a slight effort and expense on his part could save a great loss; and hence the law
justly casts the burden upon him.
Id
The court concluded, however, that "the Lessee was not bound to make substantial, lasting or
general repairs, but only such ordinary repairs as were necessary to prevent waste and decay of the
premises." Id
227. Suydam v. Jackson, 54 N.Y. 450, 454 (1873). See also supra note 51. Technically, the
common law did not authorize any remedy for waste in the case of tenants for years. The remedy
was first provided by the Statute of Marlbridge, 52 Hen. 3, ch. 23, § 2 (1267), subsequently ex-
panded by the Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. 1, ch. 5 (1278). Both were repealed, Repeal Act, 42
Vict., ch. 59 (1879), though not before their substance became a part of American law. See supra
notes 81 & 226.
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premises in repair.228 Traditionally, however, the landlord may refuse
such responsibility and, in a tight housing market, the tenant might
have no option but to deal on the terms which the landlord offers.229 In
any case, the tenant often may not possess the legal knowledge neces-
sary to realize the need for contractual modifications of his convey-
ance-based rights and duties.
Because tenants so often fail to negotiate for desired protections, the
traditional rule that the landlord is generally not responsible for the
condition of the premises has caused much consternation among those
concerned about the plight of tenants. Injustice is perceived to result
from the application of the rule. For present purposes, however, the
difficult issues of ultimate justice can be side-stepped by making a sim-
ple, relatively noncontroversial assumption: When parties act deliber-
ately and without compulsion to modify their legal rights and duties
vis-a-vis each other, so that each intentionally leads the other to expect
a benefit enforceable at law, justice requires the legal protection of the
expectations thus intentionally created.23 °
By defining justice in this narrow way for this narrow purpose, it is
possible to avoid such virtual imponderables as, for example, whether a
tenant has a "human right" to a decent home or the landlord has a
"natural right" to dispose of his property on whatever terms he
228. E.g., Moldenhauer v. Krynski, 62 111. App. 2d 382, 210 N.E.2d 809 (1965);supra note 222.
Landlord covenants to repair are discussed at length in 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 428-42.
229. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir.), cer. denied, 400
U.S. 495 (1970); Green v. Superior Court, l0 Cal. 3d 616, 625, 517 P.2d 1168, 1173, 111 Cal. Rptr.
704, 109-10 (1974). This discussion should not be taken to imply that a tight housing market or
the landlord's bargaining position are the sole reasons why tenants may have no option but to deal
on the landlord's terms. It may simply be that the transaction costs of truly negotiated leases are
too high for anybody to feel justified in incurring them. For further discussion of this point, see
Humbach, supra note 77, at 304-08. Nor is it suggested that one should uncritically accept the
notion that the terms of "adhesion" leases offered by landlords are necessarily much different than
those that might be contained in freely negotiated leases. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW 84-85 (2d ed. 1977). Even a monopolist, if he wishes to maximize profits, must be respon-
sive to the market. Some tenants, at least, may prefer to live in cheaper "tumble-down" housing
and use the money saved for other purposes. See Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114, 131-33 (W. Va.
1978) (Neeley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
230. The word "intentionally" refers here to an objectively manifested intention, not to a
purely subjective intention. That is, a person ought to be held responsible for the expectations
which he should realize that he is creating in others, not merely those which, subjectively but
secretly, the person may want to create. See Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293
(S.D. N.Y. 1911), aj'd, 201 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912), aff'd, 231 U.S. 50 (1913); Lucy v. Zehmer, 196
Va. 493, 84 S.E.2d 516 (1954). See also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 223 (1932); 3 A. CORBIN,
supra note 104, at § 538.
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pleases' 3 t It is sufficient to say that a person is justly entitled to a de-
cent home if someone else, in exchange for an agreed quid pro quo,
has willingly undertaken to provide it.232 What, then, accounts for the
perception of injustice in the traditional application of the common law
landlord-tenant conception? The foregoing suggests that the injustice
comes from the unredressed disappointment of tenants' reasonable ex-
pectations; that is, expectations that tenants reasonably form on the ba-
sis of the intentions which landlords objectively manifest in the course
of making leases.233
In the factual context of a typical residential lease, the tenant may
reasonably suppose that the landlord, and not the tenant, will be the
one responsible for making and keeping the premises suitable for the
intended purpose. Widespread customary patterns, the particular land-
lord's normal mode of operation, and practical necessity all tend to
make landlord responsibility the more reasonable expectation. The
tenants, especially in multi-unit buildings, cannot as a practical matter
assume responsibility for the supply of heat, operation of the elevators,
231. Calling these questions "virtual imponderables" does not mean that they should not be
pondered, nor that the implied issues of distributive justice and the just distribution of resources
cannot be at least tentatively resolved. It is certain, however, that such questions and issues re-
quire quite fundamental value judgments. Because the implementation of any tentative resolution
will likely have serious adverse effects, the value judgments involved may be quite controversial.
For example, assume that every tenant is seen to have a moral right to a decent home. It would
not follow that landlords should be forced to bear a special burden, in effect a special tax, to
subsidize such a right. In any event, such a determination would be better made by processes
normally thought of as political rather than legal in the traditional sense. Happily, for purposes of
the present description of landlord-tenant law, it is not necessary to enter into this thicket. It is
assumed that some other mechanism must be relied upon to provide a social distributive scheme
which is adequate to permit everyone to afford a decent home. Correspondingly, it is assumed
that the relevant function of landlord-tenant law is not to redistribute wealth, but rather to assure
that those who have bargained for a decent home get what they bargained for.
232. Another issue, which is being deliberately postponed, see infra text accompanying notes
245-61, is what might be called the "paternalism" issue: whether the state should require that all
agreements on particular subjects must contain particular terms. For example, should all product
sales mandatorily include warranties of quality, or should all residential landlords, if they wish to
lease at all, be required to supply "decent" housing? The paternalism issue is really a policy deter-
mination of whether the freedom of contract should be restricted so that people may not enter into
arrangements which, in the real, imperfect market world, they may find acceptable but to which,
in an ideal, perfect market they would not likely assent. The answer is an emphatic "sometimes."
See Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114, 131-33 (W. Va. 1978) (Neeley, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Calabresi & Melamed, Propery; Liability and Inalienability Rules: One View of
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1111-15 (1968). See also infra text accompanying notes
245-61 (suggestions in relation to the landlord-tenant context).
233. See supra note 230.
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conditions in common areas and so on.2 3 4 Practicality requires that re-
spqnsibility for these matters be centralized, and the landlord is the
most logical, perhaps the only logical point of centralization. Hence,
the almost inevitable expectation is that the landlord will assume the
responsibility. Even as to those facilities for which the tenant conceiva-
bly could assume responsibility, for example, the plumbing fixtures in-
side the tenant's apartment, the virtually universal custom-and
probably greater economy--of landlords having responsibility for these
matters, generates the expectation that the landlord will take the re-
sponsibility. Doubtless these expectations of landlord responsibility
are in fact subjective expectations of both tenant and landlord in al-
most every case. The landlord and tenant both expect the landlord to
take care of these things. If the landlord does not perform as expected,
the reasonable lease-created expectations of the tenant are disap-
pointed, and there is "injustice. 235
The disappointment of such intentionally236 created expectations of
the residential tenant, however, is more than mere injustice. On any
reasonable interpretation of a typical residential lease, in light of the
usual circumstances, such disappointment would appear to be a pure
and simple breach of contract. Ordinarily, it is not even necessary to
view the contract merely as a contract implied in fact. As a matter of
interpretation, a lease of an "apartment" or a lease "for residential pur-
poses" means a space which has been and will continue to be appropri-
ately outfitted for living-that it will be "livable. 2 37
234. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077-78 (D.C. Cir.), cer. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970); accord Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 624-25; 517 P.2d 1168, 1173; 111
Cal. Rptr. 704, 709 (1974); Kamarath v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tex. 1978).
235. See supra note 234. See also Liverpool City Council v. Irwin, [1976] Q.B. 319.
236. The reference is, of course, to objectively manifested intention. See supra note 230.
237. Marini v. Ireland, 56 NJ. 130, 144, 265 A.2d 526, 534 (1970); accord Green v. Superior
Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 623, 517 P.2d 1168, 1175, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 708 (1974); Kamarath v.
Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658, 661 (Tex. 1978).
The fact that premises are leased for some particular purpose known to both parties does not
necessarily mean that the landlord is intended to be the one who should put and maintain the
premises in a condition suitable for that purpose. For example, an empty storefront leased for use
as a restaurant does not necessarily connote an intention that the landlord is obligated to install or
maintain expensive refrigeration, stoves, decoration, or other such items. See Richard Paul, Inc.
v. Union Improvement Co., 59 F. Supp. 252 (D. Del. 1945). Ultimately, the proper interpretation
of intention must be found in the words used and the surrounding circumstances. The circum-
stances of residential leasing are usually conducive, it is submitted, to the interpretation stated in
the text.
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Over the last decade or so, courts23 8-sometimes with assistance
from leglslatures 23 9-began to recognize the interpretational relevance
of these factual realities, and began to impose responsibility on land-
lords for the condition of residential premises. This new responsibility
of landlords has become generally known as the "implied warranty of
habitability." 24° In defining the precise performance requirements of
the implied warranty of habitability, two basic approaches have been
taken: One, as outlined above, is to view the warranty as part and par-
cel of the actual objective understanding of the parties as interpreted in
light of the circumstances. 241 The other is to treat the warranty as an
implied undertaking to meet the requirements of the applicable hous-
ing code.242 That is, it is taken to be a reasonable expectation of the
tenant that the landlord is offering the lease on terms which would not
violate the law.243
The actual understanding approach arguably is preferable since it
presumably incorporates the material housing code requirements as a
minimum expectation while explicitly offering the flexibility to impose
such further requirements which the circumstances of leasing may im-
238. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l. Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970); Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974);
Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280
N.E.2d 208 (1972); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329,
521 P.2d 304 (1974); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973);
Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114 (W. Va.
1978).
239. See, ag., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 554.139 (1979); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.060 (Supp. 1982). See also UNIFORM RESI-
DENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 2.104(a)(2).
240. See supra notes 238-39. Earlier, an implied warranty of habitability had been recognized
as applicable to short-term leases of furnished dwellings. See, e.g., Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass.
348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961); Smith v.
Marrable, 11 M & W. 5, 152 Eng. Rep. 693 (1843).
241. E.g., Gfeen v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974);
Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426,462 P.2d 470 (1969); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972);
Marini v. Ireland, 56 NJ. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); Kamarath v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658 (Tex.
1978).
242. E.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
925 (1970); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); King v. Moorehead,
495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114 (W. Va. 1978).
243. As part of its rationale in Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 362, 280 N.E.2d 208,
214-15 (1972), the court observed that "the parties ... would have expressed that which the law
implies had they not supposed that it was unnecessary to speak of it because the law provided for
it." Id (quoting Schiro v. W.E. Gould & Co., 18 Ill. 2d 538, 544-45, 165 N.E.2d 286, 290-91
(1960)).
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ply.2" Under either approach, however, the implied warranty of habit-
ability is not a departure from the common-law conception of leasing
transactions, but is rather a necessary consequence of it. It is true that
for residential premises the implied warranty reverses the traditional
presumption that the tenant, not the landlord, has primary responsibil-
ity for the premises' condition,245 but that presumption is, after all, fun-
damentally only a presumption of intention, an issue of fact. It is thus
quite proper to reverse the presumption where such a reversal is neces-
sary to a realistic interpretation-in the modem context-of the con-
veyance-cum-contract comprising the lease. Leases should be
recognized to contain an undertaking as to the character of that which
is conveyed, not because such an undertaking "ought to be" assumed
by the landlord, but because it is actually assumed, or understood to be
assumed, by persons offering leases of residential premises. The con-
ception of the landlord-tenant relationship need not change, but the
facts to which it is applied must be recognized to have changed.
Although the contractual basis for the implied warranty of habitabil-
ity is analytically plausible, there is much to be said for rooting the
warranty of habitability not in contract, but rather in tort. Phrased dif-
ferently, there is good reason for seeing the warranty not as an objec-
tively intended promissory undertaking, but rather as a duty that
inheres in the landlord-tenant relationship itself as an integral part of
privity of estate. For one thing, such a tort conception of the warranty
would free it from any possible questions concerning the applicability
of the limitations on contract remedies, such as the requirement that
special damages be foreseeable24 6 or that the plaintiff be in privity of
contract with the landlord.247
It appears that at least some courts are willing to treat the warranty
of habitability as though its breach constitutes a tort, for example, by
244. See Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 796-97 (Iowa 1972); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130,
144, 265 A.2d 526, 534 (1970).
245. See supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text.
246. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341 (1854). See Moldenhauer v. Krynski, 62 111. App. 2d
382, 210 N.E.2d 809 (1965); Cooper v. Roose, 151 Ohio St. 316, 85 N.E.2d 545 (1949). But see
Reitmeyer v. Spreacher, 431 Pa. 284, 243 A.2d 395 (1968); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 357 (1965).
247. See W. PROSSER, supra note 220, at 622-27. See also Uccello v. Laudenslayer, 44 Cal,
App. 3d 504, 118 Cal. Rptr. 741 (Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Faber v. Creswick, 31 N.J. 234, 156 A.2d
252 (1959). The Uceello case permitted recovery by the tenant's neighbor, who was clearly not in
privity of contract with the landlord, for injuries inflicted by a dog belonging to the tenant.
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allowing punitive damages.248 General legal principles provide ample
grounds for doing so. It frequently occurs that parties who have en-
tered into a legal relationship find themselves subject to certain duties
not voluntarily assumed, even though the relationship itself was quite
voluntary. For example, in the property relationship of bailment, the
bailee owes a duty of ordinary care in relation to the bailed goods sim-
ply by virtue of the fact that he is in possession of goods belonging to
another.249  Similarly, in the landlord-tenant relationship the law has
long imposed an obligation on the tenant not to commit waste-an ob-
ligation which exists purely as an incident of the privity of estate
itself.25 °
Comparably, in the case of the warranty of habitability, the justifica-
tion for imposing the duty on the landlord may be found in his conduct
relative to others-specifically, in the landlord's act of putting residen-
tial space into the hands of persons who experience shows are often
unable to keep it habitable themselves.25" ' That is, the duty may be
founded, in accord with general principles, on the landlord's position to
control hazards or losses to others in relation to whom he acts. As such,
the duty may be seen as an extension of the duties of care and mainte-
nance placed on persons in control of land252 and, perhaps even more
closely, as an extension of the duties of care imposed on landlords of
premises leased for admission to the public.253 The history of founding
248. See, e.g., Kipsborough Realty Corp. v. Goodbetter, 81 Misc. 2d 1054, 367 N.Y.S.2d 916
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1975); cases cited supra note 247. See also Ackarey v. Carbonaro, 320 Mass. 537, 70
N.E.2d 418 (1946); Kline v. Bums, II1 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971).
Conduct violating the implied warranty of habitability may itself be a tort, such as a failure to
use due care, if injury ensues. See Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 628 (1973). A strong
argument can be made, however, that the implied warranty should be law-imposed-as a non-
waivable tort duty-only in cases of personal injury or property damage, and not in cases which
merely involved so-called "economic" (loss of bargain) losses. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1973).
249. R. BRowN, supra note 111, at 252-70; W. PROSSER, supra note 220, at § 92.
250. See supra notes 51 & 227.
251. See Kline v. Bums, Ill N.H. 87,276 A.2d 248 (1971) (warranty of habitability is imposed
by law because of the relationship of the parties, the nature of the transaction, and the surround-
ing circumstances). Cf. Evans v. Otis Elevator Co., 403 Pa. 13, 168 A.2d 573 (1961) ("It is not the
contractper se which creates the duty; it is the law which imposes the duty because of the nature
of the undertaking in the contract"). Prosser observed that in the analogous context of warranties
implied in sales of chattels "the obligation is imposed upon the seller [landlord], not because he
has assumed it voluntarily, but because the law attaches such consequences to his conduct, irre-
spective of any agreement .. " W. PROSSER, supra note 220, at 635.
252. See supra note 220.
253. E.g., Spain v. Kelland, 93 Ariz. 172, 379 P.2d 149 (1963); Fitchett v. Buchanan, 2 Wash.
App. 965, 472 P.2d 623 (1970); W. PROSSER, supra note 220, at § 63.
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affirmative tort duties as a part of the undertaking in voluntarily as-
sumed relationships is a long one. 54
Treating the landlord's duties in relation to habitability as tort, or
law-imposed, duties arising out of the privity of estate itself is in no
way at odds with the contractual explanation for the implied warranty
of habitability. Holding that the warranty ordinarily is dually based,
both in contract and in conduct relative to others, comports quite com-
fortably with the traditional dual conception of the landlord-tenant re-
lation and the overlapping bases of the basic rights and duties of that
relation.2 55
Moreover, to regard the warranty as being based on the conveyance
as well as in contract avoids technical battle with another potential dif-
ficulty posed by a purely contractual theory: How can the law deal
with the disclaimers of responsibility for the premises' condition that
may be routinely expected in any lease which, from the landlord's per-
spective, has been competently drawn? If the implied warranty of hab-
itability is predicated solely on contract, that is, on the actual, although
perhaps unexpressed, objective consent of the landlord, it is hard to say
that the warranty exists when the lease expressly disclaims landlord
responsibility for the condition of the premises, in general or in particu-
lar.2 5 6 There are good arguments for a policy refusing to give effect to
such disclaimers. In a world of standard-form leases, the implied war-
ranty of habitability could be effectively repealed by private legisla-
tion.257 Further, it might be assumed that tenants in an ideal (perfect)
market would not assent to such disclaimers; thus, they should be pro-
tected from effectively doing so out of real world exigency.25 8
254. See supra note 251; Ames, supra note 24, at 3-6.
The argument that actions on warranties of quality were originally founded in tort law, see W.
PROSSER, supra note 220, at 634-35, and therefore still may have a tort "flavor," see Ackarey v.
Carbonaro, 320 Mass. 537, 70 N.E.2d 418 (1946) ("la]n action of tort, as well as an action of
contract, may be maintained upon a false warranty"), seems to carry little weight in itself. The
modem landlord's duty of quality is called a "warranty" probably because of a semantic accident
rather than because of a choice conscious of history. In any event, virtually all modem contract
actions would, at an earlier time, have procedurally sounded in tort.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 20-29.
256. See Kamarath v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. 1978) (recognizing express waivability);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 5.1 (1977) (same).
257. Fair v. Negley, 390 A.2d 240 (Pa. Super. 1978); Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114 (W. Va.
1978); supra note 222. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960).
258. Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114, 130-31 (W. Va. 1978). See W. PROSSER, supra note 220,
at 442-43; Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 232, at 1111-15.
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One plausible contractual justification for ignoring the disclaimers,
at least in a case that does not involve a deliberate slumlord "milking"
his building, is to treat routinely printed disclaimers as disingenuous
and contrary to the actual practice, performance expectations, and os-
tensible intentions of the landlord.259 Although this approach may en-
counter analytical difficulties with the parol evidence rule, exceptions
to that rule are available, possibly along the lines of fraud.260 Never-
theless, by viewing the warranty of habitability as founded on the rela-
tionship that results from the conveyance transaction, that is, as a
normal law-imposed incident of privity of estate, there is no need for
any conceptual embarrassment when finding the warranty "implied" in
the very agreement which expressly disclaims it. Rather than insisting
that, contrary to all evidence, the landlord has assented to its creation,
the law remains free, as a matter of policy, to disallow the
disclaimer.26'
2. The Independence of Covenants in Leases
Placing the responsibility for the premises' condition on the landlord
goes only part of the way in preventing the injustice of disappointed
tenant expectations. There still remain the problems posed by the doc-
trine of "independence of covenants," a doctrine which traditionally
has meant that the tenant's obligation to pay rent is not affected by the
landlord's breach of the duty to supply services.26 2 Courts that recog-
259. The question might be treated as one purely of interpreting inconsistent manifestations of
intent, see Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd., 23 N.Y.2d 398, 244 N.E.2d 685, 297
N.Y.S.2d 108 (1968), or of unconscionability, see Tai On Luck Corp. v. Cirota, 35 A.D.2d 380, 216
N.Y.S.2d 438 (1970); Lefrak v. Lambert, 89 Misc. 2d 197, 390 N.Y.S.2d 959 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1976);
Seabrook v. Commuter Hous., 72 Misc. 2d 6, 338 N.Y.S.2d 67 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1972); Fair v. Neg-
ley, 390 A.2d 240 (Pa. Super. 1978); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 234-c (McKinney Supp. 1980); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 5.6 (1978).
260. Lusk Corp. v. Burgess, 85 Ariz. 90, 332 P.2d 493 (1958); Sabo v. Delman, 3 N.Y.2d 155,
143 N.E.2d 906, 164 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1957); International Milling Co. v. Hachmeister, Inc., 380 Pa.
407, 110 A.2d 186 (1955); Green River Valley Found. v. Foster, 78 Wash. 2d 245, 473 P.2d 844
(1970) (Finley, J., concurring).
261. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.) (disclaimer disallowed,
referring to statutory [law-imposed] basis of the duties), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Boston
Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973) (same).
It should be observed that when the law insists that parties to particular types of contractual
relationships have agreed in certain ways, contrary to their actual agreement, the law has in fact
imposed the duties in question by virtue of the type of relationship. It serves no purpose to insist
that such duties are contractual duties rather than tort duties, except perhaps to confuse the issue.
262. See, e.g., Richard Paul, Inc. v. Union Improvement Co., 59 F. Supp. 252 (D. Del. 1945);
Frazier v. Riley, 215 Ala. 517, 111 So. 10 (1926); Interstate Restaurants v. Halsa Corp., 309 A.2d
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nize the implied warranty of habitability have characteristically also
held that the obligation to pay rent is dependent on the landlord's per-
formance under the warranty.263 In so holding, courts usually have
said that they are treating leases as ordinary contracts.264 In reality,
however, they are not,265 for if leases were treated as ordinary con-
tracts, the obligation to pay rent usually would still be independent of
the landlord's performance of the service obligations.266 Quite surpris-
ingly, a reconsideration of the traditional dual-relationship conception
of leases, the lease as a conveyance-cum-contract, reveals that the effec-
tive dependence of lease obligations is not necessarily excluded by, and
indeed, is seemingly required by the common law conception. Before
discussing the implications of a pure contractual theory of leasing and
the interesting implications of the dual-relationship conception, the
problem of independence of covenants under the conception of leases
as generally understood at common law must be examined.
It is the hypothesis of the preceding subsection that tenants often
cannot, or at least do not, bargain for the contractual protections
needed in order to have a legal right to the services that they expect to
receive under a lease. Even if the tenant does succeed in obtaining a
lease covenant to provide services from the landlord, the doctrine of
independence of covenants may frustrate the objective of securing the
services. If a landlord breaches the covenant, then the tenant will have
an action for damages.267 Except in the most egregious cases, however,
108 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972); Stone v. Sullivan, 300 Mass. 450, 15 N.E.2d 476 (1938); Duncan Dev.
Co. v. Duncan Hardware, 34 N.J. Super. 293, 112 A.2d 274 (1955); Dittman v. McFadden, 159
Okla. 262, 15 P.2d 139 (1932); Graham Hotel Co. v. Garrett, 33 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930);
3 A. CORBIN, supra note 104, at § 686; 6 S. WILLISTON, supra note 24, at §§ 890-901; Annot., 28
A.L.R.2d 446 (1953).
263. See supra cases cited at note 238.
264. E.g., Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974);
King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Pugh v. Holmes, 384 A.2d 1234 (Pa.
Super. 1978); Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114 (W. Va. 1978).
265. See infra text accompanying notes 278-95.
266. See infra text accompanying notes 285-87.
267. See, e.g., Rosen v. Needleman, 83 So.2d 113 (Fla. 1955); Selz v. Stafford, 284 Ill. 610, 120
N.E. 462 (1918); Duncan Dev. Co. v. Duncan Hardware, 34 N.J. Super. 293, 112 A.2d 274 (1955);
Pryor v. Foster, 130 N.Y. 171, 29 N.E. 123 (1891); Dittman v. McFadden, 159 Okla. 262, 15 P.2d
139 (1932); Graham Hotel Co. v. Garrett, 33 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930). See also Annot.,
28 A.L.R.2d 446, 453-56 (1953).
Generally, the damages recoverable are the cost of making repairs or diminution in rental
value. E.g., Richard Paul, Inc. v. Union Improvement Co., 59 F. Supp. 252 (D. Del. 1945); Rosen
v. Needleman, 80 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1955); Cook v. Soule, 56 N.Y. 420 (1874); Jersey Silk & Lace
Stores v. Best Silk Shops, 134 Misc. 315, 235 N.Y.S. 277 (City Ct. N.Y. 1929). See also 2 M.
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the damages will usually be less than the expenses of the lawsuit. In
any case, the tenant really wants the services, not damages. If the serv-
ices involve, for example, expensive repairs, the landlord may prefer,
instead of the certain cost of performance, to take the relatively insub-
stantial risk that the tenant will sue. Since it may be presumed that the
tenant typically will not sue and will simply endure the lack of services
or vacate, this strategy often can succeed in enabling the landlord to
evade his services obligations.
By contrast, permitting tenants to withhold rents in cases of landlord
defaults appears to be a very efficient means of inducing landlords to
perform their obligations under leases. The landlord's interest in leas-
ing transactions is almost always purely pecuniary. Landlords are in
the business of leasing for the rents that leases produce, and therefore
have an important incentive to eliminate any situation that interferes
with the inflow of rents. If the interference is the landlord's own non-
performance, then the landlord has a compelling incentive to perform.
Thus, when the law allows the landlord to recover the full rent irrespec-
tive of the landlord's performance, the tenant is deprived of a powerful
weapon for inducing the landlord to perform.268
An apparent solution to the problem of landlord defaults in provid-
ing services is the application in such cases of a general principle of
ordinary contract law: You do not have to pay for what you do not get.
This general principle finds expression in the ordinary contract rule
that performance obligations under contracts are usually "depen-
dent.' 269 Applying this contract rule to leases, the argument goes, ten-
FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 434-35; Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 446 (1953). The possibility of proceeding
in small claims court would of course reduce litigation costs, but even so, damage actions are at
their best poor substitutes for performance and poor incentives for providing it."
Injunctive relief could provide a specific, albeit delayed, performance if the court would be
willing to order it. See Continental & Vogue Health Studies v. Abra Corp., 369 Mich. 561, 120
N.W.2d 835 (1963). Even if the desired injunction were granted and followed, however, the result
would, as a practical matter, hardly satisfy the tenant's objective in bargaining for the landlord's
promise to repair.
268. Landlords have long been aware of the corresponding efficacy of dispossession in induc-
ing performance of tenants' obligations under leases. For an extensive discussion of this subject,
see Humbach, supra note 77, at 258-68.
269. K & G Constr. Co. v. Harris, 223 Md. 305, 164 A.2d 451 (1960); Palmer v. Fox, 274 Mich.
252, 264 N.W. 361 (1936); Morgan v. Singley, 560 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 251-52, 237-38 (1981); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
§§ 266 comments a & b, 274 (1932). See also J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 119, at 405-
12; Farnsworth, supra note 119, at 253-59. The statement in the text is an extreme simplification
of the contract doctrines of conditions and is meant only to express their spirit. A more elaborate
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ants would not only be protected from the injustice of paying for
unprovided services, but would also possess a potent weapon in secur-
ing such services. Elimination of the rule of independence of covenants
would eliminate the main legal impediment to tenants' use of the rent
weapon to secure services.
The existence of the doctrine of independence of covenants for leases
is not, of course, the reason for the traditional rule that tenants' obliga-
tions to pay rent are not conditioned on landlords' prior due perform-
ance.270 The doctrine is merely a way of describing the rule. Indeed, to
say that the covenants or promises in leases are independent obscures a
situation which, under the traditional dual-relationship conception, is
more complicated.
Because in the traditional analysis a lease is seen not merely as a
contract, but as a conveyance-cum-contract, rent is due not merely be-
cause it is promised, but because it is reserved.271 Thus, even if the
tenant's promise to pay rent were dependent on performance by the
exposition of the applicable contract doctrines, as they might be hypothetically applied to a purely
contractual leasing transaction, is set forth infra text accompanying notes 278-95. Certainly, how-
ever, the courts that purport to treat leases as ordinary contracts seem to have in mind an oversim-
plified and novel version of contract law, rather than the actual law of contracts as generally
understood. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). "Under contract principles. . . the tenant's obligation to pay rent is
dependent upon the landlord's performance of his obligations .... In order to determine
whether any rent is owed to the landlord, the tenants must be given an opportunity to prove the
.. . breach of the landlord's warranty [of habitability]." Id See also Pugh v. Holmes, 253 Pa.
Super. 76, 384 A.2d 1234 (1978); 1 A.L.P., supra note 17, at § 3.11, at 202; cf. Farnsworth, .ura
note 119, at 257 ("many courts have begun to apply the concept of constructive conditions even to
leases").
As a matter of ordinary contract law, a promise or covenant may be or become independent
under certain circumstances such as when the agreed return has been substantially performed, see
Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889 (1921); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 237 comment d (1981); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 274 (1932); infra note 278,
where the contract is aleatory, see Southern Sur. Co. v. MacMillan Co., 58 F.2d 541 (10th Cir.
1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 379 (1981), RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
§§ 292, 293 (1932); or where the promisor continues to accept the benefits of the contract from the
other party after the other party has committed a material breach, see Rosenthal Paper Co. v.
National Folding Box & Paper Co., 226 N.Y. 313, 123 N.E. 766 (1919); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 246 (1981); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 298 (1932). This last qualification
upon the doctrine of the dependency of contractual promises is highly pertinent to the contractual
analysis of lease defaults, and is discussed infra text accompanying notes 278-95.
270. Cf. Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 634, 517 P.2d 1168, 1180, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704,
716 (1974) ("These [prior] decisions, however, rested primarily upon the ancient property doctrine
of 'independent covenants' "); R. SCHOSHINSKi, supra note 17, at 377.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 57-71.
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landlord-that is, even if the tenant's promise to perform were dis-
charged by the landlord's breach272-- the tenant would still, under the
dual-relationship conception, have a privity-of-estate liability to pay re-
served rent. This privity-of-estate liability, which results from the land-
lord's reservation in leasing, has nothing to do with promises, contract
duties,27 or the "independence" thereof. Unless the landlord's failure
to perform amounts to an eviction, there is no extinguishment of the
privity of estate" and, therefore, no extinguishment of the attendant re-
served-rent liability.27 4
There are, to be sure, circumstances in which the landlord's failure to
perform may result in a rent-extinguishing eviction; namely, where the
landlord's breach of duty is so severe as to cause the premises to be-
come untenantable, causing the tenant to abandon. An abandonment
"forced" in this manner will be treated as an eviction,275 and is denomi-
nated a "constructive" eviction to distinguish it from a direct physical,
or "actual" eviction. Like an actual eviction, a constructive eviction
suspends the obligation to pay rent because the possession upon which
the rent is predicated no longer exists.276 Thus, the doctrine of con-
272. Cf. O.W. Grun Roofing & Constr. Co. v. Cope, 529 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 237, 241-42, 225(2) (1981); RESTATEMENT OF CON-
TRACTS §§ 274, 397 (1932). See supra note 269; infra note 278 and accompanying text.
273. See supra text accompanying notes 57-71. Professor Siegel argues that "in fact, the inde-
pendence of lease covenants results from.. . the [contract] doctrine of substantial performance."
Siegel, supra note 11, at 664. See also infra note 278. This contention does not appear to be
historically accurate inasmuch as it ignores the significance of the much older view that, apart
from contractual promises, the tenant is liable for reserved rent. See supra text accompanying
notes 57-71. Nor does it seem technically accurate, since many landlord failures to provide serv-
ices are certainly of sufficient magnitude to constitute a failure of substantial performance in the
nature of a material breach. See infra notes 278 & 295. Professor Siegel apparently was confused
by the constructive "real covenant" to pay reserved rent and was thus led to overlook the tradi-
tional common-law view that the obligation to pay reserved rent, though supported by covenant,
is not founded in covenant. See Siegel, supra note 11, at 650 n.5; supra notes 21, 67 & 69.
274. Technically, the liability is not extinguished by eviction. The liability ceases to arise after
eviction because the tenant without possession does not receive benefits out of which rents belong-
ing to the landlord can be rendered. See supra text accompanying notes 57-71. Reentry by an
evicted tenant should cause liability for future-accruing rents to resume. Talbot v. Citizens Nat'l
Bank, 389 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1968); Martin v. Martin, 7 Md. 368 (1855).
275. Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 NJ. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969); Tallman v. Murphy, 120
N.Y. 345, 24 N.E. 716 (1890); Dyett v. Pendleton, 8 Cow. 727 (N.Y. 1826); see Barash v. Penn-
sylvania Station Real Estate Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 77, 256 N.E.2d 707, 308 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1970); see
also infra note 295. See generally 1 A.L.P., supra note 17, at § 3.51; Bennett, The Modern Lease-
An Estate in Land or a Contract, 16 Tax. L. REv. 7, 63-73 (1937); Rapacz, Origin and Evolution of
Constructive Eviction in the United States, 1 DE PAUL L. REv. 69 (1951).
276. See supra note 275; and text accompanying notes 83-85.
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structive eviction constitutes a major exception to the general rule of
independence of covenants in leases, even under the traditional con-
veyance-cum-contract conception. If the tenant does not abandon pos-
session after the landlord's default, however, no constructive eviction
occurs and the conveyance-based obligation to pay the reserved rent
remains unimpaired. 277 This requirement of abandonment makes the
doctrine of constructive eviction an unsatisfactory device for securing
landlord services. The general rule remains that the landlord's
breaches do not per se affect the occupying tenant's obligation to pay
rent.
Although the conveyance theory of leasing is sometimes seen as the
villain preventing tenants from withholding rent from defaulting land-
lords, it would appear on analysis that the same independence of cove-
nants would also be required by a purely contractual theory of leasing.
That is, even if leases were treated as ordinary contracts, the tenant's
promise to pay rent would still be independent-at least insofar as it is
independent under the traditional conveyance-cum-contract view.
Consider in purely contractual terms the case of a simple lease in
which the only promises are as follows:
Tenant's Promise Landlord's Promises
Pay Rent Allow Occupancy
Supply Services
The tenant has a single performance obligation in a given rent period
in exchange for which the landlord has two separate performance
obligations.
Suppose the landlord fails to supply services and that this failure is a
material breach.,."7 Under ordinary contract analysis, the tenant
277. See Automobile Supply Co. v. Scene-in-Action Corp., 340 I11. 196, 172 N.E. 5 (1930);
supra note 275. But see Charles E. Burt, Inc. v. Seven Grant Corp., 340 Mass. 124, 163 N.E.2d 4
(1959).
278. Under ordinary contract law, only a material breach has the effect of discharging the
other party's obligation to perform. See Plotnick v. Pennsylvania Smelting & Ref. Co., 194 F.2d
859 (3d Cir. 1952); Walker & Co. v. Harrison, 347 Mich. 630, 81 N.W.2d 352 (1957); Plante v.
Jacobs, 10 Wis. 2d 567, 103 N.W.2d 296 (1960); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 237,
242 (1981); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 274, 397, 313 comment c (1932); A. CORBIN, supra
note 104, at § 946. This requirement of a material breach for discharge is sometimes referred to as
the doctrine of "substantial performance," that is, a substantial performance by one party suffices
to trigger the duty of performance of the other. Farnsworth, supra note 119, at 226-72, 287-88.
Arguably, and possibly historically, see Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 634, 517 P.2d
1168, 1180, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 716 (1974); J. MURRAY, su/pra note 114, at § 183, the landlords'
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would have two alternatives. 279 The tenant may either rescind the lease
and regard it as terminated for purposes of performance, if not for pur-
poses of remedies.280  Alternatively, the tenant may accept the land-
lord's partial but deficient performance of allowing occupancy without
supplying the services. 281
failure to provide services would not necessarily be viewed as a material breach, and hence not
discharge the tenants from their performance obligation. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
§§ 268(2), 269, 274(1) (1932); A. CORBIN, supra note 104, at § 946; Siegel, supra note 11, at 663-66,
discussed supra note 273. For purposes of this discussion, however, it will be assumed that a
landlord's failure to provide agreed services is a material breach. See Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d
114, 126 (W. Va. 1978); Medico-Dental Bldg. Co. v. Horton & Converse, 21 Cal. 2d 411, 132 P.2d
457 (1942).
279. See Cities Serv. Helex, Inc. v. United States, 543 F.2d 1306 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Grady-Gould
Watershed Improvement Dist. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 570 F.2d 720 (8th Cir. 1978); Southern
Pipe Coating Co. v. Spear & Wood Mfg. Co., 235 Ark. 1021, 363 S.W.2d 912 (1963); Rosenthal
Paper Co. v. National Folding Box & Paper Co., 226 N.Y. 313, 123 N.E. 766 (1919); Dunn v.
Steubing, 120 N.Y. 232, 24 N.E. 315 (1890); Wheeler v. Wheeler, 299 N.C. 633, 263 S.E.2d 763
(1980); Towery v. Carolina Dairy, 237 N.C. 544, 375 S.E.2d 254 (1953); Longenecker v. Brommer,
59 Wash. 2d 552, 368 P.2d 900 (1962); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 309 comments
a-d, 313, 317 (1932). See generall, J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 119, at §§ 11-22(a), 11-
37; A. CORBIN, supra note 104, at § 946; supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
280. See supra note 279. Some contracts commentators argue that the word "cancel" is prefer-
able to the word "rescind" in this context. See, e.g., J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 119, at
758; A. CORBIN, supra note 104, at § 1236; Farnsworth, supra note 119, at 282. The term "re-
scind," however, is amply supported by usage, e.g., Pelletier v. Masse, 49 R.I. 408, 143 A. 609
(1928); Longenecker v. Brommer, 59 Wash. 2d 552, 368 P.2d 900 (1962), and will be used here.
281. See authorities cited supra note 279; See also infra note 282.
The last proposition assumes that the landlord has not repudiated the lease. See Wheeler v.
Wheeler, 299 N.C. 633, 263 S.E.2d 763 (1980); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 317 (1932); A.
CORBIN, supra note 104, at § 954; supra note 119. The effect of a repudiation is to make a total
breach of a partial breach and thereby to disable the other party from treating a total breach as
partial in order to keep the contract alive for purposes of performance. In other words, under
ordinary contract rules a repudiation by the landlord would deprive the tenant of the choice of not
rescinding and accepting the deficient performance. As a matter of ordinary contract law, how-
ever, it is not clear exactly how a partial repudiation should be treated. See A. CORBIN, supra note
104, at § 972. A court in one case involving a partial repudiation refused to treat the partial
repudiation as a total breach. See Johnstone v. Milling, 16 Q.B.D. 460 (1886). The contract at
issue in Milling was, however, a lease and, for that reason, the case may not shed direct light on
ordinary contract law. Moreover, as pointed out by Corbin in his extensive discussion of the case,
the reasoning of the court, which required the other party's assent for a repudiation, was out of
harmony with modem trends of the law of anticipatory repudiation. A. CORBIN, supra note 104,
at § 972.
It would appear to make little sense to hold that landlords' anticipatory repudiations, even of a
material part of their obligations, should oblige tenants to regard the breach as total, provided at
least that there is no repudiation of the tenants' occupancy rights. Such a holding would deprive
the tenant of the choice of treating the lease as on-going and remaining in possession. If ordinary
contract law were to compel such result, and a literal reading of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS §§ 250, 253 (1981) and RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 317(2), 318(a) (1932), sug-
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If the tenant rescinds the lease, the tenant's contractual obligation for
future-accruing rents would of course be terminated.282 In this sense,
under ordinary contract law, the rent promise would be dependent on
the landlord's promise to supply services. But in electing to rescind the
lease, the tenant would have to relinquish occupancy. The tenant could
not, under ordinary contract law, rescind the lease as to the tenants rent
obligation while keeping the lease alive for purposes of the landlord's
occupancy obligation.283 If the tenant wishes to retain occupancy, then
the tenant cannot rescind the lease.284
When the tenant elects the second alternative, accepting the deficient
performance which the landlord offers (occupancy without services),
the tenant would be seen, under ordinary contract principles, to have
waived the discharge for the tenant's performance. 285 This "excusing
the nonoccurrence of a condition" precedent 286 can occur whenever a
promisor's performance is conditioned on two or more other perform-
gests that it may, then this is certainly one instance where the conveyance theory of leasing would
be more advantageous to tenants than a pure contract theory.
282. Coughlin v. Blair, 41 Cal. 2d 587, 262 P.2d 305 (1953); Palmer v. Fox, 274 Mich. 252, 264
N.W. 361 (1936); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 313(1), 397 (1932).
283. Specialities Dev. Corp. v. C-O Two Fire Equip. Co., 207 F.2d 753, 756 (3d Cir. 1953)
("[One against whom a material breach is committed must make up his mind what he is going to
do about it."). See Venz v. State Auto. Ins. Co., 217 Iowa 662, 251 N.W. 27 (1933); Rosenthal
Paper Co. v. National Folding Box & Paper Co., 226 N.Y. 313, 123 N.E. 766 (1919); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 246 (1981); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 298, 309, 317(2)
(1932); A. CORBIN, supra note 104, at § 755.
284. Two recent construction contract cases seem to hold that when a subcontractor commits a
material breach, the contractor may withhold progress payments even though the contractor con-
tinues to accept the subcontractor's defective performance. See K & 0 Constr. Co. v. Harris, 223
Md. 305, 164 A.2d 451 (1960); Morgan v. Singley, 560 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). Both of
these cases, however, ignore the principle of "Acceptance as Excusing the Non-Occurrence of a
Condition," RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 246 (1981). See infra note 285 and text
accompanying notes 285-91. Both appear therefore to be at odds per incuriam with ordinary
contract law. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 246, illustration 1 (1981). The prin-
ciple is easily overlooked even by persons keenly aware of it. E.g., Farnsworth, supra note 119, at
285 n.174, 295-302.
285. See supra note 283. "[A disappointed promisee] has power to recreate his former duty
...nearly always by continuing to render his own performance or by receiving further perform-
ance from the other party, with knowledge that the condition has not been performed." A.
CORBIN, supra note 104, at § 755. Accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 246 (1981);
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 309 (1951). See generally Farnsworth, supra note 119, at 295-
302.
286. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 246 (1981); RESTATEMENT OF CON-
TRACTS § 298(1) (1932). The same principle may also be referred to as "waiver of the right of
rescission," see Longenecker v. Brommer, 59 Wash. 2d 552, 368 P.2d 900 (1962), "waiver by con-
tinuing to perform or accept performance," see Wheeler v. Wheeler, 299 N.C. 633, 263 S.E.2d 763
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss4/2
Number 4] CONCEPTION OF LEASING 1279
ances and the promisor elects to accept a deficient performance rather
than treat the deficiency as grounds for rescission.28 7 Of course, waiver
of the discharge of performance should not constitute a waiver of the
promise to perform.288 The tenant thus could still recover contract
damages for the failure to supply the services. 28 9 The crucial point is,
however, that even if leases were treated as ordinary contracts, the
promises in leases would nevertheless be independent-tenants in oc-
(1980), or "waiver of the material breach," see Cities Serv. Helex, Inc. v. United States, 543 F.2d
1306, 1313 n.16 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
287. See supra notes 279 & 283. Excuse of conditions precedent after their nonoccurrence
should not be confused with the generally discredited Sergeant Williams' Third Rule: "Where a
covenant goes only to part of the consideration on both sides and breach of such covenant can be
paid for in damages, it is an independent covenant." Pordage v. Cole, 1 Wms. Sound 319, 85 Eng.
Rep. 449 (1669) (Reporter's Note).
The acceptance of the deficient performance must be elected in order to have the effect of excus-
ing the condition. If X promises to paint Y's house and then X quits after painting only two sides,
Y will not be deemed to have accepted the deficient performance merely because he does not
return X's paint and labor. See Cawley v. Weiner, 236 N.Y. 357, 140 N.E. 724 (1923); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 246(2) (1981); RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRACrS § 298(2) (1932).
A promisee has no choice but to accept a defective performance which is attached to his land or
chattels. It may be said, of course, that the leasehold is "land or chattels" of the tenant so that, by
parity of reasoning, the tenant's mere retention of possession should not be deemed an excuse of
condition or waiver of discharge. This argument, however, presupposes that a lease is a convey-
ance and not a mere contract, and such an argument would lead the analysis, if not the result, in
an entirely different, and presumably quite traditional, direction. See RESTATEMENT OF CON-
TRACTS §§ 309 illustration 1, 400 (1932). The suitability of analyzing the problem along these
lines is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 296-313.
In a contract calling for performance in installments, a less-than-substantial performance of an
installment may justify the other party in withholding a payment without justifying declaring the
contract at an end. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 269 (1932); A. CoRBIN, supra note 104,
at § 708. Nevertheless, even if the delay in the landlord's performance of his service obligations
became so great as to excuse the other party altogether from his duty, see RESTATEMENT OF CON-
TRACTS § 269 comment a (1932), essentially a question of the materiality of the breach, id, the
duty would still be subject to re-creation under the principles referred to in note 285 supra. See
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 309 illustration 2 (1932). Therefore, the so-called independence
of covenants in leases most emphatically cannot be regarded as simply a result of the doctrine of
substantial performance, as has been alleged. See Siegel, supra note 11 at 664; supra note 273.
288. See Cities Serv. Helex, Inc. v. United States, 543 F.2d 1306 (Ct. CL. 1976); Rosenthal
Paper Co. v. National Folding Box & Paper Co., 226 N.Y. 313, 123 N.E. 766 (1919); Graham
Hotel Co. v. Garrett, 33 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note
119, at § 11-39; A CORBIN, supra note 104, at § 766; see also Lydner v. S.S. Kresge Co., 329 Mich.
359, 45 N.W.2d 319 (1951); Thompson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Durant Land Improvement Co., 144
N.Y. 34, 39 N.E. 7 (1894); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 317(2), 327 (1932); but see Richard
Paul, Inc. v. Union Improvement Co., 59 F. Supp. 252 (D. Del. 1945) (holding that by taking
possession and paying the rent, the tenant waived the breach in relation to consequential damages
(lost profits) but not for general damages).
289. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
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cupancy would still be obligated to pay rent, despite the landlord's
breach, just as they have been obligated under the traditional lines of
cases.290  Only if the tenant rescinds based upon the landlord's mate-
rial breach, that is, only if the tenant abandons occupancy, would ordi-
nary contract law provide for extinguishment of the rent obligation.29'
Thus, in treating the tenant's rent obligation as effectively independ-
ent of the landlord's promises, it appears that courts have been treating
leases as ordinary contracts.292 Even the abandonment requirement for
constructive eviction293 coincides with ordinary contract rules. A dis-
charge, based on the landlord's material breach of a contractually de-
pendent obligation to pay rent, would require the tenant to relinquish
occupancy just as the doctrine of constructive eviction. Constructive
eviction is, in effect, the conveyance-theory counterpart of rescission
290. The possibilities of counterclaim and recoupment of setoff, see infra note 297 and accom-
panying text, make it unlikely that a landlord in material breach would ever actually recover the
full rent from a properly represented tenant. Moreover, a tenant might anticipate the effects of
these procedural devices by withholding all or part of the rents due and, as a result of the land-
lord's breach, never have to pay-or in a real sense, owe-the full amount of rents provided for in
the lease. See infra text accompanying notes 290-313. The fact remains, however, that based on
ordinary contract law, a tenant who retains possession continues to be substantively liable for the
full rent. The procedural dependence of the landlord's recovery on his own performance has
nothing to do with the dependence of covenants as a substantive matter.
Nor is such procedural dependence of liabilities in any way a unique feature of ordinary con-
tract law. Such dependence of liabilities, through counterclaim, recoupment, or setoff, appears to
apply equally under the traditional dual-relationship conception of a lease as both a contract and
a conveyance. The matter is discussed in greater detail infra text accompanying notes 296.313.
291. Corbin recognized the clumsiness of contract theories in dealing with problems of this
type: "It is obvious that in cases in which a breach occurred in the course of performance a just
solution cannot be reached by sole dependence on the methodology of conditions, whether they be
described as express, implied or constructive." A. CORBIN, supra note 104, at 163. This thoughtful
reflection is in stark contrast to the facile insouciance with which some have tried to import half-
truth contract notions into the law of landlord and tenant.
292. This statement does not mean that, overall, leases are treated as ordinary contracts. If
they were, for example, the landlord's obligation to allow occupancy would likewise be eventually
excused by the tenant's chronic failure to pay rent. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 274-76,
269 comment a (1932); ef Plotnick v. Pennsylvania Smelting & Ref. Co., 194 F.2d 859 (3d Cir.
1952); Harton v. Hildebrand, 230 Pa. 335, 79 A. 571 (1911); Pelletier v. Masse, 49 R.I. 408, 143 A.
609 (1928). See also Farnsworth, supra note 119, at 290-95. To the contrary, under the convey-
ance theory, the tenant is entitled to possession irrespective of payment of rent or other defaults.
See supra text accompanying notes 72-76. This discrepancy is not surprising since the very reason
for creating and the continuing effect of the conveyance theory of leasing is to enhance the protec-
tion given to tenants in their possession over the protection which would be afforded by mere
contractual interests. See supra note 34 & 36 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 275-77 and accompanying text.
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after a material breach.294 Both extinguish the rent obligation, but a
failure to abandon possession prevents both constructive eviction and
rescission for material breach.2 95
3. Making Lease Obligations Effectively Dependent
From the standpoint of policy, it hardly matters whether the so-
called "independence of lease covenants" results from the operation of
the conveyance theory, the rules of contract, or both. It nevertheless
must disappoint the expectations of most tenants if the full obligation
for rent continues even while the landlord is providing considerably
less than the rent was supposed to pay for. Because purporting to treat
leases as ordinary contracts does not provide a suitable analytical
framework for making lease covenants dependent, the question arises
294. See Bennett, supra note 275, at 63-73; Lasar, Landlord and Tenant Reform, 35 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1279 (1960). See also Kulawitz v. Pacific Woodenware & Paper Co., 25 Cal. 2d 664, 155 P.2d
24 (1945). In Kulawitz, the court used an essentially contractual analysis in discussing the land-
lord's material breach of a lease covenant, but concluded with the assertion that a "constructive
eviction" was the result of such breach. Id
295. On a contract theory, any material breach, not merely those breaches which render the
premises untenantable, should justify rescission. On the other hand, it is sometimes said that
abandonment can be justified on a constructive eviction theory only if the landlord's defaults have
resulted in untenantability. See, e.g., Thomas v. Roper, 162 Conn. 343, 294 A.2d 321 (1972);
Masser v. London Operating Co., 106 Fla. 474, 145 So. 79 (1932); Dittman v. McFadden, 159
Okla. 262, 15 P.2d 139 (1932). See also Net Realty Holding Trust v. Nelson, 33 Conn. Super. 22,
358 A.2d 365 (1976); First Wis. Trust Co. v. L. Wiemann Co., 93 Wis. 2d 258, 286 N.W.2d 360
(1980). See generally Bennett, supra note 275, at 63-73. This apparent lack of correspondency
between rescission and constructive eviction might, however, be of relatively little significance.
Because occupancy of tenantable premises is the main advantage bargained for by the tenant, if
the tenant receives this, everything else is more or less incidental. Thus, no breach by the landlord
would be material when the tenant still is in occupancy of tenantable premises. Nevertheless,
there remains the possibility of finding material breaches, short of untenantability, in leases in
which the services component is a comparatively large part of the value promised to the tenant,
especially if the landlord's breach is willful. See O.W. Grun Roofing Constr. Co. v. Cope, 529
S.W.2d 258 (Tex, Civ. App. 1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcrS §§ 241, 242 (1981);
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 275(e) (1932). Thus, a purely contractual theory of leasing might
expand somewhat the number of cases in which a tenant could abandon occupancy and thereby
avoid the obligation for further rent. See Medico-Dental Bldg. Co. v. Horton & Converse, 21 Cal.
2d 411, 132 P.2d 467 (1942) (landlord's breach of covenant not to lease nearby premises to com-
petitor of tenant); University Club v. Deakin, 265 I. 257, 106 N.E. 790 (1914) (same); Hiatt Inv.
Co. v. Buehler, 255 Mo. App. 151, 16 S.W.2d 219 (1929) (same). It should not, however, be
overlooked that such expansion seems to work equally well within the traditional conveyance-
cum-contract conception of leases. In any event, such considerations do not affect the main point
of the present discussion: A purely contractual theory of leasing would not permit extinguishment
of the tenant's rent obligation if the tenant retains possession, and thus a contract theory would
not in that respect represent an advance over the traditional conveyance-cum-contract conception
of leasing.
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whether any analytical basis for such dependence can ever be found or
whether the dependence of lease covenants must be treated as simply
sui generis. Reflecting upon the larger principles of landlord-tenant
law, it appears that a sui generis approach is not necessary. The depen-
dency of lease obligations, in practical effect, can be rationalized ana-
lytically by treating the lease as fundamentally a conveyance to the
tenant of an interest in property.
Even under the traditional lines of conveyance-theory cases, there
have been ways for the tenant to avoid paying the full rent when the
landlord fails to meet the obligations to the tenant. Remember that the
tenant has an action against the landlord to recover damages for the
landlord's breach.2 96 Moreover, depending upon local practice, the
tenant can also assert such rights by set-off, recoupment or counter-
claim in the very action in which the landlord seeks to recover rent.297
As a consequence, although the tenant may technically be obligated to
pay the full rent irrespective of the landlord's breaches, the breaching
landlord would ordinarily not, as a procedural matter, be. able to re-
cover more than a net amount; that is, the overdue rent minus a deduc-
tion for the damages sustained by the tenant.298  This procedural
dependence of liabilities, even under the conveyance theory, detracts
much from the substantive independence of covenants.
Procedural dependence of liabilities alone does not, however, make
the substantive independence of covenants entirely irrelevant.
Problems can still arise if the tenant withholds rent and the breaching
landlord responds by suing not for rent but for possession, by relying
on a statute2 99 or a forfeiture provision3°° in the lease. Even if the ten-
ant counterclaimed for damages in such a suit, the result might be that
296. See supra notes 267 & 288.
297. E.g., Frazier v. Riley, 215 Ala. 517, 111 So. 10 (1926); Selz v. Stafford, 284 111. 610, 120
N.E. 462 (1918); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65
(Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Thompson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Durant Land Improvement Co., 144 N.Y.
34,39 N.E. 7 (1894); Cooke v. Soule, 56 N.Y. 420 (1874); Dittman v. McFadden, 159 Okla. 262, 15
P.2d 139 (1932); Graham Hotel Co. v. Garrett, 33 S.W.2d 522 ('ex. Civ. App. 1930); Teller v.
McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114 (W. Va. 1978). See also R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 17, at 114 n.60;
Siegel, supra note 11, at 666-70; Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 446, 476-79 (1953). It may occur, however,
that a court, in its discretion, will defer trying the counterclaim, thereby resulting in an initial
judgment against the tenant for the full rent. See Chelsea Hotel Co. v. Gelles, 129 N.J.L. 102, 28
A.2d 172 (1942).
298. See supra note 297.
299. See supra note 79.
300. See supra text accompanying notes 74-78.
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the tenant would leave the court with a handful of money but no place
to live. If, under the lease or an applicable statute, the tenant could not
present offsetting claims in dispossession proceedings,30' the tenant
might be evicted for failing to pay an amount that the landlord could
never lawfully collect anyway. In ordering the eviction despite the
landlord's breach and attendant liability, the court would be resolving
only half the controversy. One would not expect that deciding only
half a controversy would produce a just result.
One way to avoid this problem is by resort to fictions. It has been
held, for example, that there is no failure to pay rents when the tenant
has "paid them by sustaining damages as the result of [the landlord's]
failure to repair."30 2 Other cases, similar in approach, simply give sub-
stantive significance to the procedural dependence of liabilities by fiat,
holding that the tenant's rent obligations are deemed met, for purposes
of forfeiture, once the tenant pays at least the actual net liability to the
landlord. 0 3 It would be satisfying, however, to find a rationale for al-
lowing tenants in occupancy to withhold rents without resorting to
fictions or fiats. Somewhat surprisingly, the traditional common-law
conveyance conception of leasing transactions seems not merely to per-
mit, but perhaps even to require the conclusion that the tenant's net
301. See Interstate Restatements v. Halsa Corp., 300 A.2d 108 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972); Johnson
v. Haynes, 330 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1959). Compare Reaume v. Brennan, 299 Mich. 305, 300 N.W. 97
(1941) with Rome v. Walker, 38 Mich. App. 458, 196 N.W.2d 850 (1972). See also Siegel, supra
note 11, at 668-70. There is no constitutional requirement that the tenant be permitted to present
such offsetting claims in eviction proceedings. See Lindsey v. Normat, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
302. See Ashmore v. Hays, 159 Ark. 234, 240, 252 S.W. 11, 12 (1923); accord Jack Spring, Inc.
v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972).
303. This method of dealing with a landlord's breaches does not seem at odds with the com-
mon-law conception of reserved rents, that is, that rent is a reserved property right entitling the
landlord to a portion of benefits which inure initially to the tenant and that such reserved benefits
may be "recouped" from the tenant in the recuperatory action of debt. See supra text accompany-
mg notes 57-71. The parties could always expressly make the tenant's obligation to pay the re-
served rents subject to an express condition of performance by the landlord. Budget Way
Cleaners & Laundry v. Simon, 311 P.2d 591 (Cal. App. 1957); 6 S. WILLISTON, supra note 24, at
§ 890A. Additionally, the rationale may be given that, in modem circumstances, such a limitation
on the recoverability of reserved rents must be implied in fact as the proper interpretation of the
parties' reasonable expectations. See Brady v. Brady, 140 Md. 403, 408, 117 A. 882, 884-85 (1922).
The trouble with this implied contract theory is that it makes dependency of lease obligations
vulnerable to express language of the lease prohibiting the tenant from suspending or withholding
any part of the rent. If, however, the lease is regarded as a conveyance, an analytical basis exists
for achieving the desired result despite such express language. See infra text accompanying notes
304-13.
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lihbility to the landlord is all that must be paid 'for the tenant to retain
possession.
Because the traditional conception views the tenant as having a prop-
erty right to possession,3° enforcement of a forfeiture for nonpayment
means that a property right, in this case -the tenant's estate, must be
terminated. Forfeiture by a leasehold tenant is not, in other words, a
case of merely refusing to enforce a contract at the behest of the party
(the tenant) in default a.30  This distinction between property rights and
contract rights appears to be substantively important. The difference
lies in the different treatment of express conditions on mere contractual
rights when compared with the treatment of conditions30 6 on estates in
land. The difference may be summarized as follows: An express condi-
tion on a contractual right must be strictly or literally complied with or
the contract right is forfeited.30 7 By contrast, conditions on estates do
304. See supra text accompanying notes 47-56.
305. As a contract matter, eviction for nonpayment of rent would be the concurrent-conditions
counterpart of rent withholding for nonprovision of services or occupancy. See supra notes 269 &
278 and accompanying text. Of course, in cases of rent withholding, the tenant's nonperformance
is generally precipitated by the landlord's breach in failing to provide services, that is, both parties
have at least partially failed to perform. In cases of bilateral breach, ordinary contract law would
generally hold the fault to lie with the party (here the landlord) who committed the first material
breach. Farnsworth, supra note 119, at 285-86. As previously demonstrated, however, if the non-
breaching party decides to continue accepting benefits under the partially breached contract, that
nonbreaching party waives the excuse for his own nonperformance; therefore, in a purely contrac-
tual treatment of leases, the landlord's initial breach would be, for present purposes, irrelevant.
See supra text accompanying notes 278-91. The tenant's nonpayment would count as the first
material breach and, hence, the tenant's occupancy rights would be susceptible to forfeiture.
306. Conditions on the leasehold estate must be express because conditions that the tenant
perform are not implied in leases. See supra text accompanying notes 72-82. Accordingly, the
comparison in the text is between express conditions in contracts and express conditions on es-
tates.
Although the discussion in the text is in terms of "conditions" as distinguished from conditional
limitations, see supra note 76, the discussion should equally apply, under traditional rules, to relief
of forfeitures occasioned under the conditional limitation device. See Erskine v. Board of Re-
gents, 170 Neb. 660, 104 N.W.2d 285 (1961); Hare v. Elms, 1 Q.B. 604 (1893); Taylor v. Knight, 22
Eng. Rep. 208 (Ch. 1725); 3 J. STORY, EQuiTY JURISPRUDENCE § 1736 (14th ed. 1918); 2 W.
WALSH, supra note 76, at § 193; but see First Nat'l Stores, Inc. v. Yellowstone Shopping Center,
Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 630,237 N.E.2d 868, 290 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1968); Dunham, Possibilty of Reverer and
Powers of Termination-Fraternal or Identical Twins, 20 U. CH. L. REv. 215, 225-29 (1953);
Humbach, supra note 77, at 290-91.
Statutory forfeiture may also be relieved. Such relief is ultimately a matter of statutory inter-
pretation, however, and is therefore not directly germane to the common-law conception of leases
or the analytical workings of the common law rules. See R. SCHOSmNSKI, supra note 17, at 394-
99.
307. E.g., Luttinger v. Rosen, 164 Conn. 45,316 A.2d 757 (1972); Metz v. Heflin, 235 Md. 550,
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not generally result in forfeiture so long as either (1) there is substantial
compliance with the condition,"' or (2) the failure of compliance, espe-
cially in cases of payment conditions, is fully compensable and com-
pensated.3°9 The latter basis for relieving forfeitures of estates is, of
course, merely a special case of substantial compliance.310
To be sure, courts dislike forfeitures of both estate and contract
rights, and have resorted to a number of devices, such as strict interpre-
201 A.2d 802 (1964) (a condition "means what it literally says"); Gray v. Gardner, 17 Mass. 188
(1821); Kindervater v. Motorists Casualty Ins. Co., 120 N.J.L. 373, 199 A. 606 (1938); 5 S. WILLIS-
TON, supra note 24, at § 675; Ballantine, Forfeiturefor Breach of Contract, 5 MINN. L. REv. 329,
341-52 (1921).
308. Eg., Lasiter v. Town of Oxford, 234 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1956); Stewart v. Weaver, 264 Ala.
236, 87 So. 2d 548 (1956); Erskine v. Board of Regents, 170 Neb. 660, 104 N.W.2d 285 (1968);
Brooks v. Kimball County, 127 Neb. 645, 256 N.W. 501 (1934); Rose v. Hawley, 118 N.Y. 502,23
N.E. 904 (1890); St. Clara College v. City of Madison, 250 Wis. 538, 27 N.W.2d 745 (1947). See
also Fowler v. Coates, 201 N.Y. 257, 94 N.E. 987 (1911).
309. See, e.g., Noyes v. Anderson, 124 N.Y. 175, 26 N.E. 319 (1891); Henry v. Tupper, 29 Vt
358 (1857); Donnelly v. Eastes, 94 Wis. 390, 69 N.W. 157 (1896). See also cases cited infra note
313 which, though involving lease forfeitures, invoke the estate character of leaseholds in reaching
their results. Leaseholds are, of course, far more likely than freehold estates to carry forfeiture
possibilities based upon conditions of payment because leaseholds normally are conveyed in ex-
change for rents while freeholds are not. Therefore, it is to be expected that the rules concerning
forfeitability of estates would most often find application in the leasehold context.
Apparently, it was by easy analogy to the rules applicable to mortgages that equity began reliev-
ing against payment-default forfeitures of leasehold estates. Sanders v. Pope, 33 Eng. Rep. 108
(Ch. 1806); Northcote v. Duke, 27 Eng. Rep. 330 (Ch. 1765); Hack v. Leonard, 88 Eng. Rep. 335
(Ch. 1724); see also Wafer v. Mocato, 88 Eng. Rep. 348 (Ch. 1724). The theory seems to have
been that payment-default forfeitures were intended "as a mere security," see Cedrom Coal Co. v.
Moss, 230 Ala. 32, 39, 159 So. 225, 227 (1935); 1 A.L.P., supra note 17, at § 3.96, and that the
secured party received what he bargained for once the secured payment was made. Maginnis v.
Knickerbocker Ice Co., 112 Wis. 385, 394, 88 N.W. 300, 302-03 (1901). Consonant with the view
that payment-default forfeitures are intended as security, occasional dicta to the effect that relief is
not available for willful defaults, e.g., Molyneaux v. Town House, 195 A.2d 744 (D.C. Ct. App.
1963); Noyes v. Anderson, 124 N.Y. 175, 26 N.E. 319 (1891); but cf. Henry v. Tupper, 29 Vt. 358
(1857), should probably not be read to mean anything more than that general equitable principles
apply. Molyneaux v. Town House, 195 A.2d 744 (D.C. Ct. App. 1963); see also Smith v. Warren
Petroleum Corp., 126 A.2d 152 (D.C. Mun. App. 1956); Trans-Lux Radio City Corp. v. Service
Parking Corp., 54 A.2d 144 (D.C. Mun. App. 1947). Rent withholding by a tenant as a response to
landlord defaults,,though a technical breach of the tenant's duties, hardly seems to be the sort of
aggravated nonperformance to which the willful-default concept is directed.
310. Interestingly, the treatment of express conditions on estates, though quite different from
that of express contractual conditions, appears to be quite close to the treatment of constructive,
implied-in-law conditions in contracts, namely, both are subject to a substantial performance test
as contrasted with the literal compliance test applicable to express contractual conditions. See
Wilson v. Gait, 18 Ill. 431, 437 (1857); supra note 278. For a striking comparison of express
conditions on estates and express contractual conditions, see the very lease-like facts of the "li-
cense" case, Kama Rippa Music v. Schekeryk, 510 F.2d 837, 843-44 (2d Cir. 1975).
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tation, waiver, and estoppel, for avoiding forfeitures. 31 ' These avoid-
ance devices obscure the contours of forfeiture enforceability overall
and, hence, make it difficult to compare directly the difference in treat-
ment of express contractual conditions with conditions on estates. Nev-
ertheless, the clear difference in the points of departure for the two
kinds of conditions is illuminating. It seems fair to conclude that, on
the whole, having a property right to possession almost certainly places
the tenant in a significantly more favorable position with respect to for-
feiture than if leases were viewed as purely contractual. That is, the
tenant is better off as owner than as a mere promisee of occupancy. 3 2
In view of the traditional reticence to enforce forfeitures of estates
despite a degree of noncompliance with an express condition, it may
be concluded that rent-withholding seldom if ever should ipso facto
result in an eviction from possession. For even when the nonpayment
of rent is expressly made an event of forfeiture under the lease, relief
from the forfeiture would be available under traditional property prin-
ciples if the tenant is willing to pay whatever net amount is due the
311. See, e.g., Thomas J. Dyer Co. v. Bishop Int'l Eng'g Co., 308 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1962)
(strict construction; contract); Board of Comm'rs v. Russell, 174 F.2d 778 (10th Cir. 1949) (strict
construction; estate); Southern Sur. Co. v. MacMillan Co., 58 F.2d 541 (10th Cir. 1932) (strict
construction; contract); Jeffries v. State ex rel Woodruff County, 216 Ark. 657, 226 S.W.2d 810
(1950) (waiver and estoppel; estate); Clark v. West, 193 N.Y. 349, 86 N.E. 1 (1908) (waiver;, con-
tract); Berryman v. Shumaker, 67 Tex. 312, 3 S.W. 46, (1887) (waiver; estate); Santa Clara College
v. City of Madison, 250 Wis. 538, 27 N.W.2d 745 (1947) (strict construction; estate); Carop v City
of Casper, 66 Wyo. 437, 213 P.2d 263 (1950) (same). See Dunham, supra note 306, at 225-29;
Goldstein, Rights ofEntry and Possibilities of Reverter as Devices to Restrict the Use of Land, 54
HARV. L. REV. 248 (1940).
312. There appears to be some convergence of the treatment of contractual and estate condi-
tions as courts move to mitigate, in a wider range of cases, the harshness of unambiguous but
draconian express conditions in contracts. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Family Dining, 426 F.
Supp. 485 (E.D. Pa. 1977), af'd, 566 F.2d 1168 (3d Cir. 1977); Wortman v. Jessen, 183 Neb. 274,
159 N.W.2d 564 (1968). A broad reading of the Second Restatement of Contracts would make the
convergence practically complete, assuming such a broad reading truly restates the law. The Re-
statement would excuse any condition which is not "a material part of the agreed exchange" if the
condition would cause "disproportionate forfeiture." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 229 (1981). By contrast, the First Restatement would relieve only an "extreme [instead of a
merely "disproportionate"] forfeiture or penalty." RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 302(a) (1932)
(emphasis added). Nevertheless, the treatment of express contractual conditions does not seem to
have yet merged with the doctrine of substantial performance applicable to constructive, implied-
in-law conditions. Kama Rippa Music v. Schekeryk, 510 F.2d 837, 843-44 (2d Cir. 1975); Della
Ratta, Inc. v. American Better Community Dev., 38 Md. App. 119, 132-40, 380 A.2d 627, 636-39
(1977); Farnsworth, supra note 119, at 267. See supra notes 278 & 310. Accordingly, forfeitures
by express contractual conditions appear more likely to be enforced than forfeitures under express
conditions on estates.
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landlord. t3
By viewing leases as conveyance-cum-contract transactions, and ap-
plying the usual property, contract, and procedural principles to that
traditional conception, it can be seen that: (1) the landlord in default
cannot recover the full rent but only, at most, the amount of rent minus
the damages sustained by the tenant, and (2) no forfeiture for nonpay-
ment of the full rent should be enforced if payment by the tenant of all
net liabilities is made, thus compensating the landlord in full.
That is to say, under the traditional rules, lease obligations are effec-
tively dependent. It is true that under the conveyance-cum-contract
analysis, as under "purely" contractual analysis, the tenant's gross rent
obligation would technically still be regarded as owing despite breaches
by the landlord. This technical gross-rent obligation usually should
have no ultimate significance, however, because only the net amount
due after deduction of damages should be recoverable or the predicate
of an enforceable forfeiture. Accordingly, to be consistent with the
view that a lease is a conveyance and not merely an ordinary contract,
the tenant's duty to pay rent must be held, as a practical matter, condi-
tional on the performance by the landlord of the landlord's obligations.
Holdings to the contrary appear to be a misapplication of the tradi-
tional rules.
V. DOES THE CONVEYANCE THEORY HAVE A PLACE?
The traditional common-law conception of leases as conveyances re-
cently has been viewed by courts and commentators as an obstacle to
reform.31a A contract theory of leasing has been suggested as prefera-
ble.315 Within the common-law conception of leasing, however, three
313. Eg., Humphrey v. Humphrey, 254 Ala. 395, 48 So. 2d 424 (1950); Cedrom Coal Co. v.
Moss, 230 Ala. 32, 159 So. 225 (1935); Thompson v. Coe, 96 Conn. 644, 115 A. 219 (1921);
Branmar Theatre Co. v. Branmar, Inc., 264 A.2d 526 (Del. Ch. 1970); Famous Permanent Wave
Shops, Inc. v. Smith, 302 Ill. App. 178, 23 N.E.2d 767 (1939); Farmer v. Pitts, 108 Neb. 9, 187
N.W. 95 (1922); Income Properties Inv. Co. v. Trefethen, 155 Wash. 493, 284 P. 782 (1939); 1
A.L.P. § 3.96. Thie matter of relief from forfeitures is discussed at length in Humbach, supra note
77, at 266-88.
A variation of the approach described in the text is for the tenant to seek an injunction against
the landlord's maintenance of dispossession proceedings, pending resolution of the parties' money
disputes. See Thompson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Durant Land Improvement Co., 144 N.Y. 34, 39
N.E. 7 (1894).
314. See supra notes 11, 115-18 & 238 and text accompanying notes 11-14, 115-18, 229-30 &
268-69.
315. See supra note 314.
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important reforms can be understood and analytically accounted for,316
Moreover, it has been demonstrated that contract principles, at least
ordinary contract principles, may be even less conducive to the desired
reforms than the traditional conveyance-cum-contract conception.3 t7
Resort to a contract theory of leasing can be criticized for its flawed
understanding of contract law and for its nonrecognition of certain fac-
tual realities and interpretational consequences which would rational-
ize results under the conveyance approach. Nevertheless, the question
may be raised: What purpose is served in retaining an essentially con-
veyance conception of leasing transactions? Why not simply regard
leases as a type of contract and create for leases a special contract law
which avoids application of certain ordinary contract rules that are an-
tagonistic to modem policy objectives?
To be sure, the choice of a conceptual paradigm for leases has no
real ontological foundation; it cannot be said that leases are "really"
conveyances, in their essence, as distinguished from pure contracts.
Nor can it be said that leases are really, in their essence, contracts.
Leases have no verifiable reality of this sort, beyond what courts and
legislatures choose to posit.
The choice made by common-law courts, at least since the late
fifteenth century, has been to conceive of leases as fundamentally con-
veyances of property.3 8 The rationale for this choice-to better protect
the tenant's possession3 19-- was essentially functional. Further, this
functional rationale for the conveyance conception still seems to be ap-
plicable. No one suggests that the tenant's possessory right be demoted
to an ordinary contract right terminable on payment of damages, 320
316. The three are: (i) limiting aggrieved landlords' recoveries by deduction of mitigatable
damages, see supra text accompanying notes 212-18, (ii) making landlords responsible for the
condition of residential premises, see supra text accompanying notes 225-61, and (iii) achieving
practical dependence of lease obligations so as to permit rent withholding by a tenant in occu-
pancy when the landlord defaults, see supra text accompanying notes 295-313.
317. See supra text accompanying notes 201-12, 245-61 & 278-95.
318. See supra note 15 and text accompanying notes 23-56.
319. See supra note 15 and text accompanying notes 32-37.
320. Compare Golde Clothes Shop v. Loew's Buffalo Theatres, 236 N.Y. 465, 141 N.E. 917
(1923) (ejectment by tenant against landlord) with Marrone v. Washington Jockey Club, 227 US.
633 (1913) (license contract provides only a revocable permission) and RESTATEMENT OF PROP-
ERTY § 519 comment b (1944) (same).
It is the tenant's specifically enforceable superior claim to possession for a prescribed duration
that makes the tenant an "owner" and the lease a "conveyance." See supra note 15 and text
accompanying notes 23-56. To extract the conveyance component and leave the lease a mere
"continuous interchange of values," see supra note 48, it seemingly would be necessary to confine
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relatively unprotected as against third parties,3 21 and probably more
susceptible to forfeiture for breach of express conditions.322 It is true
that the protection of possession is not the urgent issue that it once was
in landlord-tenant law, having been eclipsed by concerns more press-
ing. This fact should be taken, however, as evidence of the success of
the conveyance conception rather than of its obsolescence.323
Function thus remains the most compelling basis for viewing leases
as conveyances. Strong arguments of convenience suggest that the law
should provide the possibility of creating specifically enforceable tem-
porary entitlements to the exclusive control of areas of land, volumes of
space, and fixtures. There is a place for legal interests in land, space
and fixtures which are less ephemeral than a license and less enduring
than a fee simple. Leases are used to fill that place.
Though leases function as devices for allocating control of land,
space, and fixtures, they would not, of course, have to be conceived of
as conveyances. A kind of contractually based, specifically enforcea-
ble license could be devised which would serve the purposes and pro-
vide the protections sought and achieved in leasing transactions.324 If
the characteristics of such a device were assembled into a conception,
however, it is doubtful that the result would be functionally distin-
guishable from the common-law conception of conveyance. Insofar as
leases are intended by their parties as devices for allocating exclusive
control of land, space, and fixtures, courts will tend to carry out that
intention. Thus, even if the conveyance model were rejected as a guide,
its functional similarity to leasing, as a control allocating device, would
cause it to be replicated, or nearly so, in point of fact. To deny that
leases are conveyances in such circumstances, and to insist on labelling
them as mere contracts, is logomachy.3 25
the dispossessed tenant to the substitutionary remedy of damages. For so long as the law commits
itself to preserve the tenant's possession in specie, the landlord in leasing does more than just
promise possession; possession is conveyed.
321. See supra notes 32 & 96-98 and accompanying text.
322. See supra text accompanying notes 304-12.
323. The problems of habitability and securing landlords' services in general have received
most of the recent attention, but courts are probably more alert than ever to preserve tenants'
possession as well. See, e.g., Robinson v. Diamond Hous. Corp., 463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(seminal case on retaliatory eviction); Sy Jack Realty Co. v. Pergament Syosset Corp., 27 N.Y.2d
449, 267 N.E.2d 462, 318 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1971) (preserving renewal rights); see also Humbach,
supra note 77, at 274-333; supra text accompanying notes 295-313.
324. See supra notes 30-31.
325. See supra note 320.
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A consistent conception of comparable interests and transactions is
no mere aesthetic concern. It is practically indispensable to the even
application and predictability of the law. It is true that the implications
and dictates of conceptions should never supplant the exogenously de-
termined purposes and policies of the law. Ultimately, only the latter
are legitimate bases for decisions. Nevertheless, as embodiments of
purpose and policy, conceptions have more than met the test of utility
as convenient bases for deciding new cases falling within the law's in-
terstices. Moreover, without the logical coherence which conceptions
supply, law could be little more than a hodgepodge of ad hoc do's and
don'ts. The taxonomic framework of conceptions and doctrine is prac-
tically indispensable to the goal of treating similar cases similarly, dis-
tinctive cases distinctively and, in general, achieving equality under the
law.
Thus, at an ontological level, the choice of conceptual paradigm,
conveyance or contract, may be trivial. As a matter of practical meth-
odology, however, it could hardly be more critical. To be sure, logical
purity in law is not an end in itself; but chaos is the opposite of coher-
ence and the enemy of justice. Therefore, the coherent development of
law, especially in areas needing change, is more than worth the effort.
Retaining the common-law conception of leasing, especially in cases
introducing reform, remains the best way to assure the coherent devel-
opment of law.
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